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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides a contribution to the analysis of the link between monetary 
policy and financial markets. It does so by combining elements from the finance 
and economics literature and developing areas of intersection which, to some ex- 
tent, have been evolving in a rather autonomous manner. The thesis takes an 
empirical perspective and examines three main issues. The first regards the mod- 
elling of the short-term interest rate where models are presented that integrate 
finance contributions with the literature on monetary policy rules. The chapter 
concludes that there are non-linearities in the short-rate process and these are re- 
lated to macroeconomic factors in a way consistent with a monetary policy rule. A 
second essay deals with the effect of monetary policy announcements, improving 
on previous contributions by extending the investigation to a broader set of instru- 
ments and using multivariate models of volatility to capture in a better way the 
complex interactions between monetary policy and financial markets. The issue 
of the endogeneity of monetary policy is also a main concern in the final essay of 
the thesis which examines the contribution of monetary policy shocks in explain- 
ing fluctuations in real stock prices in the G7. In this chapter, it is argued that 
previous approaches may suffer from an omitted variables problem. By includ- 
ing a minimum set of variables both for identifying monetary policy shocks and 
explaining real stock prices, the study concludes that monetary policy may make 
a stronger contribution to stock price fluctuations than what is usually found in 
similar studies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Financial markets play an important role for monetary policy. Financial market 
prices reflect expectations regarding the macroeconomy. As a result, financial 
market reactions to monetary policy decisions can reveal useful information for 
central banks, yielding indications about the market's perception of the outcome of 
their policies. In addition, financial markets, by providing intermediation between 
lenders and borrowers of funds play an important role in the functioning of the 
economy. In fact, monetary policy operates via the financial markets, with the 
central bank ultimately trying to influence the cost of money. Financial assets also 
constitute an important component of wealth and changes in wealth may have 
real effects. Thus, financial market reactions to monetary policy decisions can 
potentially have powerful effects on the state of the economy. 
Against this background, there appears to be a demand for a deep investigation 
of the links between monetary policy and financial markets. For many years this 
has been a topic, primarily in the finance literature. However, in many respects, 
the methodology used in the finance literature has differed from the one used in 
monetary economics research and the converse is also true. 
This thesis provides three essays on the relation between monetary policy and 
financial markets. A common feature of the three parts is the aim of providing a 
unifying approach, bridging contributions from the monetary economics literature 
with those from the finance literature. The main purpose is to test whether omis- 
sions in each approach of elements contained in the other can affect the conclusions 
regarding the way monetary policy influences financial markets. 
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The first essay of the thesis looks at the modelling of the short-term interest 
rate in a non-linear framework. The essay begins by distinguishing monetary eco- 
nomics from finance literature contributions. The former tend to be more focused 
on explaining the behaviour of the central bank in relation to a set of macro- 
economic variables while the latter attempt to arrive at models that describe the 
empirical behaviour of the short-term interest rate and its volatility but rarely take 
macroeconomic information into account. 
In this thesis a further approach is proposed that helps to bring into finance 
models contributions linked to the literature on monetary policy rules. The idea 
is to use regime switching models where the behaviour of the short-rate in each 
regime is defined in terms of a simple model with little or no structure, as as- 
sumed in mainstream finance models, while the probability distribution of the 
short-rate depends on macro variables. This is likely to lead to more realistic mod- 
els that might perform better in explaining the systematic behaviour of money 
market short-term interest rates. The general approach is quite flexible and can 
easily accommodate modifications including features related to the functioning of 
the money market and the characteristics of the monetary policy implementation 
process. 
Other questions posed in this part are whether the process of the short-rate cor- 
responds to a random walk when interest rates are low and only displays mean re- 
version when interest rates are high, as previous approaches using regime-switching 
but excluding macro influences have concluded. Also of interest is to investigate 
whether the usual finding in finance studies that the volatility of the short-rate is 
a function of the level of the rate still holds in these extended models. 
The chapter deals only with univariate models of the short-term interest rate. 
It shows how the above models can be specified in the context of Markov Switching 
models as put forward by Hamilton (1994) or in other type of non-linear models 
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such as Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) models or Smooth Transition Autoregres- 
sive (STAR) models. 
In the MRS model, monetary policy considerations are included by specifying 
the transition probabilities between the states as a function of the output gap and 
inflation. The macroeconomic variables determine the probability of the interest 
rate following a specific process but not the process it is following in each regime. 
This allows for the use of finance models conditional on a specific regime while at 
the same time making them a function of macroeconomic developments. In TAR 
models, a monetary policy rule and a threshold determine the process followed by 
the short-term interest rate while in STAR models there is a smooth function that 
weights the two regimes and which depends on monetary policy. 
An application to Germany and the US it is shown that there is evidence that 
the models fit the data well, even though the results for the STAR models are 
not very favourable. The thesis also shows that the models can be used to date 
monetary policy regimes. 
While the first essay can be seen as being mainly concerned with explaining the 
systematic behaviour of monetary policy, the second and third essays are about 
the effect of the non-systematic component of monetary policy, or the so-called 
"monetary policy shocks", on financial markets. A main issue in these studies is 
how to overcome the difficulty posed by the endogeneity of monetary policy and 
financial market prices, i. e. the fact that financial market prices and the macro- 
economic developments observed by the researcher reflect the effects of monetary 
policy decisions and that these in turn have been taken in response to economic 
and financial developments. This problem is very much mitigated in the modelling 
of the short-term rate in the first essay, given its close proximity with the instru- 
ment of monetary policy. However, given that the second and third essays look 
at assets far disconnected from the policy instrument, such assumption cannot be 
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made. Thus, it is necessary to use a methodology that can account for such en- 
dogeneity to identify appropriately monetary policy shocks. In the second essay 
on announcement effects of monetary policy, monetary policy shocks are identified 
by using data from Federal Funds futures while in the final essay monetary policy 
shocks are derived from Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models. These options re- 
flect the different length of the time periods analysed and the limitations in terms 
of data availability. 
There are two main differences between these two last essays. A first one is 
the different frequency used in the analysis, with the second essay looking at an- 
nouncement effects using high frequency data (daily) while the third essay uses low 
frequency data (quarterly). In this sense, there is some complementarity between 
these two parts. A second difference is that the second essay looks at several seg- 
ments of the financial markets (bond yields, the exchange rate, stock prices) while 
the third essay focuses on the effect of monetary policy on stock prices only. 
The main contribution of the second essay is to provide a systematic character- 
isation of the responses of several financial variables to monetary policy announce- 
ments including and excluding the possibility of volatility spillovers between the 
several assets. 
The main interest in testing for announcement effects is that, in principle, cen- 
tral banks decisions should have little effect on financial markets. Strong financial 
market reactions could be due to a lack of transparency, even though it is argued 
that there is not a direct link between transparency and predictability of central 
bank decisions. Nevertheless, finding evidence of announcement effects could be a 
sign that there is room for improvement in the communication of monetary policy 
decisions to the markets. 
A further motivation for studying announcement effects of monetary policy is 
to improve the understanding of the behaviour of financial asset returns and their 
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volatility, which is a central issue in financial economics. The fact that central 
bank meetings are held at irregular intervals implies that announcement effects 
in financial markets should also tend to occur at unequal periods. Knowledge of 
such effects can be used to improve existing models of financial asset returns or 
volatility. 
The second essay also contains a high frequency investigation of whether the 
central bank has an informational advantage relative to financial markets regarding 
inflation developments. The existence of an informational advantage implies that 
monetary policy decisions may reveal information on inflation, thereby causing 
adjustments in financial market prices when they are announced. So far, tests 
of this hypothesis have been done mainly with lower frequency data on inflation 
expectations. This essay extends the research on this issue by using high frequency 
data on inflation expectations in the US derived from index-linked bonds, which 
also allows for testing the effect of monetary policy announcements on the volatility 
of inflation expectations. 
The essay relies on models including LARCH effects and also deterministic 
components accounting for day-of-the-week or holiday effects. In some of the pre- 
vious studies heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors have been used instead 
of the explicit modelling of volatility. However, the finding that there are calendar 
effects and especially that there are volatility spillovers between different finan- 
cial assets advises in favour of a more detailed modelling of financial asset price 
volatility as done in this dissertation. 
The second essay uses both univariate and multivariate methods. The univari- 
ate models are more detailed in the treatment of the calendar effects. However, a 
limitation of the use of univariate GARCH models is that, despite their flexibility, 
they do not take into account the possibility of shocks or volatility spillovers from 
other assets due, for instance, to cross-market hedging. Therefore, announcement 
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effects of monetary policy on the volatility of financial asset prices are also tested 
by making use of a multivariate GARCH model, including stock returns, bond 
yields and the exchange rate. The chapter shows that the multivariate approach 
should be seen as complementary to the univariate approach, given that there is 
a "dimensionality curse" in multivariate GARCH models that makes them less 
flexible to capture effects commonly observed in financial markets such as day-of- 
the-week effects or holiday effects. Thus, it is argued that both approaches can 
provide valid indications as to the effect of monetary policy on financial markets. 
The last essay investigates to what extent monetary policy can account for 
fluctuations in real stock prices. The methodology relies on structural Vector Au- 
toregression (VAR) models for the G7 countries (United States, United Kingdom, 
Japan, Canada, Germany, France and Italy). Past studies have generally concluded 
that monetary policy accounts for only a small part of stock price fluctuations. 
However, this contrasts with the importance usually attributed to central banks in 
the economy, namely in terms of their contribution for maintaining price stability, 
or more generally, for improving the functioning of the economy and promoting 
economic growth. Thus, the question is posed whether the weak contribution of 
monetary policy found in previous studies is due to the omission of relevant in- 
formation from the VARs used, both for identifying monetary policy shocks or for 
describing stock price developments. 
In particular, models used to study the link between monetary policy and stock 
markets frequently do not contain a sufficiently large set of variables for the system 
to be considered a realistic description of the information set available to policy 
makers. As a result, monetary policy shocks estimated from such models may not 
be fully representative of the "true" monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, some 
approaches include very few variables to account for the systematic behaviour of 
stock prices. In fact, several studies ignore variables, such as the dividend yield or 
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the price-earnings ratio, that are part of standard finance models of stock prices. 
Thus, one contribution of this study is to conduct an investigation including a 
minimum set of variables that are likely to be part of a typical reaction function 
of a central bank and that can explain stock price behaviour. The results of this 
third essay suggest that monetary policy may be more important in explaining 
stock price fluctuations than some other studies including more limited information 
have concluded. 
The dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents non-linear models 
of the short rate including monetary policy behaviour. It starts by comparing the 
empirical models of the short-term interest rate in the monetary economics and in 
the finance literature, highlighting their differences. Then it is shown how Markov 
Regime Switching and Threshold models can be specified including macroeconomic 
factors. Finally, there is an empirical application to Germany and the US. Chapter 
3 presents an analysis of the "announcement effects" of monetary policy in the US. 
First, the literature on announcement effects is reviewed, with a breakdown by as- 
set (long-term government bonds, equity and the exchange rate) and a distinction 
made between announcement effects on the return of the assets and those on fi- 
nancial market volatility. After specifying univariate GARCH models appropriate 
for testing announcement effects, these are applied to US data. In a second step, 
a multivariate GARCH model that takes into account spillover effects between the 
several types of assets is estimated. Finally, the chapter includes an investigation 
of whether there is evidence that US Federal Reserve's announcements contain 
news on inflation. Chapter 4 looks at the link between monetary policy and stock 
returns. Following a theoretical overview, the chapter discusses the issue of identi- 
fication and justifies the reliance on the VAR approach. Then, several benchmark 
models are specified and estimated for the G7 and the corresponding impulse re- 
sponses and variance decompositions are computed. In a second step, the models 
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are extended with the dividend yield and the price-earnings ratio and analysed. 
Finally, the models for France and Italy are reestimated with the German short- 
term interest rate to account for the possible endogeneity of monetary policy in 
those countries. Chapter 5 presents the overall conclusions. 
CHAPTER 2 
Non-linear models of the short-rate and monetary policy 
behaviour 
2.1. Introduction 
In the finance and the economics literature a large number of models of the 
short-term interest rate has been proposed. However, there are clear differences 
in the way the two fields approach the problem. Starting with models from the 
economics field, in the literature on monetary policy rules the short-term interest 
rate is often specified as a function of macroeconomic variables the central bank is 
assumed to react to: 
it = 
,f (Qt) 
+ Et (2.1) 
where it is the short-term rate which is a function (f) of an information set Sit 
containing several variables relevant for monetary policy such as inflation, the 
output gap, monetary aggregates, commodity prices, etc. The summary reaction 
function f is assumed to capture also policymakers' preferences. The term Et is an 
exogenous shock to monetary policy which reflects nonsystematic factors affecting 
monetary policy decisions, such as political factors and the institutional design of 
the central bank. ' 
The approaches in the monetary policy rules literature differ from finance ones 
in that the former usually aim at a structural/ economic explanation of the interest 
rate setting behaviour. Estimating the historical or optimal reaction function of 
'As will be seen in Chapter 3, the identification of monetary policy shocks is useful for the 
analysis of the link between monetary policy and financial markets. 
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the central bank and describing the process through which the central bank arrives 
at its decisions are central issues in this literature. 
By contrast, the finance literature has tended to put more emphasis in arriving 
at a model that best fits the empirical behaviour of the short-term interest rate, 
sometimes using a-theoretical models that are convenient for asset pricing but 
which provide little information on the underlying macroeconomic determinants 
of interest rates. In particular, a lot of attention has been devoted to the mod- 
elling of interest rate volatility, given the important role that this variable plays in 
option pricing since the Black-Scholes (1973) seminal paper. Some finance models 
attempt to capture nonconstancy of volatility over time (such as the autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity models (ARCH) introduced by Engle, 1982) or its 
persistence over time (such as the generalized ARCH models (GARCH) models 
first proposed by Bollerslev, 1986). Other models assume that the volatility of 
the short-rate depends on its level (see Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 1985, or Chan 
et al., 1992). However, most of these models ignore links to monetary policy or 
macroeconomic developments as a source either of the volatility of the short-term 
interest rate or of the other characteristics of its data generating process. Partly, 
this has to do with the fact that, if markets are efficient, then the behaviour of 
the short-term interest rate should already embed this information and therefore 
its past behaviour is sufficient for the purpose of its modelling. 
Nevertheless, given that most central banks implement monetary policy by 
influencing the short-term interest rate, 2 there may be advantages in including 
information related to what determines central bank decisions explicitly in finance 
models. This is likely to lead to more realistic models that might perform better 
in explaining the systematic behaviour of money market short-term interest rates. 
2This point has been emphasised at length by Woodford (2003). 
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One simple way to integrate features from finance models into monetary policy 
rules is to introduce in equations of the type of (2.1) GARCH effects or make the 
variance of Et a function of the level of the interest rate. However, the resulting 
model has the disadvantage that it does not correspond to mainstream asset pricing 
or term-structure finance models that are derived from simpler models of the short- 
rate. Thus, such changes would require that the corresponding asset pricing models 
would have to be developed. 
This thesis pursues an alternative possibility that allows both finance and mon- 
etary economics approaches to be combined while at the same time maintaining 
the basic characteristics of finance models of the short-term interest rate. This 
is implemented by making recourse to regime-switching models where macroeco- 
nomic elements determine the process followed by the short-rate. Such models are 
sufficiently flexible to allow the inclusion of further technical features linked, for 
instance, to the functioning of the operational framework of monetary policy. 
Two main approaches are followed. A first approach relies on a Markov Regime 
Switching (MRS) framework. These models, pioneered by Hamilton (1989), have 
been shown to be useful in modelling short-term interest rates. For instance, Gray 
(1996) has shown that the stylized features of the behaviour of short-term interest 
rates such as GARCH effects can be captured as well by regime switching models. 
A second approach adopts the threshold models of the short-term interest rate 
initially proposed by Tong (1978) and Tong and Lim (1980). Within this second 
approach, Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) and Smooth Transition Autoregressive 
(STAR) models are considered. 
All of the models used in this chapter involve regime switching. This appears 
to be an appropriate choice for incorporating the impact of monetary policy on 
interest rates, given that monetary policy is often seen as subject to changes in 
regime (such as changes in operational procedures and policy instruments, changes 
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in the institutional and political environment, differences in popularity of several 
schools of economic thought, etc. ). 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the finance and eco- 
nomics based approaches to the modeling of the short-term interest rate. Section 
2.3 and section 2.4 propose alternative models of the short-term interest rate which 
incorporate monetary policy considerations. In such models the interest rate is as- 
sumed to follow different regimes over time and monetary policy is a determinant 
factor in defining which regime the interest rate will follow. Finally, section 2.5 
presents an application of the several methods to Germany and the US. 
2.2. Empirical models of the short-term interest rate in the economics 
and finance literature 
2.2.1. Finance models of the short-term interest rate 
A large number of models for the short-term interest rate has been proposed in 
the finance literature. The models of the short-rate are usually associated with 
models of the term-structure of interest rates. Within these, a major distinction 
is between affine and non-affine term-structure models. 
Following Dai and Singleton (2000), affine term structure models are those 
where the instantaneous short rate follows an affine (i. e. linear) function of a 
vector of unobserved state variables (see Annex 2. A for further details). Affine 
term structure models have advantages in computational terms as the log-linear 
dependence of bond yields on risk variables allows, most of the time, the compu- 
tation of closed form expressions for interest rates or, when numerical techniques 
are required, they imply a modest computational burden. 
In the finance literature, single factor affine term structure models have been 
thoroughly studied. The following formulation nests many popular models of the 
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01 02 071 0'2 y 
Vasiceck (1977) 01 
Cox Ingersoll Ross (CIR) (1985) 0 0.5 
Merton (1974) 001 
Pearson-Sun (1994) 0.5 
Table 2.1. Affine models of the short-term interest rate 
short rate of this class: 
drt = (cr' + 02rt)dt +(O'1 + a2rt7)dZt (2.2) 
where rt is the instantaneous spot rate and dZt a standard Wiener process. Table 
2.1 shows the restrictions imposed on the general equation to obtain some popular 
term-structure models. 
One-factor affine term-structure models are simple and tractable but they have 
some disadvantages. In particular, these models have been shown to lack some 
empirical properties to make them appropriate for the modeling of the short-term 
interest rate. For instance, an obvious problem in the Merton (1974) and the 
Vasiceck (1977) models is that the nominal short-term interest rate may become 
negative. In addition, the above models are not flexible in fitting the yield curve as 
they are capable of generating only simple functional forms for the term structure 
of interest rates. For instance, the CIR model allows for just one "hump" in the 
yield curve, while in practice there can be many different functional forms of the 
yield curve. Therefore, several extensions to the affine term-structure models have 
been proposed in the literature. While some of these models would still be in the 
affine class, a growing literature has been devoted to non-affine term structure 
models. 
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al 012 a3 014 6 a1 0'2 0'3 7 
With linear drift 
Brennan-Schwartz (1977) 0 0 0 001 
Dothan (1978) 00 0 0 0 01 
Constantinides-Ingersoll (1984) 00 0 0 0 001.5 
Chan et. al (1992) 0 0 0 0 
Marsh-Rosenfeld (1983) 
Ait-Sahalia (1996) 
Table 2.2 
With a non-linear drift 
00 1-2'y 00 
1 
on-affine term-structure models 
The following equation nests popular non-affine term-structure models with the 
respective restrictions being displayed in Table 2.2. 
t+ 04r-6)dt + 
(a1 + U2rt + a3rt )dZt (2.3) drt = (al + a2rt + a3r2 
Some of the above models have been proposed in order to overcome the em- 
pirical limitations of affine term-structure models. This has been the case of the 
Chan et al. (1992) model, which is based on the authors' empirical findings that 
the volatility of the short rate is a function of the level of interest rates, with a 
parameter 7 higher than 1. 
Empirical findings have also been the basis for the model proposed by Mt- 
Sahalia (1996). On the basis of nonparametric techniques, he found that when the 
short-rate is in the middle of its historical range it is very close to a random walk 
(this has also been argued by Gray, 1996), while when it moves outside that range 
it shows mean reversion. By comparing linear models with the nonparametric 
results he concludes that most of the models of the affine class are not sufficiently 
flexible to capture the behaviour of the short-term rate. He therefore proposes 
the nonlinear model shown in the table that may 
be sufficiently flexible to allow 
the empirical features of the behaviour of the short-rate to 
be captured. In fact, 
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the model is the only one not rejected statistically by Ait-Sahalia (1996). More 
recently Stanton (1997) also found evidence of a nonlinear drift of the short-rate. 
However, the hypothesis that the drift of the short-rate is nonlinear is not gen- 
erally accepted in the literature. For instance, Chapman and Pearson (2000) have 
criticized the findings of Alt-Sahalia and Stanton, showing that the parametric and 
nonparametric estimators used by these authors cannot provide reliable evidence 
of nonlinearity. 
Another class of non-affine term structure models are the Quadratic Term 
Structure Models (QTSM) proposed by Ahn et al. (2002). The authors argue 
that these models are capable of overcoming some of the limitations of affine term 
structure models. A first limitation, as shown by Dai and Singleton (2000), is that 
in order for an affine term structure model to be admissible, it implies nonnegative 
correlations among the state variables. However, according to the findings of Ahn 
et al. (2002) the historical behaviour for the US points to negative correlations 
among the risk factors. In addition, they find that there may be a problem of 
omitted nonlinearity in affine models as the pricing errors of affine term structure 
models appear to be sensitive to the magnitude of the slope of the yield curve and 
be highly persistent. A final issue is that the only affine term structure model 
that guarantees a strictly positive nominal term-structure model is a model where 
all state variables are square root processes. In order to overcome some of these 
shortcomings, Ahn et al. (2002) propose QTSMs, where a quadratic relationship 
between the state variables and the yields (including the short rate) is specified. 
Given their quadratic form, these models allow for strictly positive nominal in- 
terest rates without imposing restrictions on the correlation structure of the state 
variables. This is usually not the case in affine term-structure models. The specifi- 
cation of QTSMs is as follows. The level of the short rate is defined as a quadratic 
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function of the state variables (Y(t)): 
r(t) -c+, Q'Y(t) + Y(t)'WY(t) (2.4) 
where a is a constant, 3 is a N-dimensional vector and ' is aNxN positive 
semidefinite matrix of constants. The restriction is applied in order to ensure the 
nonnegativity of the nominal short-term interest rate. The process followed by the 
short-rate is then: 
dr(t) - [trace(>2P) + 2(µ + ýY(t))'TY(t)] dt + 2Y(t)'WFdW(t) (2.5) 
where E is a N-dimensional square matrix and W (t) a N- dimensional vector of 
standard Wiener processes. Ahn et al. (2002) apply models of this kind to the US. 
They find that although QTSMs capture well conditional expectations of future 
bond yields, they are not able to account for the observed conditional volatility in 
short and medium-term bond yields. 
Another way of improving the models for the short-rate in the finance literature 
has been to introduce jump components which cannot be captured by the assump- 
tion of normality in diffusion models. The reasons for jumps in the behaviour of 
short rates can be related to the intervention of the central bank in the money 
market, to temporary shortages in liquidity in the money market, extreme events 
and day of the week or calendar effects (so-called "anomalies" in asset prices). A 
recent application of these models can be found in Das (2002) who looks at diffu- 
sion models of the short rate with jumps ("surprise elements"). The model used 
by Das is the following: 
drt = k(Ort)dt + crdZt + Jdzr(h) (2.6) 
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where the diffusion for the short-rate is extended with a Poisson process 7r with 
arrival frequency parameter h denoting the number of jumps of size J per year that 
the short-rate may experience and where dZ is a standard Brownian motion. In the 
finance literature, this type of formulation has been originally proposed by Merton 
(1976) in an application to the modeling of stock returns. Das finds overwhelming 
evidence in favour of jumps and concludes that they can explain to some extent 
the findings of nonlinearity of the drift, including, inter alia, those of Alt Sahalia 
(1996). 
This non-exhaustive overview of short-rate models in the finance literature 
shows that the advances in the modelling of the short rate have to a large extent 
been empirically motivated. In this respect, many term structure models contain 
no elements of monetary policy or macro factors, even though it is consensual that 
central banks have a great degree of control over short-term interest rates. In fact, 
as seen in the following section, in the literature on monetary policy rules, the 
short-term interest rate is usually taken as the instrument the central bank uses 
to conduct monetary policy. 
2.2.2. Models for the short-rate in the monetary policy rules literature 
In this section, the mainstream approach to the modelling of the short-term interest 
rate in the monetary policy rules literature is briefly described. In this regard, two 
main approaches can be distinguished. A first one corresponds to rules derived 
from an optimisation problem ("optimal rules") while a second approach has to 
do with simple rules estimated by linking the monetary instrument directly to a 
set of macroeconomic indicators. 
Following the general approach to optimal monetary policy rules outlined in 
Taylor (1999), such rules are usually derived from a model of the economy which 
has as argument an instrument under the control of the central bank. In the case of 
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interest rate rules, this model economy can be written in reduced form as follows: 
yt = A(L, g)yt + B(L, g)it + ut (2.7) 
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, which can be seen as the indicator 
variables that the central bank takes into consideration when deciding on monetary 
policy actions, it is the nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank while 
A(L, g) and B(L, g) are polynomials on the lag operator L and the vector g of 
all the parameters in the rule. Despite the large number of candidate variables to 
include in yt, the literature on monetary policy rules has tended to focus on rules 
including a small set of macroeconomic variables such as the output gap, inflation 
and, less commonly, the exchange rate (see Ball, 1999). Usually, models of the 
economy have forward looking components, but these can be solved out to obtain 
the regression (2-7). 
After determining the reduced form model of the economy, the problem of 
finding the optimal interest rate rule is basically to specify a reaction function: 
it = G(L)yt + p(L)it (2.8) 
where the interest rate rule is a function of the endogenous variables yt plus lagged 
terms of the short-term interest rate in order to capture interest rate smoothing 
by the central bank. In practice, usually only one lag of the short-term interest 
rate is introduced. 
The discussion in the monetary policy rules literature has focused on the deriva- 
tion of the appropriate weights (G(L), p(L)) to attach to each set of variables. In 
the literature these weights are usually determined by minimising a loss function 
which is supposed to be representative of the central bank's preferences. One com- 
monly used loss function is the quadratic loss function which assumes that the 
central bank's objective is to keep the variables it deems important close to their 
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targets and not to allow them to fluctuate very much around the desired levels. 
Focusing on rules which include only output and inflation such loss function can 
be specified as: 
00 
Lt = Et E 6T 
(yt+T 
- y*)2 
TO 
(2.9) 
where y represents variables of interest, y* their desired level, b is a discount rate 
and Et the expectations operator. Then, the problem of the policymaker is to 
choose interest rates (or the monetary policy instrument) in order to minimise the 
discounted value of the expected quadratic deviations of the variables of interest 
from their desired levels. A commonly found loss function in the literature is the 
following (expressed for a single period) : 
Lt = a(7Tt - 7rt)2 + 
b(yt 
- Yt)2 + C(2t - Zt-1)2 
ý2.10ý 
where 7rt and yt represent the annual levels of the inflation rate and real output 
respectively and it is the short-term interest rate, while the asterisk indicates the 
corresponding target or desired levels and a, b and c are parameters representing 
the weights the central bank attaches to each objective. The above equation says 
that the policymaker attempts to minimise the variability of inflation and output 
around their target levels. In addition, central banks are assumed to be averse to 
a high volatility in the policy instrument which is penalised in the loss 
function. 
Another noteworthy feature of the rule is that the target for output or the inflation 
rate may change over time. 
In the literature on monetary policy rules, a great deal of attention has been 
devoted to deriving appropriate weights to attach to the variables on the right 
hand side of the reaction function of the central 
bank (2.8). One possibility is to 
first construct models of the economy which summarise the main characteristics of 
the data, such as a Vector Autoregression. Then, use the 
VAR impulse responses 
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to obtain the stylised facts or the summary responses of the economy to shocks 
and, relying on arguments grounded in economic theory, build structural models of 
the economy that attempt to reproduce these stylised results. Finally, such models 
can be simulated by replacing the nominal interest rate (or the instrument used 
by the central bank) by a monetary policy rule, making the assessment of each 
alternative rule on the basis of the loss function (2.9) obtained for each candidate 
weights applied in the reaction function (2.8). The combination of weights that 
minimises the loss function is chosen as the optimal one to include in the monetary 
policy rule. An example of this approach is provided by Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997). 
A less ambitious approach is to focus on the behaviour of the central bank and 
to investigate how central banks have in practice adjusted their interest rates in 
response to the changing macroeconomic environment. This amounts to looking 
at the historical determination of policy rules rather than at optimising rules as 
in the previous approach (see Taylor 1999, chapter 7). The aim is to determine 
how have central banks actually implemented monetary policy rather than what 
would have been their optimal response given the structure of the economy. The 
classical study of Taylor (1993) can be seen as part of this literature of a more 
applied nature. The Taylor study constitutes an analysis of the monetary policy 
behaviour in the US, where the interest rate is regressed on the inflation rate and 
the output gap, namely: 
it = 9,, 7Tt + gyygapt (2.11) 
where in is the inflation rate and ygapt is the output gap defined as the percentage 
difference between actual and potential GDP. This type of rule has been proposed 
by Taylor (1993) who shows that a Taylor rule with g, =1.5 and gy=0.5 appears 
to describe well monetary policy behaviour in the US. 
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Since then, several extensions and refinements of the Taylor rule have been pro- 
posed (see Ball, 1999; Clarida, Cali and Gertler, 1998; Woodford, 1999; Rotemberg 
and Woodford, 1999). Recently, several non-linear policy rules have also been ad- 
vocated (see for instance Dolado et al., 2000 and Dolado et al., 2002). 
In summary, the approaches in the literature on monetary policy rules differ in 
many respects from those found in the finance literature reviewed in the previous 
section. In finance models there is a much stronger focus on the empirical proper- 
ties of the models and their fit to the data. There is also a lot of attention given 
to the modelling of the variance of the short-rate and in capturing features of the 
empirical behaviour of the short-rate typical of high frequency data (e. g. "jumps"). 
In addition, the macroeconomic factors assumed to be driving the term-structure 
are usually not modeled. By contrast, the approaches in monetary economics tend 
to focus on the macroeconomic factors driving interest rates while largely ignoring 
the empirical features of the short-rate process. Typically, as seen above, a term 
which captures the inertia in the short-rate is included but no particular attention 
is devoted to the modeling of volatility. Furthermore, finance approaches tend to 
be applied to high frequency data, while in the monetary policy rules literature 
the frequency is usually monthly or quarterly. Thus, it appears useful to take into 
account elements of both approaches and aim at a synthesis that could encompass 
both finance and monetary economics features in the modeling of the short-rate. 
The following section will propose models that allow such blending making re- 
course to regime switching models. A key distinction of such models relative to 
existing non-linear rules is that the macroeconomic factors influence the process of 
the short-rate only via the probability of each regime. A major advantage of such 
models is that, under certain conditions, they could provide indications that are 
relevant not only for the modelling of central bank behaviour but also for finance 
applications such as valuing derivatives. 
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2.3. Regime switching models of the short-term interest rate with 
monetary policy considerations 
The existence of regime switching or structural breaks in the process followed 
by the short rate is often linked to the conduct of monetary policy. Well-known 
examples are the Fed experiment of 1979-1982 (see Ang and Bekaert, 1998; Gray, 
1996; Dahlquist and Gray, 2000) or the German unification (Ang and Bekaert, 
1998). Another example of non-linearities in the short-term interest rate process is 
found by Dahlquist and Gray (2000) in the case of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
of the European Monetary System (EMS). These authors find that in the EMS 
speculative attacks have at times led to high volatility and high interest rates in 
some countries. After the realignments, both the level of the interest rates and the 
volatility usually decline. 
These results show that regime switches are usually associated with monetary 
policy. Therefore, this section proposes two different approaches for non-linear 
models of the short-term interest rate where the probability of a switch is deter- 
mined by monetary policy considerations. Section 2.3.1 proposes a generalized 
Markov regime switching model (MRS) for the short-rate, based on the methodol- 
ogy originally proposed by Hamilton (1989) while section 2.4 discusses Threshold 
Autoregressive (TAR) models of the short-term interest rate. The latter method- 
ology was originally proposed by Tong (1978) and Tong and Lim (1980). The 
main difference between the two approaches consists in the assumptions regarding 
what is known about the state or regime of the economy that is prevailing at each 
moment in time. TAR models assume that the state of the economy is determined 
by observable variables and therefore can be known with certainty. In the case 
of the MRS framework, the state of the economy is assumed to be determined by 
an unobservable stochastic process. Therefore, it is never possible to know with 
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certainty what is the state of the economy at each point in time. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to estimate a probability function for the unobservable state variable 
governing the switches between the regimes, thereby allowing probabilistic state- 
ments to be made concerning the likelihood of the economy being in a particular 
regime at each point in time. 
2.3.1. A generalised Markov regime switching model of the short rate 
with transition probabilities dependent on monetary policy 
In this section a regime switching model for the short rate is specified by incorpo- 
rating elements of monetary policy through time varying transition probabilities. 
The chosen specification assumes that in each regime the short rate follows an 
affine model of the form: 
drt =k (O - rt) dt + ort dZt (2.12) 
This general specification assumes that the short-term interest rate is mean revert- 
ing to a long run mean 0, with an adjustment parameter of k. The volatility term 
is specified in such a way to allow for volatility to be a function of the interest rate 
level, depending on the value of -y. In terms of discrete time, the model above can 
be written in the following way: 
Ort = µt + Et (2.13) 
where the one period change in interest rates (, Art = rt - rt_1) is modelled as the 
sum of its conditional mean pt = al + a2rt_1 and an error term (Et ). The volatility 
r 
of the error term is proportional to the interest level, i. e. V ar(t) -a 
2rand 
al, a2, and 'y are parameters to be estimated. 
This model allows for mean reversion in the short-term interest rate with the 
parameter a2 providing an indication of how quickly the short-term interest rate 
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reverts to its long-run mean. The higher this parameter, the stronger is the mean 
reversion behaviour of the short-term interest rate. In turn, the long-run mean the 
short-term rate is expected to revert to is given by -al /a2 . 
The process of the short-term money market rate represented in equation (2.13) 
is to a great extent influenced by the setting of central bank policy given that 
central banks can exert a significant influence (even though not complete) on short- 
term money market interest rates by using the operational instruments they have 
at their disposal. In addition, market expectations concerning the future conduct 
of monetary policy are likely to affect the level of short-term interest rates or 
their volatility. Therefore, the process of the short-term interest rate is very likely 
to be influenced by the central bank's actual or expected reactions to economic 
developments and consequently should be related to the macroeconomic variables 
that determine central bank decisions. At the same time, it would be convenient to 
keep the form (2.12) for estimating term structure models or for valuing derivatives. 
One way to integrate monetary policy considerations in a more general model 
of the short-term interest rate, while preserving the form (2.13) in each regime 
is to make recourse to the Markov regime switching approach originally proposed 
by Hamilton (1989). The model makes the realistic assumption that the process 
followed by the short-term interest rate depends on the state of the economy, 
which is an unobservable variable. There are several possible states of the economy 
and therefore several possible different processes which the interest rate may be 
following at each moment in time. Associated with each state, there is a probability 
function that provides the likelihood of the interest rate being in a particular 
regime at each point in time or moving into a different regime. The novelty of the 
approach followed here is that the probability function has as arguments variables 
commonly used as indicators of monetary policy such as the output gap, inflation 
or monetary aggregates. This way the basic characteristic of the process given 
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State of the Conditional 
economy expected value 
State 1 µ1t = all + a2lrt-1 
Conditional 
volatility 
airs-i 
Probability 
of each state 
Pt 
State 2 42t = a12 + a22rt-1 a2rc 1 
1- Pt 
Table 2.3. Characteristics of the short- term interest rate process 
by equation (2.13) is maintained while at the same time the model incorporates 
information on monetary policy. 
The approach can be described in a two-state regime switching model without 
loss of generality. Table 2.3 summarises the characteristics of the process of the 
short-term interest rate in each of the possible states of the economy. 
The economic intuition of the model is the following: state 1 can be thought 
of as a state of low interest rates and low volatility while state 2 is a state where 
interest rates and volatility are high, i. e. µ1t < µ2t and ai <U2. In order to com- 
plete the model, a set of "transition probabilities" is specified. These probabilities 
provide the likelihood of the economy remaining in a particular regime or switching 
to the other regime. These probabilities are assumed to vary over time with the 
evolution of variables thought to be important for monetary policy formulation. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by making the transition prob- 
abilities of interest rates a function of macroeconomic variables central banks are 
supposed to react to. As short-term interest rates are usually the main instrument 
of central banks, regime switching in short-term interest rates should be related to 
shifts in the monetary policy stance. The probability of a change in regime will 
thus be related to how the central bank reacts to the evolution of the economy, 
or, more precisely, to the variables contained in the information set Qt. This is 
expressed by a probability that is a function (g) of variables to which monetary 
policy reacts: 
Pt = 9(ßt) (2.14) 
26 
In this model, when the interest rate is in the low interest rate regime and the 
available information Qt points towards the need to tighten monetary policy, the 
probability that interest rates switch to the "high interest rate" regime should 
rise (i. e. 1-pt, the probability that the economy is in state 2, should increase). 
It should be noted that in each state the short-term interest rate is assumed to 
follow a process of the type given by process (2.12). Therefore, this model could 
be used to provide an indication about which of the two processes the interest 
rate is following. After determining the process, the corresponding term structure 
models or option pricing formulas corresponding to equation (2.13) can be used in 
a straightforward way. One possible way to think about this approach is that the 
central bank does not aim at fixing the short-term interest rate at a precise level 
but instead allows it to fluctuate within certain bounds which are related to the 
macroeconomic environment. 
The use of time-varying transition probabilities in regime switching models 
has been pioneered by Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994), Ghysels (1993) and 
Filardo (1994). In the context of the modeling of the short-term interest rate time 
varying transition probabilities were first introduced by Gray (1996) who defined 
the transition probabilities as a function of the level of interest rates. Ang and 
Bekaert (1998) make a further contribution by modelling regime switches in interest 
rates in a multi-country setting making the transition probabilities a function of 
foreign interest rates and the term spread. Finally, Dahlquist and Gray (2000) 
model the impact of a target zone on short-term interest rates in the context of 
the European Monetary System (EMS). In their approach, transition probabilities 
are a function of interest rate differentials relative to Germany and the distance 
between the logarithm of the upper bound of the exchange rate band and the 
logarithm of the exchange rate vis-ä-vis Germany. 
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The next section describes in more detail the specification of the model and 
presents the estimation procedure. 
2.3.2. Log-likelihood specification 
Following the approach by Gray (1996), the Markov Regime Switching model for 
the short-term interest rate with first-order, two-state regime switching can be 
specified as follows: 
Art = it + hit zt 
where: 
(2.15) 
" i=1 if the short-rate (r) is in state (St) 1 (i. e. St=1), and i=2 if the short-rate 
is in state 2; 
. 1-tit = atz + a2irt_l represents the conditional mean in regime i; 
" hit = o-2rt ryj represents the conditional variance in regime i; 
zt is an i. i. d variable with mean zero and unit variance. 
This model implies that the volatility of the short-term interest rate is a func- 
tion of the level of the short-term interest rate as long as -y 0. The log-likelihood 
is then given by the following expression: 
T 
Lt =E log (pitf (Ort St = 1) + (1 - pit)f (Art ISt = 2)] (2.16) 
t=1 
where f is the normal density function. The log-likelihood function can be seen as 
a mixture of normal distributions with weights given by the probabilities of the 
short rate being in regime 1 or 2 conditional on the information set Qt: 
Pit = Pr(St =l lQt); p2t = Pr(St = 21SZt) _ (I - pit (2.17 
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in turn the probability of the short-rate being in regime 1 is given by the following 
non-linear recursive scheme (see Gray, 1996) : 
pit = Pt 
91t-aplt_I 
+ Qt) 92t-I_lt-i 
Sit-lPlt-1 + 92t-z(1 - pit-i) 91t-lplt-1 + 92t-i(1 - pit-1) 
(2.18) 
where: it =f (Art St = 1) and get =f (Art St = 2) and Pt and Qt are the 
transition probabilities with the following interpretation: 
" Pt = Pr [St -1 St_1 = 1] is the probability that the short-rate will remain 
in regime 1 in period t given that it was in this regime in the previous 
period. 
"1- Qt = Pr [St 1I St_ 1= 2] is the probability that the regime of the 
short-rate will shift to regime 1 in period t given that it was in regime 2 
at time t-1. 
Given this specification, the probability of the interest rate being in regime 1 
in period t given by equation (2.18) can be loosely interpreted as the sum of the 
probability of the short rate being in regime 1 in period t-1 and remaining in that 
regime plus the probability of the short rate being in regime 2 in period t-1 and 
switching to regime 1 at time t. 
The link to monetary policy actions is made by defining the transition proba- 
bilities Pt and Qt as functions of developments in macroeconomic variables. Given 
the literature review in section 2.2 these probabilities are defined in a similar way 
as in the Taylor (1993) rule which has been found to be an appropriate rule to de- 
scribe US monetary policy. According to the rule, the nominal short-term interest 
rate would be set equal to an equilibrium real interest rate plus a reaction function 
of the output gap and deviations of inflation from its target value: 
rt = r* + 7rt + a(7rt - 7r*) + ßyt (2.19 
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where rt represents the nominal short-term interest rate under the control of the 
central bank, r* is the real equilibrium short-term interest rate, 7r is the inflation 
rate, 7r* is the target inflation rate while yt is the output gap. 
Taking the Taylor rule as a basis, the novelty of this study is the different way 
monetary policy considerations are introduced. In fact the reaction function will 
not be defined as in equation (2.19), where the value of the nominal interest rate 
is a function of the output gap and deviations of inflation from its target as in 
the Taylor rule. In the model proposed here, the process followed by the interest 
rate in each regime does not depend on macroeconomic variables. Instead, what is 
defined as a function of the output gap and inflation is the transition probabilities: 
Pt = 4) (c11 + bi I(7rt - 71*) + b21yt) (2.20) 
Qt = ß(c12 + bl2(it - 71*) 
+ b22yt) (2.21) 
where represents the normal cumulative density function, in order to restrict 
the probabilities to be between 0 and 1. These probability functions provide some 
indication regarding the likelihood that monetary policy is in each regime and also 
on which macroeconomic variables play a more important role in determining the 
change in the regime followed by the short-term interest rate. In addition, the 
influence of monetary policy is incorporated without being necessary to model it 
directly in the conditional mean or variance of the short-rate. 
2.3.3. Pros and cons of the regime switching specification 
The specification of the short-term interest rate as a regime switching process 
has convenient aspects besides the usefulness of combining monetary and finance 
approaches in a richer model: 
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" The model overcomes the limitations of some monetary policy rules which 
assume that the process followed by short-term interest rates is a con- 
stant function of output and inflation as in the Taylor (1993) rule. In 
fact, it is likely that over time central banks react in different ways to eco- 
nomic developments. For instance, policymaker's preferences may change 
as regards the intensity with which interest rates should respond to de- 
viations of output or inflation from target; there can be changes in the 
implementation of monetary policy or even in the way the economy itself 
functions. All this would imply a change in the coefficients of the rule. 
In fact, in the literature on the US several instances of regime shifts have 
been documented (see for instance Poole, 1994, or Bordo and Schwartz, 
1997). Therefore, models which are flexible in accommodating regime 
shifts, such as Markov regime switching models, appear to be well-suited 
for modelling monetary policy. It should be noted that the regime switch- 
ing model is sufficiently flexible to allow the transition probabilities to be 
defined differently for each state. Not only may the value of the para- 
meters adjust but also the variables included in the transition functions 
can change. This can be useful in longer-term analyses of the short-term 
interest rate, where it is difficult to assume that the intermediate or final 
targets of monetary policy have been unchanged over time or that the 
same emphasis has been placed on the indicator variables. For instance, if 
is known that at some stage in time the central bank has paid more atten- 
tion to monetary aggregates than in other periods, as was the case in the 
US in 1979-1982, it is likely that the process followed by the short-term 
interest rate will turn out to be different in that period. Therefore, it may 
be justified to include a regime for the short-rate in the model where the 
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transition probabilities are assumed to be driven by monetary aggregates 
only. 
" The model determines potential regime shifts in the process of the short- 
rate endogenously. This overcomes the limitations of several studies (for 
instance Chan et al., 1992) which test for regime shifts in the short-rate 
using dummy variables which must be selected on the basis of information 
not included in the model. Such identification is not always straightfor- 
ward as it requires knowledge regarding institutional changes or particular 
shocks likely to have fundamentally affected the interest rate process. By 
contrast, in the regime switching framework, changes in regimes are de- 
termined endogenously without requiring a priori knowledge. 
" The regime-switching model provides a means of combining data that be- 
comes available with different frequency. For instance, the process for the 
short-term interest rate can be specified on a daily basis and at the same 
time the transition probabilities can be defined as a function of the output 
gap which is available only on a quarterly basis. This implies keeping the 
transition probabilities constant until the next quarterly release. In ad- 
dition, daily models allow the inclusion of new information in the model 
on dates matching the release dates of macroeconomic variables. This is 
useful given the increasing emphasis in the monetary economics literature 
that the testing monetary of policy rules should be undertaken using real- 
time data i. e. using the information available to policymakers at the time 
they take their decisions (see Orphanides, 2001). 
" The regime-switching model provides as output a probability that can 
be 
interpreted as a measure of the stance of monetary policy. By providing 
the probability that the interest rate is in a high or low regime, it may 
be used to provide an indication about the likelihood of the central bank 
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acting to change the process followed by short-term interest rates, for 
instance, by changing the level of interest rates. 
" The introduction of monetary policy considerations in the probability 
functions rather than directly in the model of the process followed by 
the short-term interest rate allows a great variety of models of the short- 
rate from the finance literature to be easily included in the framework. In 
fact, there are no restrictions on the models the short-rate is assumed to 
follow in each regime. For example it would be possible to include further 
lags of the change in the short-rate in the right hand side of the interest 
rate equation or specifications where the short-rate is modelled as a func- 
tion of the official interest rate. By examining the transition functions it 
can then be studied how these models vary with output and inflation. 
On the other hand, the following limitations of the regime switching model can 
be mentioned: 
" There is some arbitrariness in the selection of the number of regimes the 
short rate is assumed to have followed during the sample period. In most 
approaches the number of regimes is kept low, usually two regimes are 
estimated or at most three. This is partly due to computational rea- 
sons. Given that the model is estimated by maximum likelihood, the 
estimation procedure quickly becomes intractable as the number of pa- 
rameters increase significantly with the number of states. In addition, 
statistical tests for the determination of the number of regimes rely on 
non-standard asymptotic theory and are therefore difficult to apply (see 
Hamilton, 1994). 
" The regime switching model incorporating monetary policy considerations 
provides estimates of the process being followed by the short-term inter- 
est rate in each regime, i. e. what the conditional mean and variance of 
33 
the interest rate are likely to be in each period. It does so by including 
not only information from the short-term interest rate process, but also 
from macroeconomic variables. It may therefore be representative of how 
central banks have on average influenced the process of the short-rate in 
response to such macroeconomic developments. It does not, however, pro- 
vide a measure of the level of interest rates that would be optimal at each 
point in time, i. e. optimal in the sense of minimizing the loss function of 
the policymaker as described in section 2.2. 
2.4. Threshold models of the short-term interest rate 
Threshold models constitute an alternative way for modeling nonlinear behav- 
four in the short-term interest rate, including regime shifts. These models have 
been used to model exchange rates (Kilian and Taylor, 2003) and economic activity 
while applications to the modeling of the short-term interest rate have been scarce 
(a recent example of the latter is provided by Clements and Galväo, 2001). 
In the Threshold Autoregressive Model (TAR), originally proposed by Tong 
(1978) and Tong and Lim (1980), the regime followed by the variable of interest 
depends on the value taken by a threshold variable qt with respect to a threshold 
value c. In the context of the models studied so far, one possibility to specify a TAR 
model for the short-term interest rate following monetary policy considerations is 
to make the process of the short-rate change according to the value assumed by 
the relevant macroeconomic variables. In the two-regime case, a TAR model could 
be specified in the following way: 
all + a2lrt-1 + Et if qt <c 
Ort = 
(2.22) 
a12 + a22rt-1 + Et if qt >C 
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where Et is assumed to be an i. i. d white noise sequence conditional on the past 
information. 
In the above, the short-rate is assumed to follow two regimes. The switch 
between the two regimes is determined by the value of the variable qt, with respect 
to the threshold value c. The model may be written in a single equation form: 
Ort = (all + a2lrt-1) (I- I [qt > c]) + (ail + a22rt-z )I [qt > c] + Et (2.23) 
where use has been made of the indicator function 1[], which takes the value 1 
if qt > c, and 0 otherwise. When the threshold variable qt is set equal to the 
lagged values of the dependent variable, the model is called a Self Exciting TAR 
(SETAR) model. However, given the objective of constructing a non-linear model 
of the short-term interest rate that includes macroeconomic influences a more 
appropriate alternative is to set the threshold variable qt as a function of lagged 
macroeconomic variables the central bank is assumed to react to. Proceeding as 
in the MRS model by taking the Taylor rule as the basis, the following model can 
be specified: 
Art = 
all + a2lrt-1 + Et if bl7rt-1 + b2yt-i C (2.24) 
a12 + a22rt-1 + Et if b, 7t-1 + b2Yt-1 >c 
the threshold function (2.24) can be seen as reflecting the monetary policy of the 
central bank. Thus, the process followed by the short-rate changes according to 
macroeconomic conditions. 
One difficulty with the approach is that the parameters b1 and b2 need to be 
estimated. One possibility is to impose the parameters bl and b2 obtained from 
the Taylor rules in the literature, for instance setting bi = 1.5 and b2 to 0.5, which 
implies using the original Taylor (1993) rule. It is expected that whenever this 
function is bigger than c, the process followed by the short-term rate will shift to 
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a "high" interest rate regime and the short-term rate should have a higher longer- 
term mean (i. e. -a12/a22 > -a11/a21). In this formulation there is no possibility to 
impose that the variance of the error term Et also changes with the regime. 
One possible drawback of the TAR approach is that the model implies sudden 
shifts in regime, depending on the value of the threshold function. Such short- 
coming can be overcome by using another class of nonlinear models, the so-called 
Smooth Transition Autoregressive models (STAR). These models are similar to 
TAR models but they assume that the transition between the regimes is smooth, 
so there is a continuum of regimes. 
STAR models may be more appropriate for representing monetary policy as 
there are good reasons for shifts in monetary policy regimes to be smooth. A 
first reason for smoothness is that central banks have a tendency to avoid abrupt 
changes in policy but instead tend to prefer a gradual adjustment of interest rates 
(see for instance Goodhart, 1996). This may be due to the existence of uncertainty 
about the way the economy works, so that central banks only adjust when it be- 
comes clear that inflationary pressures have changed. For instance, if the inflation 
rate is expected to increase moderately after a protracted period of low inflation 
rates, one probably would not expect the central bank to react aggressively but 
instead to make a small upward adjustment of interest rates and analyse how that 
influences the economy. However, if inflation moves further away from desired 
levels then the central bank will probably react more aggressively to changes in in- 
flation. Another reason for having smooth transitions is that if monetary policy is 
credible and central banks have a reasonable degree of transparency, then economic 
agents may be able to anticipate changes in monetary policy, which would then 
be incorporated in market interest rates. In such case, central banks may react 
less aggressively and nevertheless achieve the desired results. Another explanation 
is provided by Goodfriend (1991), who suggests that central banks might smooth 
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interest rates in order to make their behaviour more predictable ("interest rate 
smoothing"). Given that monetary policy works mainly via market determined 
variables, such as long-term interest rates, and these reflect expectations regard- 
ing future short-term interest rates, an enhanced predictability of central bank 
actions would increase the central bank's influence on these market rates thereby 
facilitating the implementation of monetary policy. 
A STAR model for the short-term interest rate can be defined in the following 
way: 
Ort = (all + a2lrt-1)(1 - F(qt - c)) + (a12 + a22rt-7)F(gt - c) + Et (2.25) 
where qt is a function of macroeconomic variables the central bank is assumed 
to react to and F represents a transition function which is bounded between 0 
and 1. Thus, the STAR model is very similar to a TAR model, but while in the 
latter the transition function can assume only two possible values (0 or 1), in the 
STAR model the transition function varies between 0 and 1 in a smooth way and 
is a function of the difference between the threshold variable qt and the parameter 
value c. The function F determines the weights applied to each regime. If the 
threshold variable, say the policy reaction function, is below the threshold c, then 
a larger weight will be given to the low interest rate regime and vice-versa. It 
should be noted that in this specification of the transition function, a given change 
in qt necessarily alters the process followed by the short rate, increasing the weight 
given to one of the regimes and decreasing the weight given to the other regime. 
This differs from the MRS model, which allowed for the possibility of the transition 
probabilities in the two regimes being uncorrelated. 
It should be noted that the function F should not be interpreted as the prob- 
ability of the interest rate being in a particular state as in the Markov Regime 
Switching model. In fact, in the case of the MRS, it is assumed that at each point 
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in time the process followed by the short-rate is in one of the two regimes, and 
the probability is a measure of the uncertainty about whether each observation is 
coming from a certain regime or not. In the STAR model, however, the interest 
rate can be in one of the two "extreme" regimes (corresponding to the function 
F being 0 or 1) or be a mixture of these two regimes (when F is in the interval 
]0,1[). Therefore, it can be stated that in the STAR model there is a continuum of 
regimes and the function defining the interest rate process changes over time. In 
this respect, the MRS model is closer to the TAR model, as it assumes that (the 
unobserved) shifts between regimes occur in a sudden way. 
In the literature, there are several possibilities for the specification of the func- 
tion F. One popular choice for the transition function is the logistic function (the 
so-called LSTAR model): 
(qt, c) =1 1+ exP (-'Y (qt - c) ) 
where -y constitutes a measure of the smoothness of the adjustment. The above 
can be thought of as a model for the short-term interest rate where the short-rate 
process is determined by a weighted average of two "extreme" regimes. 
The above LSTAR model makes the shift between regimes depend on the cur- 
rent level of the Taylor rule relative to a threshold level. However, the past levels 
of the Taylor rule do not influence the transition function. A different specification 
of the STAR model which would not have this drawback can be achieved by using 
methods that have been recently applied to exchange rates. For instance, 
Kilian 
and Taylor (2003) set up a model where they assume that whenever the exchange 
rate is close to Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP), then it should behave like a ran- 
dom walk. However, when it is far from PPP it should 
be mean reverting and 
the intensity with which it mean reverts should increase with the 
deviation of the 
exchange rate from the long-run "equilibrium" 
level. There is an obvious parallel 
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between this behaviour of the exchange rate and the findings in the literature on 
interest rates where evidence has been found that interest rates are mean reverting 
when they are far away from historical levels and show random walk behaviour 
when close to the historical average (see Gray, 1996; Ait-Sahalia, 1996). Following 
the approach of Kilian and Taylor (2003), the following alternative function could 
be specified: 
n 
F(qt c) = exp(-E-y(qt-i - c)2) 
i=1 
and the resulting model is called an Exponential STAR model (ESTAR). In the 
above function three features can be captured. First, the size of the deviation 
from the monetary policy rule matters for the definition of the regime. While the 
central bank may not be very much concerned if the interest rate is out of line with 
fundamentals, in which case the interest rate would behave as a random walk, it 
may worry if the deviation becomes large. Thus, at some stage an intervention 
will be needed in order to bring the interest rate back in line with fundamentals. 
A second feature of the equation is that such transition function captures the 
idea of cumulative information or persistence in deviations from fundamentals. In 
fact, temporary shocks to fundamentals should not be of concern to central banks. 
From the previous discussion on smoothing, central banks probably do not react 
to temporary shocks that drive the monetary policy rule away from the current 
policy if they expect a reversal to occur in the future. Thus, an immediate reaction 
will in many instances be extemporaneous and therefore more information will be 
needed to confirm or not the temporary nature of the shock. However, if there is 
a persistent deviation from the rule (even if that deviation remains constant) this 
may signal that the monetary policy stance may not be appropriate and lead to a 
change in the behaviour of interest rates. In addition, even if the central bank does 
not follow any rule, such deviations may signal that the monetary policy is out of 
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line with fundamentals and may nevertheless explain central bank behaviour. A 
third feature is that in the above rule the influence of the central bank is assumed 
to be symmetric, i. e. equal deviations of the central bank's reaction function from 
the threshold will lead to the same change in the threshold function. 
2.5. Empirical application to the US and Germany 
2.5.1. Data 
In this section the models described above are applied to the short-term interest 
rates in the US and in Germany. The data used are quarterly spanning the period 
from the first quarter of 1970 to the last quarter of 1998. For the US the short- 
term interest rate used is the three-month Treasury bill while for Germany the 
interest rate used is the three-month money market interest rate. As mentioned in 
Section 2.2, the three-month money market rate is the variable being modelled and 
which is thought to be targeted by the central bank. As for indicators determining 
monetary policy actions, the consumer price index, seasonally adjusted, is used 
as a measure of inflation for both the US and Germany. Data for output in the 
US is GDP at market prices at 1996 prices and seasonally adjusted while for 
Germany it is GDP at market prices (ESA 95 definition) adjusted for the number 
of working days and for seasonality. All data have been obtained from the Bank 
of International Settlements (BIS). 
2.5.2. Markov Regime Switching Model - quarterly data 
In order to construct the functions of the transition probabilities, it is necessary to 
estimate a measure of the output gap. In this study, given the lack of consensus 
in the literature on the best way to compute output gap measures, 
3 a simple 
3For instance, Taylor (1993) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) use a linear trend for detrend- 
ing log output as done here; Clarida et al. (1998) use a quadratic trend; while other authors resort 
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approach is taken, namely to regress the logarithm of the GDP series on a linear 
trend and take the fitted values as an estimate of potential GDP. This approach 
assumes that potential GDP grows at a constant growth rate equal to the average 
real GDP growth observed during the sample period. The output gap is then 
simply computed as the difference between the actual and this estimated measure 
of potential GDP. As for inflation, given the difficulty in choosing a target for 
this variable that would be appropriate for the whole sample period, the approach 
followed was to use the level of inflation instead of the deviations from target 
implied by the Taylor rule. Therefore the estimated transition probabilities have 
the following form: 
Pt = 4)(cil ± bilirt + b2lyt) (2.26) 
Qt = ß(C12 + 
b127Tt + b22yt) (2.27) 
It should be noted that for convenience of exposition, the functions will be referred 
to as "Taylor" rules, even though in practice they are not so, as they are not 
comparable with the level of the short-term interest rate. 
The functional form in each regime corresponds to the Vasiceck (1977) model, 
i. e. the volatility is kept constant in each regime (-y=0) but can change across 
regimes. The maximization method used was the Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb and 
Shanno (BFGS) method. In section 2.5.3, a more general function of volatility is 
chosen, namely that of Chan et al. (1992), with no restrictions on the parameter 
7- 
2.5-2.1. Results for Germany. The results of the maximum likelihood estima- 
tion of the two-state regime switching model for Germany, are shown 
in Table 2.4. 
As can be seen in the table, the estimates of the parameters of 
the conditional 
to estimates of potential output derived 
from production functions (see for instance McCallum 
and Nelson, 1999). 
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mean and variance are all significantly different from zero. The two states identi- 
fied can be interpreted as a state of low interest rates and low volatility (state 1) 
and a state of high interest rates and high volatility (state 2). Given this result, it 
should be noted that despite the fact that the volatility of the short rate is kept as 
a constant in each regime, the unconditional volatility of the short-term interest 
process is time varying as the short-term interest rate may shift from a high to a 
low volatility regime. 
According to the estimates, in state 1 the long-run mean interest rate (given 
by -a11 / a21) is estimated to be equal to 3.8% while in state 2 it is equal to 9.8%. 
Despite these different levels of the mean interest rate, the estimates do not suggest 
significant differences in the speed of mean reversion in the two regimes which is 
indicated by the level of the parameters a21 and a22 (-0.16 and -0.17 in regimes 1 
and 2 respectively). By contrast, the estimates of the volatility parameter differ 
markedly in the two regimes. In the low interest rate regime the level of volatility 
is quite low (0.16) in comparison with the estimate found in regime 2 (1-67). 
The table reports Lagrange Multiplier tests for omitted autocorrelation in each 
regime, for omitted autocorrelation across regimes and for ARCH effects. These 
tests have been proposed by Hamilton (1996) as specification tests for Markov 
Regime Switching models. All test statistics are asymptotically chi-square, with 
one degree of freedom. As can be seen in the table, there is no evidence of au- 
tocorrelation in the residuals when the process of the short-rate is in regime 1. 
However, the tests point towards autocorrelation in the residuals in both the sec- 
ond regime and across regimes at the 5% level. These results suggest that some 
care is needed in interpreting the results, in particular as regards regime 2. As for 
ARCH effects, no evidence of ARCH effects has been found in any of the regimes 
or across regimes. 
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The estimated transition probability functions provide some indications as to 
what variables are more important in explaining the persistence of each regime. 
As can be seen in Table 2.4, the coefficient of the inflation term is not significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level in any of the states. Moreover, the coefficient 
of the output gap is significantly different from zero in the first state at the 5% 
level and in the second state at the 10% level. Thus, it appears that in Germany 
the output gap has played a relatively more important role in influencing the 
probability of the transition of the short rate process than was the case of the 
inflation rate. 
Another result worth mentioning is that the coefficient of the output gap in the 
first state is negative while in the second state it is positive. This result could be 
mirroring the central bank's behaviour in setting monetary policy. The negative 
sign in the first state means that when the economy is in a "low" interest rate 
regime and the output gap becomes smaller, i. e. actual output declines with respect 
to potential, the probability that the short-term interest rate will remain in state 
1 increases. This suggests that the Bundesbank was more likely to keep interest 
rates at a lower level in times of economic slowdown than in expansions reflecting 
perhaps some concern for output stabilisation. The positive sign of the coefficient 
of the output gap in state 2 means that the higher the output gap, the higher 
is the probability of the interest rate remaining in the high interest rate regime. 
This is also the expected result as a high output gap may indicate a overheated 
economy and therefore the central bank is more likely to keep interest rates at a 
high level in such case than otherwise. This asymmetric response suggests that, in 
a probabilistic sense, the monetary policy of the Bundesbank was countercyclical 
only when interest rates were already high. 
Figure 2.1 shows the transition probabilities as a function of the output gap 
in each regime, assuming a zero coefficient for inflation. As can be seen in the 
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Conditional Conditional Transition 
Mean variance probabilities 
all 21 2 
State 1 Coeff. 0.590 * -0 157* 0.157* 1.532* 
0 
055 -0.141* t-ratio [12.07] [-14.06] [5.18] [4.47] [1.18] [-1.97] 
-all /a21=3.8% 
a12 a22 ý2 X12 b12 b22 
State 2 Coeff. 1.683* -0.172* 1.665* 1.214* -0.054 0.140* 
t-ratio [8.98] [-7.96] [6.92] [3.51] [-1.47] [2.04] 
-a12/a22=9.8% 
Mispecification tests 
In regime 1 In regime 2 Across regimes 
Autocorrelation 1.3 6.6t 8.6t 
ARCH 0.66 0.48 0.15 
Note: tindicates rejection at 5% level of the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation or ARCH effects. 
*Coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
Table 2.4. Two-state regime-switching model for Germany, model 
with inflation and the output gap. 
chart, the probability that there will be a switch from the "high" interest rate 
regime to the "low" interest rate regime is quite low whenever the output gap is 
positive. However, when the output gap is negative the probability rises to about 
30% when the level of output is 5% away from potential. This suggests that while 
the function reacts almost by the same magnitude to changes in the output gap 
in either direction, the behaviour of the interest rate tends to shift to the low rate 
regime at low but positive levels of the output gap. 
Figure 2.2 shows the probability of the interest rate being in the low interest 
rate regime for the period from the first quarter of 1970 to the end of 
1998. Two 
measures are shown, the filtered probability (i. e. the probability of the 
interest 
rate being in regime 1 given the information up to that point, i. e. 
P(St=1I Sit)) and 
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Figure 2.1. Transition probabilities as a function of the output gap. 
the smoothed probability (i. e. the probability of the interest rate being in regime 1 
given the full sample information, i. e. P(St=1 QT)). These measures were obtained 
using the smoothing algorithm provided by Gray (1996). The smoothed probability 
takes into account all the sample information in computing the probability of the 
interest rate being in regime 1 and is therefore the most appropriate measure for 
conducting inference. As can be seen in the figure, with the exception of the first 
years of the seventies, it appears that it is quite clear-cut to determine the regimes 
followed by the interest rate. Up to 1975 the interest rate regime was, with great 
probability, one of high interest rates and high volatility. From the second quarter 
of 1975 to the first quarter of 1979, the interest rate moved into regime 2, returning 
with high probability to the first state in the last quarter of 1981. From then until 
the second quarter of 1988 the economy was in the low interest rate regime. At 
that point in time the interest rate moved again to the high interest rate regime. 
This shift was temporary as by the end of 1992, there is a high probability that 
the short rate returned to the first regime of low interest rates. 
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Figure 2.2. Germany - probability of the short-term interest rate 
being in regime 1. 
Figure 2.3 shows the smoothed probability of the interest rate being in the low 
rate regime and some developments in Germany in the last 30 years which may 
help to shed some light on the results. As can be seen in the chart, the last period 
leading to the collapse of the Bretton Woods, in 1973, was, with high probability, a 
regime of high interest rates (and high volatility). This regime lasted until the mid 
1970s, with the second half of the decade being characterized by a regime of low 
interest rates and low volatility. The oil price shock of 1979 and the start of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) gave way to a relatively short period of high 
interest rates and frequent realignments. From 1983 until 1988 the regime followed 
by the short-term interest rate returned again to the "low interest rate regime". 
The decline in oil prices in 1986 and the appreciation of the Deutsche Mark relative 
................ TTTTTTTTTTTTTTT 
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to the US dollar had a favourable influence on inflation in Germany, which was 
very low in the period 1986-1988. However, after 1988 the process followed by the 
short-term interest rate turned again with high probability to the high interest rate 
state. This shift was probably related to the German unification as the Bundesbank 
tightened monetary policy in response to inflationary concerns related to the rising 
government budget deficit due to the costs of unification. The evolution of the 
probability suggests that when the first ERM crisis occurred in 1992, the interest 
rate in Germany was still in the high interest rate regime. However, when the crisis 
of 1993 took place, leading to the widening of ERM bands, the process followed by 
the short-term interest rate had, with high likelihood, already moved back towards 
the low interest rate regime. The whole period since then until European Monetary 
Union (EMU) can be seen as one of low interest rates. 
2.5.2.2. Results for the United States. The results of the estimation of the 
MRS model for the United States are shown in Table 2.5. As can be seen in the 
table, the estimates of the parameters of the conditional mean and variance are all 
significantly different from zero. 
As in the case of Germany, the two states identified can be interpreted as a 
state of low interest rates and low volatility (state 1) and a state of high interest 
rates and high volatility (state 2). According to the estimates, in state 1 the mean 
interest rate (given by -all / a21) is estimated to 
be equal to 3.8% while in state 
2 it is equal to 7.1%. As in the case of Germany, the speed of mean reversion 
appears to be the same in both regimes (0.07), even though they suggest much 
slower mean reversion than in the case of Germany. 
In the case of the US, the estimated functions defining the transition probabili- 
ties suggest that in the low interest rate regime, both the output gap and 
inflation 
play an important role (in accordance with the 
formal and legal objectives of the 
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Figure 2.3. Probability of the short-term interest rate being in 
regime 1. 
Federal Reserve). Thus, if output increases with respect to its potential or if in- 
flation increases, the probability that the short rate will remain in regime 1 will 
decline. By contrast, in the high interest rate regime the transition probability 
appears to be determined solely by inflation developments. The latter result is 
consistent with the findings of Ang and Bekaert (2002) who attribute an impor- 
tant role to inflation in influencing the smoothed probability of the high interest 
rate regime (which is specified as a function of the level of the short-rate and the 
spread defined as the difference between the 5 year zero coupon bond long-rates 
and the short rate). In fact, these authors find a positive correlation between the 
smoothed probability of the high interest rate regime and inflation. However, by 
including inflation explicitly in the transition functions, as done here, it can be 
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Conditional 
Mean 
Conditional 
variance 
Transition 
probabilities 
all a21 (72 1 C11 b11 b21 
State 1 Coeff. 0.266* -0.069* 0.012* 0.719 -0.672* -0.906* t-ratio [11.19] [-14.03] [2.47] [1.71] [-3.60] [-5.10] 
-a11/a21=3.8% 
a12 a22 2 X12 b12 b22 
State 2 Coeff. 0.484* -0.069* 1.019* -0.151 0.381* 0.033 
t-ratio [4.60] [-6.54] [12.04] [-0.46] [4.02] [0.27] 
-a12/a22=7.1% 
Mispecification tests 
In regime 1 In regime 2 Across regimes 
Autocorrelation 0.27 3.12 5.281 
ARCH 0.70 2.76 2.70 
Note: indicates rejection at 5% level of the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation or ARCH effects. 
*Coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
Table 2.5. Two-state regime switching model for the US, model with 
inflation and the output gap. 
shown that there is indeed a positive relation that is statistically significant. More 
importantly, the results presented here suggest that inflation is also important for 
explaining the probability of the low rate regime but in this case it is necessary to 
take due account of the output gap. 
The misspecification tests for the US model suggest a better outcome in terms 
of residuals than is the case of the model for Germany. The only sign of misspecifi- 
cation is the evidence of autocorrelation across the regimes whereas all other tests 
are passed by the model. 
Figure 2.4 shows the transition probabilities as a function of inflation and the 
output gap in regime 1. As can be seen in the chart, for high values of 
inflation 
(above 10%), the probability that the interest rate will remain in the low interest 
rate regime is very low, even if the output gap is negative. 
Similarly, when the 
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Figure 2.4. Transition probability of the interest rate remaining in 
regime 1 as a function of the output gap and inflation. 
output gap is above 1 per cent, the probability that the interest rate will remain 
in the low interest rate regime is very small, even if the inflation rate is, just 2 per 
cent. Nevertheless, whenever output is below potential by 1 per cent or more and 
simultaneously inflation is below 6 per cent, the probability that the interest rate 
regime will remain in the low interest rate one is very high (above 90 per cent). 
Figure 2.5 shows the evolution of the estimated transition probabilities over 
the sample period, i. e. the probability that the process of the short-term interest 
rate will shift to regime 1 conditional on being in regime 2 in the previous quarter 
(1-Qt) and the probability of switching to regime 2 conditional on being in regime 
1 in the previous period (1-Pt). The charts suggest that up to the beginning of the 
1980s, regime 2 was an absorbing state, i. e. there was a very high probability that 
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the process of the short-term interest rate would shift to regime 2 and once in this 
regime the probability of going back to regime 1 was almost nil. From the third 
quarter of 1982 to the third quarter of 1993, the probability that the interest rate 
would shift to regime 2 temporarily declined. At the same time, there was a small 
increase in the probability of the regime shifting from regime 2 to regime 1, even 
though it stood at a low level. After this short period and during most of the 1980s, 
there was a much greater tendency for the short rate to shift to regime 2 and once 
in this regime having a low probability of returning to regime 1. However, regime 2 
during this period cannot be considered to be an absorbing state as during most of 
the 1970s there was a small, but nevertheless positive probability of shifting back 
to regime 1. From 1992 onwards the probability that the interest rate shifts to the 
second state becomes very low and is below that of switching from regime 2 to 1 
until almost the end of the sample. 
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Figure 2.6 shows the filtered probability of the interest rate being in the low 
interest rate regime and the corresponding smoothed probability. In the 1970s and 
up to the end of 1982, the interest rate is very likely to have been in the high 
interest rate regime. During this whole period, high inflation and a number of im- 
portant shocks probably contributed to the high interest rate regime, such as the 
oil price shock of 1979 and the Volcker experiment in the period 1979-1982, which 
corresponded to a shift in the monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve towards 
a greater focus on monetary aggregates. During this period the Federal Reserve 
adopted a more aggressive approach in implementing monetary policy, placing a 
stronger emphasis on money growth targets, especially those for M1, and allowing 
interest rates to become high and very volatile (see Federal Reserve, 1998, for a 
history of monetary policy in the US). The Volcker experiment ended in late 1982 
when the Fed suspended its M1 target and changed its policy towards a greater 
focus on inflation and economic activity and placing less weight on monetary aggre- 
gates. As can be seen in the chart, this resulted in a somewhat higher probability of 
the interest rate being in the low interest rate regime. The Federal Reserve policy 
became less accommodative in the late 1980s and this corresponded to a decline 
in the probability that the interest rate was in the low interest rate regime. How- 
ever, from 1992 onwards the inflation rate declined substantially which explains 
the shift, with high probability, to the low interest rate regime in that period. 
Except for a brief period between the first quarter of 1994 and the first quarter 
of 1995, when there were some concerns that the economy was overheating which 
led to a monetary policy tightening, interest rates were with high probability in 
the low interest rate regime until almost the end of the sample. This probability 
declines in the end of 1998, the last year of the sample. 
It should be noted that the findings that monetary policy in the US seems to 
have been in only one regime from the 1970s to the early 1980s is fully in line 
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Figure 2.6. Probability of the short-term interest rate being in 
regime 1. 
with the findings of Dolado et al. (2002) which were obtained in a different setting 
than the one followed here. These authors conclude that "Reduced-form estimates 
indicate that US monetary policy can be characterized by a non-linear policy rule 
after 1988, but not before 1979. This finding is consistent with the view that the 
Fed's inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime differ considerably 
from the ones during the Burns-Miller regime. " 
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2.5.3. A weekly MRS model for the US overnight interest rate 
The analysis of the previous section focused on quarterly data. However, the diffu- 
sion models that have been proposed in the finance literature have been designed 
for continuous time. While the previous analysis provided some information on 
regime switching models from a monetary policy perspective, it may also be useful 
to look at a shorter frequency to determine whether the results continue to hold. 
Before turning to the model, the next section provides a descriptive analysis of the 
data. 
2.5.3.1. Descriptive analysis of the weekly data. The data used is weekly 
data on overnight interest rates in the US, corresponding to the period from 1980 
to 1998. All observations correspond to Wednesdays so that day-of-the-week effects 
(documented for the US for instance by Das, 2002) can be avoided. 
Table 2.6 shows some descriptive statistics of the interest rate series used. 
During the period under review the US overnight interest rate average was 7.7%. 
The Table shows that the short-rate was subject to strong oscillations, with a 
minimum of 2.6% and a maximum of 22.4% and a standard deviation of around 3.5 
percentage points. This can also be seen in the series for the first difference of the 
short rate, with the maximum and minimum weekly changes above 8 percentage 
points. The skewness measure points to a long right tail in the probability 
function 
as is evident in Figure 2.7. By contrast, the probability density function 
for the first 
difference of the short-term interest rate appears to be symmetric, as is suggested 
also by Figure 2.8. For both the level and the first difference, the value of 
kurtosis 
is higher than that of the normal distribution, reflecting fat tails, particularly in the 
case of the first difference series. This is confirmed 
by the Jarque-Bera test which 
strongly rejects the normality of the series, both in 
levels and in first differences. 
54 
Mean 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Standard deviation 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Jarque-Bera test of normality 
[p-value] 
r 
7.718 
22.36 
2.6 
3.543 
1.296 
4.869 
422.18 [0.00] 
dr 
-0.0093 
8.12 
-8.15 
1.036 
0.069 
17.015 
8110.950 [0.00] 
Table 2.6. Characteristics of the US overnight rate (weekly data, 
1980-1998). 
Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 show the probability density functions of the level 
and the weekly change in the overnight interest rate estimated with an Epanech- 
nikov kernel density function. As regards the level, it appears that the probability 
density function of the short-term interest rate is bimodal, with peaks around 5% 
and 10%. In addition, there appears to be a third local maximum at around 15%. 
Therefore, it could hypothetically be the result of a mixture of two or three uni- 
modal distributions. Given the low probability attached to the third maximum, a 
model including two regimes is selected. 
2.5.3.2. A high frequency Markov Regime Switching model for the US 
short-rate. The model used for describing the high frequency behaviour of the 
short-rate is basically the same as in section 2.5.2. However, the introduction of 
macroeconomic factors, for which high frequency data are not available, requires 
some adjustments in order to take into account the slower moving nature of the 
macroeconomic variables in the transition probability functions. Namely, the fol- 
lowing transition functions are specified: 
Ptw = 41)(c11 + 
b117Ttm-1 + b21Ytq-1) 
Qtw = ýD(C12 + bl2rtm-1 + 
b22Ytq-1) (2.28 
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Figure 2.7. Probability density function of the level of the short rate 
(weekly data, 1980-1998). 
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Figure 2.8. Probability density function of weekly change in the 
short rate (weekly data, 1980-1998). 
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in these functions the time subscript reflects the different frequencies used. While 
the transition probabilities are defined in weekly terms (therefore the subscript 
tw), the inflation rate used corresponds to the one of the previous month (tm_1). 
This reflects the fact that data on prices are available only with a delay and so it is 
necessary to adjust the models in order to obtain a more accurate approximation 
of the flow of information. Similarly, the output gap is given the subscript tq, 
to indicate that information on the output gap is available only at a quarterly 
frequency and a delay of one quarter is assumed. 
A further change relative to the quarterly models is that the weekly model 
makes the volatility of the short-rate depend on the level of the interest rate. This 
is the general form of the model of Chan et. al 
process in state i be: 
Al-t 
= /-tit + Eit (2.29) 
and 4)t_1 represent the information available at time t-1, then, the specification of 
volatility is the following: 
E [E tI()t-l] = 07z, rt-1272 (2.30) 
where the parameter 7 is allowed to vary between the regimes. 
The results for the estimation of the model are shown in Table 2.7. As in the 
quarterly models, the estimates suggest that the short rate follows two distinct 
regimes, which can be characterised as a regime of high interest rates and high 
volatility and a regime of low interest rates and low volatility. However, contrary 
to the findings with quarterly data, the speed of mean reversion in the weekly 
model appears to be much lower in the low interest rate regime than in the high 
rate one. As regards the transition probabilities, inflation now appears to be the 
(1992). Letting the short rate 
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Conditional 
Mean 
Conditional 
variance 
Transition 
probabilities 
all a21 071 i'1 C11 b11 b21 
State 1 Coeff. 0.043* -0.007* 0.078* 0.647* 1.930* -0.090* 0.037 
t-ratio [3.93] [-5.39] [3.70] [6.29] [21.12] [-3.62] [0.97] 
-a11 /a21 =6.4% 
a12 a22 072 '72 X12 b12 b22 
State 2 Coeff. 0.272* -0.030* 0.273* 0.783* 0.391* 0.139* 0.028 
t-ratio [4.07] [-3.29] [4.16] [9.50] [3.29] [5.91] [0.51] 
-a12/a22 9.0% 
* Coefficients statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
Table 2.7. Two-state regime-switching model for the United States: 
model with time-varying conditional volatility. 
most important variable determining the shifts, with the output gap coefficient 
being insignificant in both regimes. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.9, the behaviour of the short-term interest rate 
in the period from 1980 to the end of 1998 has been characterised by relatively 
frequent regime switching. Nevertheless, several periods can be distinguished. In 
the beginning of the 1980s, the Volcker experiment appears to be well captured 
by the model, which attributes a low probability to the interest rate being in 
the "high" interest rate regime. In the periods from 1982 to 1994,1986-1991 and 
1997-1998 there was a high probability that the interest rate was in the low interest 
rate regime. The period form the early 1990s to 1997 is the period where regime 
switches appear to have been more intense. 
Figure 2.10 compares the quarterly averages of the probability of the interest 
rate being in the "low" interest rate regime from the weekly model with the corre- 
sponding figures obtained from the quarterly model. It should be noted up-front 
that this comparison has some limitations. First, the weekly model refers to the 
overnight rate while the quarterly model is applied to the three-month Treasury 
58 
bill. Second, the regimes identified differ in many respects, for instance in terms 
of the long-run level implied for the short-term interest rate. 
Bearing these caveats in mind, some similarities in the results can nevertheless 
be seen (see figure 2.10). First, the results of the weekly model confirm that the 
beginning of the 1980s was characterised by "high" interest rates and that during 
the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, regime switches were more frequent than at 
other times. The weekly results also concur with the quarterly ones for the last 
years of the sample period, pointing to a period of low interest rates. The main 
difference between the two models is that while the results of the weekly model 
suggest that during most of the 1980s the short-term interest rate was more likely 
to have remained in a "low" interest rate regime, the results of the quarterly model 
suggest that it was more likely to have remained in the "high" interest rate regime. 
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Figure 2.10. Probabilities of the low interest rate regime from the 
quarterly model and corresponding quarterly averages obtained from 
the weekly model. 
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2.5.4. Threshold (TAR) models of the short-term interest rate 
In this section the threshold models described in section 2.4 are applied to the 
US and Germany. Starting with the TAR model, the estimated equation is the 
following: 
Ort = (all + a2lrt-i)(1 -I [qt > c]) + (ail + a22rt-i)I [qt > c] + Et (2.31) 
As explained in section 2.4, for the purpose of the estimation, the variable qt was 
set equal to a function of a one quarter lagged inflation and output gap, with 
b1=1.5 and b2=0.5, which can be interpreted as a kind of a Taylor rule. However, 
it should be noted that given this formulation and the fact that no use is made 
of the equilibrium interest rate to construct this type of Taylor rule, the values 
assumed by qt should not be seen as indicative of the appropriate level of the 
short-term interest rate. 
The above equation has the property that for a known threshold level c, the 
equation can be estimated by ordinary least squares. The estimation is therefore 
performed by making a grid search over all possible values of c and selecting the 
value of c that minimises the residual sum of squares. It is straightforward to 
verify that the candidate values for c are those equal to the observed values for the 
variable qt. In order to test the significance of the estimated threshold value c it 
is convenient to compute the following Likelihood-Ratio statistic: 
LR c' =n 
ýa 02 (s)) 
c2 /C) 
(2.32) 
where &2 (c) is the residual variance from the model corresponding to the value of 
the threshold that minimises the residual sum of squares and -2 (c') the residual 
variance obtained with another threshold value c'. 
62 
Coefficient Point 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
P-value 
Regime 1 all 0.41 0.28 0.14 
a21 -0.09* 0.04 0.04 
-all/a21=4.6% 
Regime 2 a12 1.62* 0.62 0.01 
a22 -0.15* 0.06 0.02 
-a12/a22=10.7% 
R-squared 0.10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 
Mispecification tests 
Serial Correlation LM Test: 4 lags Obs*R-squared: 21.73; Prob.: 0.00 
ARCH Test: 4 lags Obs*R-squared: 9.22; Prob.: 0.06 
Note: Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test. 
* Coefficients statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
Table 2.8. TAR model for Germany. 
This statistic has been proposed by Hansen (1997) who also computes the 
corresponding critical values. If the likelihood ratio does not change very much in 
a boundary of the estimated value, then it can be assessed, with a given degree 
of confidence, whether the estimated threshold is statistically significant. One 
drawback of TAR models is the fact that the function implies a discontinuity in 
the process, making usual misspecification tests invalid (see Franses and van Dijk, 
2000). 
2.5.4.1. Results for Germany. The results of the estimation of the TAR model 
for Germany, using quarterly data, are shown in Table 2.8. The model appears to 
identify two clearly distinct regimes. A first regime is one of low interest rates (the 
long-run mean for this regime is 4.6%) while a second regime is a regime where 
interest rates are high (the long-run mean for this regime is 10.7%). The value for 
the long-run mean for the low interest rate regime is somewhat higher than the 
one obtained with the MRS model (3.8%), while the mean for the high interest 
rate regime is also higher than in the MRS model (9.8%). 
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Figure 2.11. Likelihood ratio statistic for different values of the 
threshold - Germany. 
The likelihood ratio tests for several values of the threshold variable (=several 
values taken by the "Taylor rule") are shown in Figure 2.11, together with the 
corresponding 80% and 95% critical values following Hansen (1997). It appears 
clear that the minimisation of the residual sum of squares occurs for large values 
of the "Taylor rule", even though there is some uncertainty surrounding the point 
forecast of the threshold given that for values of the rule between 17 and 18 the 
likelihood ratio statistic remains below the 80% critical value. 
Figure 2.12 provides information on how the interest rate observations were 
distributed across the regimes. The estimates of the TAR model imply two distinct 
05 10 15 t 20 
Rule 17.9 
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Figure 2.12. TAR Model for Germany - allocation of observations 
by regime and comparison with the MRS model. 
periods. During the period from 1970 to the end of 1981, the process of the short- 
rate is mainly in the high interest rate regime with only a few observations being 
picked up from the "low" interest rate regime. In this respect, the results of the 
TAR model, in terms of the selection of regimes, are very much in line with those of 
the MRS model, which, with few exceptions, attributes a probability close to zero 
to the low interest rate regime during the periods where the TAR model allocates 
the observations to the high interest rate regime. However, from 1981 onwards, the 
results of the TAR model point to only one regime of the short-term interest rate, 
corresponding to the "low" interest rate regime. This contrasts with the findings 
of the Markov Regime Switching model, which pointed to a temporary switch to 
the high rate regime during the late 1980s/early 1990s. 
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Coefficient Point Standard P-value 
estimate error 
Regime 1 all 0.54 0.30 0.07 
a21 -0.11* 0.05 0.02 
-au/a21 =5.0% Regime 2 a12 1.35* 0.53 0.01 
a22 -0.12* 0.06 0.03 
-a12/a22 =11.1% 
R-squared 0.11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 
Mispecification tests 
Serial Correlation LM Test: 4 lags Obs*R-squared: 21.76; Prob.: 0.00 
ARCH Test: 4 lags Obs*R-squared: 23.67 Prob.: 0.00 
Note: Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test. 
* Coefficients statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
Table 2.9. TAR model for the United States. 
2.5.4.2. Results for the United States. The estimates of the TAR model for 
the United States are shown in Table 2.9. Two regimes are found, one where the 
mean rate was 11.1% and another where the short-rate was 5.0%. However, the 
estimates for regime 1, the low interest rate regime, are uncertain as the coefficient 
on the constant is not significant at the 5% level. 
The analysis of the allocation of the observations by regime shows two distinct 
periods (see Figure 2.13). Before the second quarter of 1982, most of the observa- 
tions are allocated to the regime of high interest rates. Thereafter, all observations 
are allocated to the first regime of low interest rates. Thus, the results of the TAR 
model up to the early 1980s are very much in line with those obtained with the 
MRS model estimated with quarterly data. However, there are clear differences 
in the results of the models for the later period. In particular, the TAR model 
does not capture the shift back to the high interest rate regime between the first 
quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 1995, and does not suggest that the switch- 
ing between regimes was more frequent during the 1980s. In turn, these results 
are more in line with those obtained with the MRS model estimated with weekly 
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Figure 2.13. TAR model for the US - allocation of observations by 
regime and comparison with MRS model. 
data, which, with high probability, pointed to the occurrence of only one regime 
(of "low" interest rates) from 1993 to the end of the sample period (see section 
2.5.3). 
However, it should be noted that the examination of the likelihood ratio statistic 
(see Figure 2.14) shows that the threshold value is poorly estimated. The minimum 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic is reached for a value of the rule of 11.4. However, 
all the LR statistics obtained for a value of the rule above 10 and below 15 are 
also below the 80% critical value. In particular, there is another local minimum 
(for values of the rule of 13.3) which would produce a residual sum of squares 
well below the critical values. Thus, the estimate of the threshold value is rather 
imprecise which implies some caution in interpreting the results. 
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2.5.5. Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) models 
In the estimation of the STAR model, the following specification was used: 
Ort = (all + a2lrt-1) (I- F(qt, c)) + (a12 + a22rt-1)F(gt, c) + Et (2.33) 
Given the results obtained with the MRS model suggesting that the short-rate 
follows a mean reverting process in both regimes, it is decided to choose the logistic 
function for the transition function instead of an exponential one. Therefore, the 
estimated model is an LSTAR model. 
A first estimation was performed assuming the following transition function: 
(qt, c) = 
1 
1 -ý- exp(-7(qt - c)) 
(2.34) 
where qt = b17rt + b2yt , 
is a function of inflation (7) and the output gap (y). 
However, the results were not satisfactory as the parameter cy, which measures 
the smoothness of the adjustment, turned out to be difficult to estimate and was 
systematically insignificant. This problem has been found before in the literature 
(see Franses and van Dijk, 2000, page 91). In order to obviate the problem, the 
restriction -y=l was imposed, and the function used was simply the following: 
(qt, c) =1 I+ exp(c + b17rt + b2yt) 
(2.35) 
Thus, this function attaches a weight to the first state that is increasing with the 
value of the monetary policy "rule". 
A problem faced in the empirical estimation of STAR models for the US and 
Germany relates to the presence of outliers. As can be seen in Figure 2.15 and 
Figure 2.6 in both countries there are clear instances where the short-term rate 
shows strong oscillations that could be classified as outliers. In the case of Germany, 
there seems to be outliers in the years of 1973,1974 and in the early 1980s. In the 
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Figure 2.15. Short-term interest rate - Germany (quarter-on-quarter 
percentage changes) 
case of the United States, the outliers seem to occur mainly in the early 1980s. The 
presence of outliers affects the estimation of the STAR models based on non-linear 
least squares as well as leading to problems of autocorrelation in the model. To 
overcome the problem, dummy variables are introduced in the model in order to 
offset the effect of a few observations that were "responsible" for the difficulties in 
maximizing the likelihood function. It should be noted that this problem was not 
faced in the MRS model which suggests that such approach may be more robust 
in accommodating exceptional observations than STAR models. 
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Figure 2.16. Short-term interest rate - United States (quarter-on- 
quarter percentage changes) 
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2.5.5.1. Results for Germany. The results of the estimation of the STAR 
model for Germany by nonlinear least squares are shown in Table 2.10. The mod- 
els include two dummies in order to capture the outliers mentioned above. The 
dummies DUM74Q1 and DUM81Q1 take the value 1 in the first quarter of 1974 
and 1981 respectively and zero otherwise. As can be seen in the table, the STAR 
model implies a low interest rate regime (regime 1), where the long-run level of the 
short-term interest rate is 4.0% and a regime of high interest rates (regime 2), with 
a long-run mean of 13.3%. With respect to the findings in the MRS, the results 
of the STAR model for the high interest rate regime imply a much stronger mean 
reversion of the interest rate in the high interest rate regime (0.42 versus 0.17 in 
the case of the MRS) and a slower mean reversion in the low interest rate regime 
(0.09 versus 0.157). 
As regards the transition function, an increase in inflation or the output gap 
leads to a lower weight given to the low interest rate regime and a higher weight 
given to the high rate regime. This is in line with a Taylor rule like behaviour of 
the central bank. However, as found before, the coefficient of inflation is again not 
statistically significant and therefore it appears that the output gap is the most 
relevant variable explaining the regime shifts. 
As for the misspecification tests, it should be noted that commonly used LM 
tests for autocorrelation are not valid in a STAR model. The appropriate LM test 
in this context is the one proposed by Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996). According 
to the test results, shown in Table 2.10, there are no signs of autocorrelation in the 
model for Germany. In addition, no signs were found of autocorrelation or ARCH 
effects on the residuals. However, it should be noted that the dummy variables 
play an important role in these results. 
Figure 2.17 shows the transition function of the STAR model for Germany and 
the probability of the low interest rate regime from the MRS model estimated in 
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Art= (all+a2lrt-1)(1 
- F(qt, c)) + (a12+a22rt-1)F(gt, c)+ 
+d1DUM74Ql + d2DUM81Ql + Et 
F(qt, c) =1 1+exp (c+bl lrt +b2 yt ) 
Coefficient Point Standard P-value 
estimate error 
Regime 1 all 0.36 0.20 0.07 
a21 -0.09* 0.03 0.00 
-all/a21 =4.0% 
Regime 2 a12 5.59* 1.27 0.00 
a22 -0.42* 0.11 0.00 
-a12/a22 =13.3% 
dl -2.01* 0.86 0.02 
d2 3.95* 0.75 0.00 
Transition function c 29.62 16.65 0.08 
bl -0.24 0.56 0.67 
b2 -3.38 1.99 0.09 
R-squared 0.47 
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 
Mispecification tests 
Serial Correlation LM Test: 4 lags Test statistic: 7.77 Prob.: 0.10 
ARCH Test: 4 lags Obs*R-squared: 4.30 Prob.: 0.37 
Note: Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996) autocorrelation test. 
* Coefficients statistically different from zero at 5% level. 
Table 2.10. STAR model for Germany. 
section 2.5.2.1. The results show that except for two periods in the 1970s, the 
short-term rate has followed the low interest rate regime. This contrasts with the 
results obtained with the MRS model which suggest that in the early 1990s the 
short-term rate had temporarily shifted to the high interest regime. One way to 
interpret these results is to note that the transition function is high in periods of 
high volatility in the short rate which may signal that the transition function is 
adjusting to these periods in order to improve the fit of the process. 
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Figure 2.17. Model for Germany - transition function of the STAR 
model and probability of the low interest rate regime from the MRS 
model. 
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2.5.5.2. United States. The results for the estimation of the STAR model for 
the US are shown in Table 2.11. The model includes an impulse dummy variable 
for the fourth quarter of 1980. As seen in the table, the results of the estimation 
are disappointing given that most of the coefficients are not statistically different 
from zero. Although the model does not show signs of autocorrelation, there are 
signs of ARCH effects in the residuals which could be responsible for the low t- 
statistics of the coefficients. In this respect, it has proved infeasible to remove the 
ARCH effects by introducing dummy variables in the model. Therefore, the model 
has been reestimated fitting a GARCH(1,1) model to the residuals instead. The 
results are shown in Table 2.12. However, this latter model, while not evidencing 
anymore ARCH effects in the residuals, now shows autocorrelation which is also 
undesirable and implies some caution in the interpretation of the results. 
Drawing on the model with GARCH effects, the estimates point to two regimes 
of the short rate, where a first regime (regime 1) is one of low interest rates (the 
long-run mean is around 4%) while in a second regime the short-rate follows a 
random walk with drift, given that the mean reversion coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. As regards the transition function, the coefficient on inflation is 
not statistically different from zero while the term on the output gap is significantly 
different from zero. Thus, the transition function implies that the regime followed 
by the short-term interest rate becomes one of a random walk when the output 
gap is large. 
The estimated transition functions for both the models with and without 
GARCH effects are shown in Figure 2.18. It shows that during the volatile periods 
of 1973-75 and the early 1980s, the model attaches a much stronger weight to the 
random walk regime. However, thereafter the model shows that the short-rate was 
most of the time in the low rate regime. These results seem to contradict those 
obtained with the MRS model and those of Dolado et al. (2002) that point to a 
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Art = (all + a2lrt-i)F(gt, c) + (a12 + a22rt-1)(1 - F(qt, c 
(qt, c) =1 1+exp(c+bl 7rt+b2yt ) 
+ +d1DUM8OQ4 + Et 
Coefficient Point Standard P-value 
estimate error 
Regime 1 all 0.30 0.21 0.15 
a21 -0.08* 0.03 0.01 
-all/a21=3.8% 
Regime 2 a12 0.38 0.61 0.54 
a22 0.05 0.08 0.52 
-a12/a22=7.6% 
dl 4.64* 0.55 0.00 
Transition function c -7.16 7.09 0.32 
bl 0.16 0.35 0.65 
b2 2.10 2.26 0.36 
R-squared 0.49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 
Mispecification tests 
Serial Correlation LM Test: 4 lags Obs*R-squared: 8.88 Prob.: 0.06 
ARCH Test: 4 lags Obs*R-squared: 29.7 Prob.: 0.00 
Note: Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996) autocorrelation test. 
* Coefficients statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
Table 2.11. STAR model for the United States. 
stronger degree of regime switching after the early 1980s. However, the results of 
the US STAR model would still corroborate the assertion that there are significant 
differences between the two periods in the way monetary policy was conducted. 
Finally, it should be noted that the fact that there is evidence of autocorrelation 
in the STAR model would caution against overemphasising its results, suggesting 
that the MRS findings may be more reliable. 
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Ort = (all + a2lrt-i)F(gt, c) + (ail + a22rt-1)(1 - F(qt, c)) + d1DUM80 + Et 
(qt, c) =1 l+exp(c+blirt+b2yt 
var(Et) = Qt =y+ aE +09 t-i 
Coefficient Point Standard P-value 
estimate error 
Regime 1 all 0.52* 0.17 0.00 
a21 -0.13* 0.03 0.00 
-all /a21 =4.0% 
Regime 2 a12 1.22* 0.56 0.03 
a22 -0.01 0.09 0.94 
-a12/a22 =122.0% 
dl 4.17* 0.34 0.00 
Transition function c -3.92* 1.47 0.01 
bl 0.15 0.11 0.15 
b2 0.85* 0.41 0.04 
GARCH (1,1) terms 0.07* 0.02 0.01 
cx 0.81* 0.26 0.00 
ß 0.18 0.15 0.23 
R-squared 0.45 
Adjusted R-squared 0.40 
Mispecification tests 
Serial Correlation LM Test: 4 lags Obs*R-squared: 13.6 Prob.: 0.00 
ARCH Test: 4 lags Obs*R-squared: 1.22 Prob.: 0.87 
Note: Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996) autocorrelation test. 
* Coefficients statistically different from zero at the 5% level. 
Table 2.12. STAR model for the United States with ARCH(1,1) effects. 
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Figure 2.18. STAR model for the United States - transition function. 
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2.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter, models of the short-term interest rate incorporating features 
from both monetary economics and finance approaches are specified and estimated 
for Germany and the US. The three proposed class of models are the Markov 
Regime Switching (MRS) model, the Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model and 
the Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) model. The main novelty of the 
approach followed here is to make the transitions between the regimes a function 
of a monetary policy rule. 
In the MRS model, monetary policy considerations are included by specifying 
the transition probabilities as a function of the output gap and inflation. The 
macroeconomic variables determine the probability of the interest rate following a 
specific process but not the process it is following in each regime. This allows for 
the use of finance models conditional on a specific regime while at the same time 
making them a function of macroeconomic developments. 
In this study it is shown that the MRS specification has more similarities with 
TAR models of the short-term rate than with STAR models. In fact, while TAR 
models assume that the short-rate follows a fixed number of regimes (as is also 
the case of MRS model), in STAR approaches the short-rate follows a continuum 
of regimes given by a weighted average of a number of "extreme" regimes. Thus, 
STAR models cannot be reconciled with the other two approaches and are not 
so well suited to fulfill the objective of using in a straightforward way standard 
models of the finance literature. 
The results for the estimation of the models for Germany and the US show 
some variation according to which of the three methodologies is chosen. However, 
there is evidence in all cases that the short rate followed different regimes during 
the periods studied. 
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In the Markov Regime Switching approach the estimated models for both coun- 
tries suggest that the short-term interest rate switched between a first state of low 
interest rates and low volatility and a second state of high interest rates and high 
volatility. In both countries, there is evidence that the short-rate is mean reverting, 
which contrasts with the results of Gray (1996) and Ang and Bekaert (2002) for the 
US which point to mean reversion only in the high interest rate regime. The fact 
that the low (high) volatility regime corresponds to a regime where the interest 
rate is low (high) confirms previous evidence (Chan et al., 1992; Gray, 1996) that 
the volatility of the short-rate is positively related to its level. The estimation of a 
weekly model for the US where this feature is included provided further evidence 
that this is the case. 
The results for Germany suggest that switching probabilities in this country are 
a function of the output gap while inflation was found insignificant and therefore 
does not seem to enter the transition functions. 
As regards the US, both the output gap and inflation appear to influence the 
probability of the interest rate remaining in the low interest rate regime but not 
the transition probability of it being in the high interest rate regime. In the 
latter case, only inflation appears to influence the probability of the interest rate 
remaining in the high interest rate regime. This is in line with the suggestion 
of Ang and Bekaert (2002) that inflation plays an important role in explaining 
the smoothed probability of the US interest rate being in the high interest rate 
regime. The results presented in this dissertation for the MRS model including 
macroeconomic variables suggest that inflation is also relevant in influencing the 
probability of the persistence of the low interest rate regime. However, in this case 
the output gap also plays a role. These findings confirm those of Bansal and Zhou 
(2002) that the business cycle may be an important determinant of regime shifts 
but they characterise better this dependence: while in a low interest rate regime 
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both output and inflation influence the transition probability, the high interest 
rate regime appears to correspond to periods where the central bank is primarily 
concerned with inflation. 
An analysis of the historical evolution of the probabilities of the short-term 
interest rates being in each regime suggests that the estimated models are, to a large 
extent, capable of capturing shifts in monetary policy that are well documented in 
the literature. 
The results of the estimation of Threshold Autoregressive models again point 
to the existence of more than one regime. In the case of Germany and the US, 
the results suggest that the short-rate is a mean-reverting process in both regimes. 
However, in both cases the coefficient on the constant in the low rate regime is im- 
precisely estimated. As regards the effects of macroeconomic variables, the model 
for Germany provides evidence of threshold effects with economic developments 
determining the process followed by the short rate. However, particularly for the 
US, the estimate for the threshold is rather imprecise, suggesting that the short 
rate could follow more than two regimes. 
As regards the results for the STAR models, a first finding is that the estimation 
of this model is very sensitive to the presence of outliers in the data, requiring the 
inclusion of dummy variables in the models to make the estimation feasible. Under 
this approach, satisfactory results for Germany were obtained with evidence of 
mean reversion of the short rate in both regimes and with macro factors influencing 
the transition between the regimes with the expected sign. However, as in the case 
of the MRS model, only the output gap seems to be important in determining 
the switches between regimes, with the coefficients on inflation being insignificant. 
The results for the US are not so satisfactory as there is evidence of ARCH effects 
in the residuals or, when correcting for these, of autocorrelation thereby impairing 
inference. 
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Overall, the analysis provided evidence suggesting that macroeconomic vari- 
ables linked to monetary policy are important in the modelling of the short-term 
interest rate. This evidence is particularly strong in the case of the Markov Regime 
Switching model, which produces the best results. As directions for further work, 
it would be useful to exploit further specifications of the transition functions in 
the MRS model. In this regard, the current approach implies that the transition 
probabilities are a function of the one-period level of inflation and the output gap. 
However, one could consider using instead several lagged inflation and output gap 
terms for inclusion in the function. 
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2. A. Definition of affine yield models 
Following Dai and Singleton (2000), affine term structure models are those 
where the instantaneous short rate follows an affine (i. e. linear) function of a 
vector of unobserved state variables Y(t)=(Yl(t), Y2(t),..., YN(t)): 
N 
r(t) = bo + 6jyj(t) = So + 6yY(t) (2.36) 
Z-1 
where öj, i=0,..., N are parameters to be estimated. 
In turn, the vector of state variables (Y(t)) follows an affine diffusion: 
dY(t) = K(B - Y(t))dt +E S(t)dW(t) (2.37) 
where W (t) is an N-dimensional independent standard Brownian motion, K and 
S are NxN matrices and S (t) is a diagonal matrix with the ith diagonal element 
given by: 
S(t)22 = a2 + N2 (2.38) 
These models imply that the S matrix is an affine function of the state variables. 
Given this specification of the short-rate, Duffee and Kan (1996) show that the 
price at time t of a zero coupon bond maturing at time T is given by: 
P(t, T) = ea(T)-B(T)'Y(t) (2.39) 
where T= T-t and A and B are obtained as satisfying the ordinary differential 
equations: 
n 
dA(T) 
_ -9'K'B(T) +1 
[ES(T)]2 ai - bo (2.40) dT 2 
i-1 
n dB(T) 
_ -KB(T) 
+1[ B(T)]2 oi - (Sy 
(2.41) 
dT 2 
i=1 
LJ 
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these term structure models are called affine because the bond yield defined as: 
- 
log(P(t' 7-» 
- -A (T) + B(T)Y(t) 
(2.42) 
T 
is a linear function of the state variables. 
CHAPTER 3 
"Announcement Effects" of Monetary Policy 
3.1. Introduction 
Central banks usually take monetary policy decisions following central bank 
meetings, at which the appropriate course of action is discussed and, in some cases, 
voted. Such decisions are not always perfectly anticipated by financial markets, 
but may lead to movements in financial asset prices in response, the so-called 
"announcement" effects. Monetary policy announcement effects are then the result 
of the adjustment of financial asset prices by financial market participants to the 
information or news produced when central banks take a monetary policy decision, 
which, in this study, is equivalent to taking a decision concerning the level of the 
central bank interest rate. 
This chapter conducts an event study of the existence of announcement effects 
of monetary policy decisions on financial asset returns and volatility. The analysis 
is focused on the US monetary policy and investigates announcement effects of the 
US-Federal Reserve decisions on the return and volatility of US stocks, long-term 
interest rates and the US-dollar exchange rate against the Deutsche Mark/euro. In 
addition, the study also investigates the effects of US monetary policy announce- 
ments on the return and volatility of stocks and bonds in Germany and on US 
inflation expectations derived from index-linked bonds. 
Announcement effects of monetary policy are usually understood to be the 
reaction of market participants to unanticipated decisions on central bank interest 
rates. In principle, if asset prices are set in a forward-looking way, then they 
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should already price in expected policy changes and therefore should only react to 
the unexpected component of the monetary policy announcement. In this study, 
however, the reaction to expected changes in central bank rates is also going to be 
analysed, which is relevant for the study of the efficiency of financial markets. 
In analysing the responses of financial markets to central bank actions, this 
study takes a broad view as to what constitutes a monetary policy decision. Early 
studies of announcement effects of monetary policy focused only on the effect 
of changes in central bank rates on financial asset prices (see Cook and Hahn 
1986,1988). However, it can be argued that whenever a central bank meets to 
decide on the monetary policy stance, the outcome of the meeting should always be 
considered as a decision, even if the central bank decides to keep rates unchanged. 
For instance, if the central bank unexpectedly keeps interest rates unchanged when 
there is a strong market expectation of a rate change this may potentially cause 
a stronger effect on market prices than if the central bank would change rates as 
expected. In this latter case, it is usual in the literature to classify these events as 
"non-announcement" effects. ' 
The study of announcement effects is of interest for the analysis of the pre- 
dictability of central bank decisions. In general, it is thought that the higher 
the predictability of monetary policy decisions, the more "credible" is the central 
bank. To the extent that monetary policy should be predictable, the existence 
of announcement effects could signal deficiencies in the communication with the 
markets on the part of the central bank. The study of announcement effects of 
monetary policy can provide useful information for assessing the performance of 
central banks in this respect. 
'Given the broad view of what constitutes monetary policy decisions adopted in this study, 
such occasions should not be treated differently from the case when the central bank actually 
changes interest rates. Therefore, the terms "non-announcement effects" are probably not the 
most adequate for designating these effects. 
86 
A further motivation for studying announcement effects of monetary policy is 
to improve the understanding of the behaviour of financial asset returns and their 
volatility, which is a central issue in financial economics. The fact that central 
bank meetings are held at irregular intervals implies that announcement effects in 
financial markets should also tend to occur at unequal periods. Models specifying 
the behaviour of financial variables with a regular periodicity, for instance weekly 
or monthly, will be unable to capture irregular patterns caused by announcement 
effects. However, if a predictable pattern in volatility can be found around central 
bank meetings, then improvements to existing models of financial market volatility 
could be made. The results may be particularly interesting in terms of forecasting, 
given that the schedule of central bank meetings of major central banks (the US 
Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, European Central Bank) for 
each year is known in advance. Therefore, a further motivation for studying the 
existence of announcement effects of monetary policy is to improve models of fi- 
nancial market returns and/or volatility by taking into account possible systematic 
movements around central bank meetings or decisions. 
By improving the knowledge on how central bank decisions affect volatility, 
the results of this research may also be useful to provide information that can be 
used by central banks to reduce unnecessary volatility in financial markets. For 
instance, the results of this research can provide some information as to whether it 
is desirable to take monetary policy decisions at meetings that have been previously 
scheduled (implying that the market might expect a decision to take place) or at 
unscheduled meetings. 
An additional contribution of this study is to investigate the existence of an- 
nouncement effects of monetary policy by using multivariate models of volatility, 
including both persistence and clustering effects (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). 
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The use of multivariate methods is useful in the analysis of announcement ef- 
fects because it allows for controlling for volatility spillover effects between the 
different markets. The existence of these effects can make it more difficult to cap- 
ture announcement effects using only univariate models. The model used includes 
three assets, namely bonds, stocks and the exchange rate, while existing studies on 
macroeconomic announcement effects usually do not include more than two assets. 
The research in this chapter extends recent findings by considering the forma- 
tion of expectations around policy decisions, i. e. taking into account both monetary 
policy "surprises" and the expected component of the monetary policy decision, 
while most studies focus only on the surprise component. In addition, it studies 
both occasions when the central bank changes interest rates (at scheduled meet- 
ings or unscheduled meetings) and situations when the central bank keeps rates 
unchanged but holds a meeting (non-announcement effect). This last aspect has 
tended to be overlooked in the literature which has mainly focused on occasions 
when central banks change interest rates (see for instance Smirlock and Yawitz, 
1985, or Fleming and Remolona, 1997). Exceptions are Roley and Sellon (1998) 
and Bomfim (2003) who find evidence of "nonannouncement" effects when central 
banks leave interest rate unchanged in scheduled meetings. A further contribution 
of this thesis is to extend the analysis to the case where the central bank is assumed 
to be continuously producing announcements effects. 
A further contribution of this chapter is to analyse cross-country announcement 
effects of US monetary policy by investigating whether monetary policy surprises 
and expectations of US monetary policy have an effect on the returns of stock 
prices and bond yields in Germany. 
Finally, in this study a high frequency approach is used to analyse the question 
of whether the central bank is thought to have an information advantage relative to 
financial markets, in particular regarding inflation developments (see Romer and 
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Romer, 2000; Faust, Swanson and Wright, 2002, and Ellingsen and Söderstrom, 
2001). A central bank's informational advantage could arise from a privileged 
access to information or from the fact that central banks are better able to assess 
the economic situation given that they devote more resources to economic analysis 
(see Romer and Romer, 2000). Even if the central bank is perfectly credible, the 
existence of an informational advantage from the part of the central bank implies 
that monetary policy decisions may contain useful information for the markets, 
thereby causing adjustments in financial market prices when they are announced. 
So far, tests of this hypothesis have been done mainly with lower frequency data 
on inflation expectations. This chapter extends the research on this issue by using 
high frequency data on inflation expectations in the US derived from index-linked 
bonds. An advantage of the use of high frequency data is that it facilitates the 
testing of the effect of monetary policy announcements on the volatility of inflation 
expectations. 
The methodology used in this study is based on that commonly used in event 
studies, relying on parametric models for modelling the return and volatility of each 
asset and using dummy variables to take into account news effects. The use of an 
event study methodology allows for concentrating the analysis on periods where 
it is likely that shocks related to monetary policy are affecting financial market 
returns, thereby facilitating the identification of the announcement effects. The 
approach relies mostly on univariate and multivariate GARCH models to model 
financial market asset returns and volatility. Nevertheless, also announcement 
effects using implied volatility measures in stocks are tested in this chapter. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on 
announcement effects mentioning both methodological issues and the theoretical 
predictions on how the return and volatility of financial assets react to monetary 
policy surprises. This section also reviews the main empirical findings of studies in 
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the related literature. Section 3.3 presents the empirical approach used, providing 
some institutional background on the US Federal Reserve meeting practices and 
procedures. After reviewing the several ways of estimating the expected and un- 
expected components of a rate change, a choice is made to conduct the analysis 
using surprises and expectations derived from Fed funds futures contracts. The 
section concludes by presenting the univariate GARCH models to be used. In sec- 
tion 3.4, the main results of the analysis for these models are shown. Section 3.5 
looks at the testing of announcement effects using multivariate GARCH models 
while section 3.6 examines the effect of monetary policy announcements on high 
frequency measures of inflation expectations. 
3.2. Literature on announcement effects 
There is a very extensive literature on announcement effects of macroeconomic 
news on financial markets. The literature concerning monetary policy effects on 
financial markets is not so vast. Recent examples of the latter are Gaspar, Perez- 
Quiros and Sicilia (2001) for the money market, Li and Engle (1998) for the Trea- 
sury bond futures, Fleming and Remolona (1997) for the bond market, Bomfim 
(2003) for the stock market and Roley and Sellon (1998) who examine Treasury 
yields, stock prices and futures markets. In this section, some general consid- 
erations regarding alternative methodologies for testing announcement effects are 
discussed and the literature on announcement effects of monetary policy is reviewed 
before proceeding to the empirical approach. 
3.2.1. Event studies: parametric versus nonparametric methods 
Before undergoing a study of announcement effects, a first decision is to choose 
whether to use parametric or nonparametric methods. Parametric methods require 
that an assumption be made regarding the distribution of the returns, with the 
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normal distribution being frequently chosen to model these. By contrast, nonpara- 
metric methods are less demanding as regards the choice of the distribution of the 
returns, being more flexible in taking account of deviations from normality, for 
instance due to skewness or, which is very common in financial series, to fat tails 
in the distributions of the returns (excess kurtosis). Nonparametric methods may 
therefore be more robust in the presence of outliers and nonstandard distributional 
properties of the residuals than parametric methods. 
Despite the advantages of nonparametric methods, this study relies on para- 
metric models of the mean and volatility of asset returns. A first reason for this 
choice is that the results from the parametric approach can be related to the mean- 
variance framework that is a cornerstone of standard models of asset pricing used 
in finance. A second reason is that the use of these methods makes the results 
more comparable with the related literature looking at announcement effects of 
monetary policy which has tended to privilege parametric tests. 
In any case, nonparametric methods may be a direction for future research. In 
particular, recent advances in the methods for measuring volatility, such as realised 
volatility which are measures obtained by aggregating the squares of higher fre- 
quency returns (see Andersen, Bollerslev and Diebold, 2003) could be a promising 
alternative. 2 However, such methods require the availability of data of a higher 
frequency than the one of the volatility measure to be computed. For instance, 
in the present study, which focuses on daily volatility, intra-daily data would be 
required to produce a daily realised volatility measure. 
2For example, a measure of daily volatility can be obtained by computing the squares of the 
asset returns over a fixed interval (say 5 minutes) and summing all the observations for the day, 
scaling the result by the number of observations. 
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3.2.2. Response of financial asset returns - methodological issues 
A large part of the literature on monetary policy announcement effects on financial 
markets focuses on the reaction of the financial assets rates of return to monetary 
policy announcements. The study by Cook and Hahn (1988) constitutes one of 
the first studies on the effect of changes in the US Federal funds rate target on US 
Treasury bills rates and government bond yields. The methodology followed by 
Cook and Hahn (1988) consists in estimating by ordinary least squares equations 
of the following form: 
ARt=ß1+ß2 f. fit+ut (3.1) 
where ORt is the daily change in the Treasury bill/note rate and Af ft is the 
change of the Federal Funds rate and ut is an error term. The empirical approach 
followed by Cook and Hahn (1988) is to test whether a change in the Fed funds 
rate has a significant impact on the change in the Treasury securities rates (i. e. 
the hypothesis that ß2 = 0). Numerous other studies have since then followed a 
similar methodology. 
Two main issues can be raised as to the limitations of this approach. A first 
one is econometric, related to the fact that financial market returns frequently 
display considerable heteroscedasticity. By using ordinary least squares to esti- 
mate equation (3.1), the estimators of the coefficients, although still consistent 
and asymptotically normal, are inefficient and inference can no longer be based on 
t-distributions (see for instance Hayashi, 2000, p. 133). Therefore, better results 
may be obtained if this heteroscedasticity is explicitly taken into account in the 
model. 
A second issue has to do with the use of actual interest rate changes for testing 
the effects of monetary policy on asset returns. The approach followed by Cook and 
Hahn (1988) corresponds to what Prabhala (1997) deems the traditional approach 
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for testing for the existence of an information effect of an announcement. In the 
finance literature, this type of approach was first proposed by Fama et al. (1969), 
who examined whether stock returns changed in the months around a stock split. 
These authors argue that if an event has a statistical effect, then there should 
be a corresponding stock price reaction to it. Applying this view to the study of 
monetary policy influences on asset prices, then one should use the change in the 
policy instrument as the explanatory variable of the rates of return of financial 
asset prices. 
However, another strand of literature on event studies has moved towards what 
Prabhala (1997) deems a conditional methodology for testing announcement effects. 
According to this view, anticipated policy actions should have no effect on finan- 
cial market prices, only the unexpected component should be relevant for price 
formation. In the terminology of Fama (1970), this is required for having "market 
efficiency", as the anticipated part of the announcement should already be priced 
in by the time it occurs. 
Reflecting this second view, the literature focusing on announcement effects of 
central bank actions has therefore evolved into considering the reaction of financial 
market prices to both the expected and the unexpected part of the announcement. 
For instance, Fleming and Remolona (1997) and Kuttner (2001) in testing an- 
nouncement effects of monetary policy on market interest rates propose regressions 
of the following type: 
ORt = ß1 + ß20f ft + ß30f ft + ut (3.2) 
where ORt is the daily change in the treasury bill rate or bond yield, Af ft is the 
change in the targeted Federal funds rate that is expected by the market and Af ft 
is the part of the change in the Federal funds rate that is not expected and therefore 
constitutes the "surprise component". It should be noted that the "traditional" 
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approach of equation (3.1) can be obtained as a particular case of equation (3.2), 
when $2 = , 
ß3. Thus, starting with model (3.2), it is always possible to impose 
restrictions to arrive at model (3.1). This makes the conditional approach more 
appealing and more general. An even more general formulation which has become 
standard in the literature is the following: 
ORt = ßl + fl2Af ft + fl3Af ft + ß4Zt + Ut (3.3) 
where Zt is a set of control variables which can be fundamentals explaining asset 
returns, lagged returns or variables capturing calendar effects. 
The main difficulty in implementing the conditional approach is that, contrary 
to the traditional approach, the unexpected change in the monetary policy instru- 
ment needs to be estimated beforehand in order to apply it. The availability of 
several estimation methods of the unexpected component of the change in central 
bank rates creates some uncertainty in the analysis. These methods include using 
available data from surveys of professional forecasters of central bank decisions; 
estimating such unexpected component by using changes in short-term interest 
rates; or, in the case of the US, using data from futures on the Federal Funds 
rate. These issues are reviewed in more detail in section 3.2.3. In any case, the 
conditional approach appears to be preferable given the problems raised by mixing 
expected and unexpected components in the traditional approach. 
Before considering the measurement of expectations of central bank rate changes, 
it is useful first to review the theoretical predictions regarding the effect of mone- 
tary policy announcements on the various assets considered, namely bonds, stocks 
and the exchange rate. The analysis considers the effect of central bank rate 
changes on both the asset returns and on their volatility. 
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3.2.3. Announcement effects on financial market returns: theoretical 
and empirical results 
This section reviews the theoretical considerations regarding how financial asset 
prices respond to monetary policy announcements as well as the main empirical 
findings, distinguishing between bond yields, stock prices and exchange rates. 
3.2.3.1. Effect on long-term interest rates. In the literature, there is some 
disagreement as to the implications of a monetary policy announcement on long- 
term government bond yields. A convenient way to see the uncertainty that may be 
involved in the reaction of bond yields is by relying on the expectations hypothesis 
of the term structure (first formulated by Lutz, 1940) as a model for determining 
bond yields. According to this hypothesis and assuming that there is no risk 
premium, a n-period long-term yield (ynt) defined in logarithms should reflect 
current and expected future yields on single period securities (it+s) : 
I n-1 
Ynt = nEE't(2t+s) 
s=0 
(3.4) 
where Et is the expectations operator. This formula can be used to determine the 
theoretical impact of monetary policy on long-term bond yields or, equivalently, 
to see how central bank decisions may affect future short-term interest rates. As 
central banks have a close control over the very short-term interest rates, as long 
as the monetary policy decision has no effect on future expected short-term rates, 
an unanticipated change in central bank interest rates should move all bond yields 
in the same direction. To see this, assume that the central bank creates a surprise 
change in the short-term interest rate. The resulting daily change in long-term 
yields (L1ynt+1 = Ynt+1 - ynt) is given by: 
1 n-1 n-1 
DYnt+l =nI: E't+l (it+s+l) - 
EEt (Zt+, ) (3.5) 
s=o s=o 
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which, after rearranging, is equivalent to: 
n-2 
DYnt+l : -- n (it+, - Etzt+1) + E(Et+lzt+s+7 - Etzt+s) + (Et+1i +n - it) (3.6) 
s-1 
the first term of the above expression it+l - Et (it+l) is known with certainty at 
time t+1. This term is the difference between the level of the short-term interest 
rate in period t+1 and its expected value in the previous period. From this term, it 
is clear that if the monetary policy decision of the central bank produces a positive 
surprise in the short-term interest rate, the result will be an increase in long-term 
bond yields, other things equal. 
However, this result also depends on the effect that the monetary policy decision 
may have on the expected path of future short-term rates. For instance, if as a 
result of the monetary policy decision market participants revise upwards their 
expectations of future short-term interest rates then the upward effect on the daily 
change in the bond yield will potentially be much greater. This implies that even if 
the central bank produces a negative surprise, bond yields may rise. For example, if 
market participants expect a rate rise and the central bank keeps rates unchanged 
(thereby producing a negative surprise), they might conclude that the central bank 
may need to act more aggressively in the future by raising rates by more than the 
market participants had previously expected. 
In order to further analyse the effect of central bank decisions on long-term 
rates, the economic determinants of long-term interest rates should be taken into 
account. In this regard, up to now it has been assumed that the valuation of 
government bond yields does not include a risk premium. However, nominal bond 
yields should be seen as incorporating a premium which could include compensa- 
tion for liquidity risk, default risk and an inflation risk premium required for taking 
into account the real depreciation of the nominal payoff of the bonds. With such 
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a risk premium (Pt), the daily change in long-term bond yields would be given by: 
n-1 n-1 
IýUnt =n 
EEt+l (it+, 
+, 
)- EEt (it+, )+ OPt (3.7) 
s=0 s=0 
where OPt is the daily change in the risk premium. Under these assumptions there 
is an extra channel whereby central bank actions may affect bond yields, namely 
through an effect on the risk premium required by economic agents to hold the 
bonds. While the influence of central banks on liquidity risk and default risk tends 
to be limited over very short periods, central bank actions often change prospects 
for expected inflation. 
Concentrating on the inflation risk premium, the Fisher (1930) relationship 
implies that nominal bond yields (i) should equal a real long-term yield (r) plus a 
component representing expected inflation (7re): 
2= 7' + 7T e (3.8) 
According to this view, changes in central bank rates may affect interest rates 
through their effect on inflation expectations or the real interest rate. By incorpo- 
rating this formula into (3.7), the result is: 
n-2 
DYnt+i =1n (rt+i - Etrt+l) + 
E(Et+lrt+s+i 
- Etrt+s) + (Et+lrt+n - rt) + (3.9) 
s=1 
n-2 
+n (7rt+l - Etat+, ) + 
E(Et+, 7t+s+l - Etat+s) + (Et+i t+n -t e) + OPt 
s-1 
Thus, if a central bank cuts interest rates and this induces the market to believe 
that with such a cut inflation will rise, then bond yields will increase as a result. 
In addition, if certain central bank decisions are seen as implying a change in 
the preferences of the central bank concerning inflation (for instance, creating the 
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perception that the central bank is becoming more lenient towards inflationary 
risks), this might result in non-negligible effects on long-term bond yields via the 
inflation risk premium and inflation expectations. 
Looking into bond yields determination from the perspective of their relation 
with inflation has led some authors to question the reasonability of the expectations 
hypothesis of the term structure. For instance, Romer and Romer (2000) argue that 
if an increase in interest rates is aimed at reducing inflation then long-term rates 
should decline after a rise in central bank rates instead of increasing as suggested 
by the expectation hypothesis. The reasoning is that if the central bank raises 
interest rates, real interest rates in equation (3.9) will rise temporarily but in the 
long-run inflation expectations will decline, thus implying lower bond yields. 
Pakko and Wheelock (1996) examine several possible interpretations of a mon- 
etary policy move by market participants that could explain different reactions of 
long-term bond yields in response to a Federal funds rate change. In a first expla- 
nation, surprise changes in central bank rates may be interpreted as being based on 
inside information which may lead agents to revise inflation expectations (which 
one could deem as the inside information hypothesis). Secondly, a monetary pol- 
icy action may be seen as inadequate to counter inflationary pressures, therefore 
resulting in a larger than proportionate increase (i. e. a credibility hypothesis). Fi- 
nally, the existence of interest rate smoothing by the central bank may lead to a 
stronger rise in longer term interest rates than the change in central bank interest 
rates as economic agents will anticipate further moves in the same direction (which 
one could name as the interest rate smoothing hypothesis). 
According to the inside information hypothesis, monetary policy actions may 
reveal important information on the inflation outlook and therefore lead to a re- 
assessment of market participants' previous inflation expectations (see Romer and 
Romer, 2000). Thus, if unanticipated increases in central interest rates lead market 
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participants to believe that there is a stronger upward pressure on inflation than 
they previously expected, then bond yields should increase. 
As for the credibility hypothesis, certain central bank actions may have an effect 
on its credibility, i. e. on the market's assessment of the capability of the central 
bank in achieving price stability. In this case, if the central bank unexpectedly fails 
to react to an unfavourable development in inflation (thereby creating a negative 
monetary policy surprise), markets may view that as a change in the central bank's 
ability to control inflation and as a result bond yields will rise due to a higher 
inflation premium. Similarly, an unexpected increase in central bank rates may 
reinstate the belief that the central bank has become less lenient towards inflation 
and therefore bond yields may decline due to the downward effect of such a move 
on longer-term inflation expectations. 
Finally, the existence of interest rate smoothing (see Goodhart, 1996) implies 
an interesting effect of monetary policy on long-term interest rates. Interest rate 
smoothing means that, when adjusting interest rates, central banks avoid mak- 
ing large rate changes but instead move interest rates in small steps in the same 
direction until the desired level is reached. If central banks are seen as conduct- 
ing interest rate smoothing, then market participants may view a move in central 
bank rates as a sign that further changes in the same direction are about to come 
and therefore adjust their expectations of future short-term rates accordingly. The 
result of this mechanism will be a stronger impact of monetary policy actions on 
bond yields than in the absence of smoothing. In fact, Goodfriend (1991) suggests 
that one reason why central banks smooth interest rates is to make their behaviour 
more predictable thereby becoming more effective in influencing long-term interest 
rates. Given the importance of long-term interest rates in the monetary transmis- 
sion mechanism, an enhanced influence of the central bank on these market yields 
would facilitate the implementation of monetary policy. Pakko and Wheelock 
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(1996) argue that this is a possible explanation for the larger increase in long-term 
bond yields in February 1994 than the increase in the Federal funds rate by the 
US Federal Reserve. 
Ellingsen and Söderstrom (2001) have recently proposed a model that would 
be able to account for three features: 1) that the long-term interest should equal 
the average of future short rates plus a term premium in line with the expectations 
theory; 2) that an increase in the short-term interest rate should lead to a less than 
proportional increase in the long-term interest rate and 3) Romer and Romer's 
(2000) argument that an increase in short-rates, by reducing inflation, should also 
lead to lower long-term interest rates. In the model of Ellingsen and Söderstrom 
(2001), a change in monetary policy comes about either because monetary policy 
reacts to new and possibly private knowledge about the economy or because there 
is a change of preferences of the central bank, i. e. a change in its objective function. 
In the first case, the authors deem policy as endogenous while in the second case 
policy is exogenous. If the change in policy is endogenous then their model predicts 
that interest rates of all maturities move in the same direction of the change in 
central bank rates. However, after an exogenous policy change, short and long-term 
interest rates should move in opposite directions. 
As regards empirical studies of the response of the yield curve, the results are 
not clear cut in supporting the different theories. Cook and Hahn (1989) find 
that a contractionary monetary policy action leads to interest rate increases in 
all maturities. By contrast, Fleming and Remolona (1997), using high frequency 
intraday data, find that while surprises in changes in the Fed funds target rate affect 
volatility of bond yields, there is no evidence of a significant effect of announcement 
surprises in the Fed funds target rate on the log price changes in bond prices. At 
the same time, they note that increases in the Fed fund target often have a strong 
effect on bond prices during the sample period, even though at some times the 
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effect was positive and at other times negative. The short period covered by these 
authors (one year) limits the generalisation of the results. 
From this review, it appears that the reaction of bond yields to unanticipated 
changes in central bank interest rates is mainly an empirical issue. Therefore, 
the empirical testing of announcement effects can help to assess the likelihood of 
each of the several hypotheses on the reaction of bond yields to monetary policy 
announcements. 
3.2.3.2. Announcement effects of monetary policy on stock returns. In 
the literature, it is common to analyse the possible announcement effects of mon- 
etary policy on stock prices by making recourse to a stock price valuation model 
and then to conjecture how monetary policy may affect each of the components. 
One convenient model is provided by Campbell and Shiller (1988). In this model 
(also called dynamic Gordon model or the dividend ratio model), stock prices are 
viewed as the expected discounted value of future dividends and returns. Letting 
p denote the log stock price and d the log dividend, then the log price dividend 
ratio is given by the following expression, which ignores constants : 
00 
pt - dt -- EtEp, '-1(Odt+j - ht+j) (3.10) 
j=1 
From this expression, it is possible to obtain the following equation for the one 
period return (ht+l) : 
ht+l = Odt+l - P(dt+l - pt+l) + (dt - pt) 
(3.11) 
where ht+l is the continuously compounded real return in stock prices and p is a 
measure of the persistence of the dividend price ratio, measured as: 
P/D 
I+ P/D 
(3.12) 
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where P and D represent the stock price and the dividend respectively. By taking 
expectations of equation (3.11) the unexpected change in the real return in stock 
prices is given by: 
ht - -Et-lht = 
(Et - Et-1) 
00 00 
Ep' Adt+j - 
J: p' ht+j 
j=0 j=1 
(3.13) 
Monetary policy announcements may create unexpected stock returns by having 
an effect on expected changes in dividend yields or in expected returns. 
The above relation applies for real returns. An alternative formulation proposed 
by Campbell (1991) can be used as an expression for excess returns defined as: 
00 
et - Et-iet = (Et - Et-1) 
E/ýOdt+j 
- 
j=0 
where: 
et=ht - rt (3.15) 
and where rt is a reference variable for which usually the real short-term riskless 
rate is chosen. 
The above expression has the convenience that it can be used to arrive at a 
finer decomposition of changes in stock returns (see Campbell, 1991). Given the 
expression for the unexpected component of the excess stock return: 
ve, t = et - Et-let (3.16) 
Three main terms can be distinguished: 
" Effect of news about cashflows: 
00 
Tld, t = (Et - Et-1) 
Epi Adt+j (3.17) 
j=o 
00 00 
Epj, rt+j - 
EP'' et+j (3.14) 
j=1 j=1 
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" Effect of news about future excess returns: 
00 
ýe t= (Et - -Et-1)Ep'et+j 
(3.18) 
j=1 
" Effect of news about real rates: 
00 
(Et - Et-1)j: P'rt+j (3.19) 
j=1 
" thus, in short: 
ve, t = Tid, t - 1ie, t - Tint (3.20) 
This expression implies that innovations in excess returns are equal to inno- 
vations in discounted dividends less innovations in expected future excess returns 
and in real interest rates. In the above equations, the inflation rate is not included 
directly. In any case, if inflation influences dividend yields or even real rates (via 
the inflation risk premium) then changes in inflation linked to monetary policy 
actions may have an effect on the daily stock return. 
The influence of monetary policy on stock returns should come through its in- 
fluence on the macroeconomy. As Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) argue, the existence 
of diversification possibilities implies that only general economic state variables 
will influence broad stock market aggregates. The literature on the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy suggests various channels through which this influ- 
ence can take place. First, if one assumes that monetary policy may have an effect 
on economic activity, it may have an effect on excess stock returns or expected 
dividends. In the shorter-term, an unanticipated increase in interest rates will, at 
least temporarily, raise real interest rates. However, this effect may last for longer 
if the policy surprise causes market participants to revise upwards their expecta- 
tion about the long-term level of the real rate, thereby resulting in a negative effect 
on stock prices. It should be noted that, as pointed out by Chen, Roll and Ross 
103 
(1986), even if pricing is done in real terms, unanticipated consumer price changes 
will have a systematic effect on returns. 
A further effect on stock returns that may occur as a result of monetary pol- 
icy announcements is the so-called "volatility feedback" effect which is due to the 
existence of a time-varying risk premium (see French, Schwert and Stambaugh, 
1987). The volatility feedback effect occurs when there is an increase in antici- 
pated volatility before an announcement. Given the expectation of higher volatility 
ahead, financial market participants will require a higher expected return for hold- 
ing stocks in order to cover for the rise in expected risk. As a result, stock prices 
are likely to decline before a monetary policy announcement, so that a higher stock 
return just until post-announcement can be expected to compensate the buyers of 
the stock for the increased risk in holding the stock. 
Overall, this review seems to suggest that unanticipated increases in central 
bank interest rates are likely to have a negative impact on stock returns. 
3.2.3.3. Announcement effects of monetary policy on exchange rates. 
There have been several studies of the effect of macroeconomic news on exchange 
rates (see Almeida et al., 1998). As regards the impact of monetary policy an- 
nouncements on the daily change in exchange rates, it is hard to a priori determine 
what will be the sign of the effect on the exchange rate. An obvious complication 
in analysing exchange rates is that a significant effect of monetary policy on the 
exchange rate is more likely in the case when the monetary policy shock occurs in 
one country only and no other significant shocks to the foreign countries occur at 
the same time. 
One possible way to conceptualise this effect, is to assume uncovered interest 
parity. Consider the case when there are only two countries (A and B) and that 
country A takes a decision on interest rates on day t and that there are no other 
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shocks. If uncovered interest parity holds, the expected daily change in the loga- 
rithm of the spot exchange rate expressed as units of the currency of country A per 
unit of currency of country B (Ost = E(st - st-1 It_1)), should be approximately 
equal to: 
E(Ost It-1) ^' ZA l, t - zB lt (3.21) 
where i1, t and iB lt are the overnight interest rates in country A and B respec- t- 
tively on the day prior to the monetary policy move. Now, the actual daily change 
in the exchange rate can be written as: 
Ost = Ost + Ut iA lt- 
iB 
lt+ Ut 
(3.22) 
where ut represents the effect of information received between day t-1 and day t, 
including information on the monetary policy stance. 
This implies that if interest rates are increased in country A on day t, then the 
respective currency should, all things equal, be expected to depreciate on day t+1. 
Thus, if uncovered interest parity is verified, positive monetary policy surprises are 
likely to lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency at time t so that it can 
be expected to depreciate at t+l, absent other shocks. 
However, relying simply on uncovered interest parity does not provide a suffi- 
ciently robust framework to analyse the impact of monetary policy on the exchange 
rate, as it does not take into account the fundamental determinants of the exchange 
rate (see for instance Walsh, 1998, p. 251-255). The fact that the exchange rate is 
a forward looking variable implies that the reaction of the exchange rate depends 
on the expectations of the future path of monetary policy and the perceptions as 
to how the policy move is likely to affect the economy. This makes it difficult to 
a priori predict the effect of a monetary policy surprise. For instance, a surprise 
increase in interest rates would tend to lead to an appreciation of the currency. 
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However, if the policy move is seen to lead to worse economic prospects, then it 
might result instead in a depreciation of the currency. Therefore, it is a priori 
uncertain how the exchange rate may react in response to interest rate news. 
As regards the empirical findings of announcement effects on the exchange rate, 
using data sampled at a 5-minute frequency on the exchange rate of the US dollar 
against the mark, Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998) find that the reaction 
of the exchange rate to macroeconomic announcements is in line with the likely 
response of monetary policy absent other shocks. For instance, they find that 
news of a higher than expected inflation rate tend to lead to an appreciation of 
the domestic currency. Although not testing directly for the effect on the exchange 
rate of monetary policy news (i. e. interest rate news), they conclude that exchange 
rates should predominantly respond to unexpected changes in short-term interest 
rates in the direction predicted by the uncovered interest parity theory. 
More recently, Galati and Ho (2003) look at announcement effects on the US- 
dollar/euro exchange rate during the period from January 1999 to December 2000 
using daily data. They find evidence of announcement effects of macroeconomic 
news, although with significant time variation. Again, these authors do not take 
into account interest rate surprises in their analysis. 
Andersen et al. (2003) study the effect of macroeconomic announcements on 
the 5-minute returns of the US-dollar spot exchange rates for the German Mark, 
the British Pound, the Japanese Yen, the Swiss Franc and the euro for the period 
from January 3,1992 to December 30,1998. They conclude that the change in the 
exchange rate reacts quickly to announcements, in contrast with the conditional 
variance. In addition, they find that monetary policy surprises have a clear effect 
on the exchange rate of the US-dollar against the Deutsche Mark. In particular, a 
positive monetary policy surprise leads to an appreciation of the dollar, which is 
consistent with a standard monetary model of the exchange rate. 
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3.2.4. Announcement effects of monetary policy on financial market 
volatility 
Several explanations have been provided in the literature for volatility in financial 
markets to change around central bank meetings. Bomfim (2003) identifies two 
reasons for such changes. 
A first possibility is the so-called pre-announcement effect, or, in the termi- 
nology of Jones et al. (1998), the "calm before the storm effect". According to 
this argument, volatility should decline before scheduled releases of major eco- 
nomic data and increase on the day the new data are published. One reason for 
this pattern to occur is that before the news release, given the anticipation that 
relevant information for the formation of the price of the asset is going to be re- 
leased, investors may prefer to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, deciding to trade 
more actively only after a news arrival. The "calm before the storm effect" is 
similar to what has been found in studies of changes in volatility before earnings 
announcements (see Donders et al., 2000). 
A second channel through which volatility can be affected is what can be called 
the "news effect". According to this effect, a monetary policy decision may reveal 
new information about the behaviour of the central bank, implying a readjustment 
of asset prices and such readjustment may create volatility. One may also add that 
a decision that is largely unexpected by market participants may lead not only to a 
reassessment of previous views on central bank behaviour but also to a reassessment 
of the likely effect of the decision on the economy. In such a case, the process of 
reevaluation is likely to result in a rise in volatility, the more so if the decision 
increases uncertainty. 
As Bomfim (2003) argues, while the "calm before the storm effect" is likely to 
be independent of the policy decision which is actually taken (but not of the fact 
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that a decision is taken)3, the "news effect" is closely linked to such decision (i. e. 
a different policy choice would lead to a different reaction of volatility). He also 
notes that only scheduled announcements can produce pre-announcement effects 
as by definition unscheduled announcements do not. 
Donders et al. (2000) provide an additional explanation for why volatility may 
increase after announcements. They argue that if investors have heterogeneous 
beliefs, receive slightly different information or if information arrives sequentially 
to investors, then a higher level of trading around announcements should occur 
resulting in higher asset price volatility. It should be noted that this also implies 
that even though the market can be "right" on average about the magnitude of 
the change in central bank rates, volatility may vary significantly from decision to 
decision due to the heterogeneity of the predictions made by market participants. 
The effect of monetary policy announcements on financial market volatility may 
be related to the central bank's meeting frequency and the possibility of changing 
interest rates in between meetings. This issue is related to the fact that the degree 
of uncertainty in financial markets regarding the timing of the central bank decision 
may be higher than the one regarding the direction of the change. 4 If central banks 
meet less frequently and if they rarely take decisions in between meetings, then 
volatility may be lower in the period between meetings as market participants 
will view it as unlikely that a decision will be taken during that time. However, 
volatility may be concentrated around the meeting dates as the next opportunity 
for the central bank to change rates will be further away. By contrast, in the case 
when the central bank meets frequently, not changing interest rates in one meeting 
may just imply that the rate change will occur at a subsequent meeting which is 
3One can expect, however, that such independence is not perfect as there is also the possibility 
that a certain monetary policy decision may affect the reaction of market participants to future 
decisions. 
4Due, for instance, to interest rate smoothing. 
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closer in time. Therefore, in the case of frequent meetings, market participants are 
likely to keep their positions relatively unchanged from meeting to meeting and 
volatility may not change so much around meeting dates. 
This study will investigate the "news effect" of monetary policy decisions on the 
volatility of financial asset prices to monetary policy decisions, taking into account 
whether the announcement is scheduled or unscheduled. It will not investigate 
the existence of a "calm before the storm" effect or the issue of heterogeneity 
of information across agents. It will nevertheless take into account the existence 
of volatility clustering and persistence. In the next section, the broad effects of 
monetary policy announcements on volatility will be made more precise by taking 
into account the particular nature of the financial assets involved. 
3.2.4.1. Asset specific responses. In the analysis of the effect of monetary 
policy announcements on volatility, it is necessary to take into account the nature 
of the asset involved, distinguishing, as in the previous case for returns, between 
stocks, bonds and exchange rates. This section reviews particular issues that apply 
in each of these cases. An additional issue is the possibility that there are spillover 
effects in the volatility of the different assets. This will be taken up in section 3.5. 
3.2.4.2. Stock price volatility. Besides the announcement effects on the volatil- 
ity of a generic financial asset outlined above, there are additional ways in which 
monetary policy decisions may affect stock price volatility. In particular, monetary 
policy decisions may affect volatility via the leverage effect (see Black, 1976, and 
Christie, 1982). The leverage effect can be understood in the context of the model 
of stock valuation outlined in section 3.2.3.2. The leverage effect comes about be- 
cause an increase in interest rates, by raising the rate at which future cash flows 
are discounted or by affecting expectations of future cash flows from stocks, may 
lower the value of the equity of the firms by more than that of their debt. As a 
result, financial leverage, measured by the ratio of the market value of the firm's 
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debt to that of its equity, will increase. As a higher financial leverage is associated 
with a higher risk (given the decline in the value of the firm that could serve as 
collateral), then it is likely that stock price volatility will be heightened as a result 
of an increase in interest rates. 
It should be noted that, in the spirit of the conditional approach for testing 
announcement effects mentioned in section 3.2.2, a leverage effect would not always 
occur as a consequence of a rise in interest rates. In fact, what is required is that the 
change in interest rates be larger than what was previously expected by financial 
market participants. This helps to explain why in many occasions when central 
banks cut interest rates by less than expected by the markets, stock prices become 
more volatile. There is a parallel to this in the finance literature that studies the 
response of stock prices to earning announcements. For instance, Donders et al. 
(2000) and Isakov and Perignon (2001) find that the evolution of the volatility of 
stock prices after earnings announcements depends on whether the announcements 
constitute "good" or "bad" news, with good news implying a decrease in volatility 
relative to "normal" levels. 
As Christie (1982) notes, however, the upward effect on financial leverage 
brought about by the effect of the increase in interest rates on the market value of 
equity, is counteracted by the fact that such increase leads to a transfer of wealth 
from bondholders to the stockholders that in turn decreases leverage. This trans- 
fer of wealth occurs because the market value of the firm's debt decreases when 
the interest rate rises (assuming a flat term structure) thereby reducing financial 
leverage. If this second effect outweighs the effect of the decline in the market 
value of equity, then the volatility of stock prices may decline after an increase in 
interest rates. Thus, the overall effect of monetary policy on stock price volatility 
via its effect on financial leverage seems to be mainly an empirical issue. In the 
investigation of this issue, Christie (1982) finds evidence that the effect of a rise in 
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interest rates on stock return volatility is positive, suggesting that a rise in central 
bank rates increases financial leverage. 
In one of the few studies on the effects of monetary announcements on the 
volatility of stock prices, Bomfim (2003) studies announcement effects on the US 
stock market (namely the Standard and Poors 500 Index) in the period from June 
1989 to December 1998 and finds that volatility is unusually high on the day of 
the FOMC meetings and depressed on the day before (pre-announcement effect) 
but does not change significantly on the day after the meeting. Bomfim finds 
no difference between announcement effects at scheduled meetings and those at 
unscheduled decisions. In addition, a positive monetary policy surprise -i. e. an 
increase in the Fed funds rate above market's expectations- leads to a stronger 
impact on volatility than a negative surprise, which is consistent with both the 
leverage and the volatility feedback hypotheses. 
3.2.4.3. Bond yield volatility. Following the model of bond yield determina- 
tion of section 3.2.3.2, monetary policy decisions may create a higher volatility of 
interest rates if they lead to higher uncertainty in the markets regarding future 
interest rate moves and inflation developments. 5 Therefore monetary policy de- 
cisions that frequently induce revisions of expectations of future monetary policy 
and/or inflation are likely to lead to higher bond yield volatility. 
Furthermore, and distinctly to the case of stock prices, it can be argued that 
in the case of bond yields it is less likely that positive surprises in interest rates 
have a higher impact on bond yield volatility than negative surprises. In fact, 
given that these are yields on low risk government securities, the effect of positive 
surprises on the possibility of default on the bonds of monetary policy should be 
5Another way of monetary policy to create volatility in bond yields is through its effect on very 
short-term money market rates as a result of operational procedures. In some cases, such very 
short-term volatility may be transmited along the yield curve. 
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small. Thus, relative to the case of stock prices, the direction of the move should 
matter less than the fact that a surprise took place. 
However, it cannot be ruled out that there may be arguments that could sup- 
port that positive surprise may have a stronger impact on bond yield volatility 
than negative surprises. First, there can be spillover effects between stocks and 
bonds which could explain that bond yield volatility would be correlated with 
stock return volatility. Second, this result would be obtained if positive surprises 
cause more uncertainty about future moves or the inflation outlook, than negative 
surprises. 
As regards the empirical findings on announcement effects of monetary policy 
on the volatility of bond yields, Jones et al. (1998) find evidence of a significant 
pre-announcement effect on the Treasury securities market. Li and Engle (1998) 
study the effect of announcements on the consumer price index, the producer price 
index and unemployment on the volatility of US Treasury bond futures. They find 
that the response of volatility varies according to whether the announcement is 
scheduled or non-scheduled. In the case of scheduled announcements they find that 
positive shocks to returns depress volatility while negative shocks increase volatil- 
ity. In addition, "bad news" (i. e. news that lower the returns) from scheduled 
announcements have stronger asymmetric effects (implying a higher persistence of 
the shock, while in the case where no asymmetric effect is taken into account there 
is no persistence at all) than in the case of unscheduled announcements. 
Fleming and Remolona (1997) measure the impact of announcement surprises 
on bond volatility (defined as the absolute value of the log price changes in five 
minute periods). They find that surprise increases in the Federal funds target rate 
have a strong effect on the volatility of bond prices during the period under review 
(August 1993 to August 1994), but the effects sometimes are positive and at other 
times negative. 
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3.2.4.4. Exchange rates. As regards the empirical findings on exchange rate 
volatility, Ederington and Lee (2001) analyse the evolution of intraday volatility 
in foreign exchange markets and its response to macro announcements. They 
conclude that three issues should be taken into account when analysing responses 
of exchange rates to news releases. First, the evolution of past volatilities indeed 
matters, so models capturing volatility persistence should be used when testing for 
announcement effects. Second, the results vary according to whether there is prior 
knowledge of the release time of macroeconomic announcements or not, volatility 
being higher when it is previously known that an announcement will occur than 
otherwise (this corresponds to the "news effect" described in section 3.2.4). A third 
conclusion of this study is that it is important to take into account the existence 
of seasonality on models of exchange rates, for instance due to day-of-the week 
effects. 
In Andersen et al. (2003) the authors find that the conditional volatility of 
exchange rates (over 5 minute periods) reacts in a more gradual fashion to macro- 
economic announcements than the conditional mean. As in the study of Edering- 
ton and Lee (2000), they also find that when the timing of the macroeconomic 
announcement is previously known there is an increase in exchange rate volatility. 
3.2.5. Are volatility changes around central bank decisions a measure 
of a central bank's credibility or transparency? 
It has been argued that a central bank's credibility is closely linked with how 
predictable a central bank is. In turn, the higher the predictability of central 
bank actions, the smaller should be the reaction of financial asset prices around 
meeting decisions. Therefore, a higher level of financial market volatility around 
central bank meetings may reflect market participants' difficulties in predicting the 
next central bank move and therefore constitute a sign of a lack of credibility. In 
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fact, if market participants find it difficult to determine the central bank's reaction 
function or observe the reaction function of the central bank with noise, then 
central bank decisions may have an effect on volatility. Thus, according to this 
view, measures of financial market volatility around central banks decisions could 
be used to assess the credibility of the central bank. 
However, there are difficulties in testing this proposition, as monetary policy 
is only one of the sources of uncertainty in financial markets. Monetary policy 
is always conducted subject to a certain degree of uncertainty about how the 
economy works and how monetary policy impulses are transmitted to the economy. 
There are also aspects related to the operational framework of monetary policy 
(namely regarding the extent to which the central bank can control its operational 
target, usually a very short-term interest rate) and to the institutional features of 
monetary policy. Finally, changes in the monetary policy strategy or preferences of 
the central bank may temporarily make monetary policy decisions more difficult to 
predict. Thus, whenever there is a change in the way monetary policy is conducted 
it may be expected that the market will find it more difficult to predict subsequent 
central bank decisions and so volatility is likely to increase. This does not mean 
that the central bank policy lacks credibility but just that a period of time is 
needed for market participants to learn how the central bank operates in the new 
regime. As market participants learn more about the new central bank behaviour, 
volatility is likely to decline. 
A further argument questioning the use of volatility measures as indicators of 
credibility is that if central banks take decisions at times of higher uncertainty, for 
instance when there are special shocks to the economy, then the volatility around 
the decision date may be higher but that does not mean that the bank is not 
credible. It may rather reflect that it is more difficult to ascertain what is the 
appropriate response to the particular economic situation in question. Therefore, 
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in order to test for central bank announcement effects, it is necessary to take 
into account other shocks that may be influencing volatility around meeting dates 
or, alternatively, long samples should be used so that the results are not unduly 
influenced by conjunctural developments. 
Different considerations apply in the use of volatility in financial markets to 
gauge a central bank's transparency. A central bank's transparency has to do with 
how much information on its internal decision procedures the central bank wishes 
to reveal. Transparency is not necessarily more conducive to higher predictability 
of the central bank behaviour or to lower volatility. In fact, given the intricate 
process leading to a monetary policy decision, too much information or badly 
communicated information may lead to more uncertainty than less information 
properly communicated. 
Given these considerations, it is nonetheless broadly accepted that central 
banks, when making their decisions, should avoid generating unnecessary volatil- 
ity in financial markets. The study of announcement effects on volatility may not 
provide a definite answer in this respect, but may constitute an additional element 
that could be part of a broader analysis of the credibility and transparency of the 
central bank, even though, as regards transparency, communication issues may be 
more relevant . 
3.3. Empirical approach for estimating announcement effects of 
monetary policy decisions 
This section reviews the empirical approach for the estimation of monetary 
policy announcement effects. In particular, GARCH models of returns are used 
to estimate announcement effects on both the return and volatility of bond yields, 
equity returns and the exchange rate. Before proceeding with the investigation, it 
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may be useful to first review some features of the setting of interest rates and the 
meeting procedures of the Federal Reserve. 
3.3.1. Central bank decisions and meeting practices 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve is scheduled 
to meet 8 times a year, with the calendar of the meetings communicated in advance. 
The meetings are scheduled to occur after major economic data releases. Besides 
these regular meetings, the FOMC may meet at short notice and take decisions in 
the inter-meeting periods. 
Table 3.1 provides a brief summary of the decisions taken by the Fed during 
the period covered in this study (3 October 1988 to 29 June 2002). The source 
for target rate changes is the US Federal Reserve Board for the period between 
13 July 1990 to June 2002 (Intended Federal Funds Rate) while for the previous 
years data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is used; FOMC meeting 
dates are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
As can be seen in the table, during the period from October 1988 to 29 June 
2002 there were 110 meetings of the FOMC and 59 changes in interest rates. 
Slightly more than half of the changes in interest rates were decided at previously 
scheduled meetings and the rest were taken in-between meetings. By looking at 
the two sub-periods, the number of interest rate changes decided at unscheduled 
meetings declined significantly after 1994, with the Federal Reserve preferring to 
take most of the decisions at scheduled meetings. By contrast, in the period before 
1994 most decisions were taken in-between meetings. As for the frequency of rate 
changes, on average the US Federal Reserve took 82 days between two decisions. 
However, both before and after 1994, there were long periods during which the 
Fed left rates unchanged but there were also occasions when Fed changed interest 
rates twice in a very short period. As regards the magnitude of rate changes, 
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Total Oct. 1988 1 Feb. 1994 
to to 
1 Feb. 1994 29 Jun. 2002 
Decisions and FOMC meetings 
Number of scheduled meetings 110 42 68 
Number of interest rate changes 59 28 31 
-decided at scheduled meetings 32 6 26 
-unscheduled 29 22 5 
Frequency of rate changes 
Maximum period between changes (in days) 553 518 553 
Minimum period between changes (in days) 6 6 15 
Average period between changes (in days) 82 68 96 
Rate changes by size 
Number of changes by 25 basis points 41 23 18 
Number of changes by 50 basis points 16 4 12 
Number of changes of other amount 2 1 1 
Table 3.1. Characteristics of FOMC decisions. 
throughout the whole period the Fed preferred to change interest rates by small 
amounts. Around 70% of the rate changes were of 25 basis points, with the Federal 
Reserve changing rates by more than 50 basis points only twice in the period under 
review. Comparing the sub-periods, before 1994 rate changes of 50 basis points 
were less common than in the later period and the Fed relied more on smaller 
changes. 
Chart 3.1 shows the Federal Reserve target rate over the period used in this 
study. The chart illustrates that the Federal Reserve rate setting behaviour seems 
to be consistent with interest rate smoothing during this period. As can be seen in 
the chart, from the end of the 1990s to 1992 the Federal Funds target rate showed a 
downward trend. After some stability between 1992 and 1994, the Federal reserve 
initiated a period of rising interest rates which ended in mid-1995. From then on 
and until mid-1999, the Fed funds rate showed some tendency to decline, even 
though the trend in the target rate was not so clear when compared to other 
periods. After mid-1999 a period of tightening interest rates ensued, again with 
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the measures taken successively in small steps in the same direction. Finally, after a 
relatively short period of stable rate, the Federal Reserve started again a relatively 
protracted period of loosening, with frequent decisions in the same direction. 
Table 3.3.1 shows comparable data on interest rate setting behaviour for Ger- 
many, the UK and the ECB. Data for Germany correspond to the discount rate 
and are obtained from the Bundesbank. Data on the ECB main refinancing 
rate/minimum bid rate are obtained from the ECB while data for the UK on 
the minimum band 1 dealing rate and the repo rate are obtained from Bank of 
England. 
As can be seen in table, from 1990 to 1998 the average period between changes 
in interest rates was larger in Germany (164 days) than in the UK (93 days) or the 
US. As regards the euro area, since the start of Stage Three of European Monetary 
Union the average duration of the periods between interest rate changes has been 
quite long (211 days) in comparison with the previous experience of the countries 
considered. 
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Looking at the maximum period between interest rate decisions one can see 
that there have been quite protracted periods in which central bank interest rates 
were kept unchanged. This has been clear in the case of Germany, where interest 
rates were kept unchanged during the period from April 1996 to the start of Stage 
Three of European Monetary Union on 31 December 1998. There were also periods 
when central banks felt the need to adjust official interest rates within a very short 
period of time. This has been particularly the case in the UK, where the minimum 
period between rate changes was 4 days. However, these changes in such a short 
period occurred in 1989 and, since then, such short periods between rate changes 
have not occurred. This also mirrors the case of the US, where there was only one 
occasion, in 1991, when the Federal Reserve took two decisions in a period of less 
than one week. Thus, central banks rarely make two decisions to raise or decrease 
interest rates in a period of less than a month, while, on average, interest rates are 
kept unchanged for at least one quarter. 
Besides the stylised facts regarding interest rate changes, another feature of 
monetary policy decisions has to do with the frequency with which central banks 
meet to decide on the interest rate level. There may be a link between this fre- 
quency and the importance of monetary policy announcement effects. Frequent 
monetary policy decisions may convey the impression that the central bank re- 
acts to short-term developments. Less frequent meetings allow for a more struc- 
tured presentation of the outlook for price stability and to shift the focus towards 
medium-term issues. In addition, less frequent meetings might avoid problems 
relating to the volatility in some of the relevant indicators that may occur when 
meeting frequency is high. These might just add "noise" to the analysis. 
On the other hand, frequent meetings (such as monthly) to decide on interest 
rate changes may increase the opportunity to provide relevant information to the 
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Germany* UK ** Euro area T 
1988-2002 
Number of rate changes 
Average period between decisions 
Maximum period between decisions 
Minimum period between decisions 
1988-Feb1994 
Number of rate changes 
Average period between decisions 
Maximum period between decisions 
Minimum period between decisions 
Feb 1994-2002 
Number of rate changes 
Average period between decisions 
Maximum period between decisions 
Minimum period between decisions 
22 53 12 
164 93 211 
986 367 329 
28 4 70 
15 20 - 
126 96 - 
483 367 - 
35 4 - 
7 33 12 
237 92 211 
986 364 329 
28 16 70 
*Bundesbank discount rate. Figures correspond to the period between 3 October 1988 
and 31 December 1998. 
** Min. band 1 dealing rate and repo rate. For the UK, it is considered that the period 
without monetary policy decision lasted until the end of June 2002. However, it lasted 
longer, since the subsequent change in interest rates was taken only on 6 February 2003. 
tECB main refinancing rate/minimum bid rate. Figures correspond to the period 1 
January 1999 to 29 June 2002. 
Table 3.2. Central bank's historical experience. 
markets and gear expectations in a more timely way than with less frequent meet- 
ings. Frequent meetings also allow for a finer monitoring of the monetary, economic 
and financial situation. This could lead to an earlier detection of risks to price sta- 
bility and a revision of previously held views in a more timely manner, thereby 
avoiding situations where monetary policy reacts too late to developments. Such 
an outcome can occur especially when monetary policy decisions may be borderline 
cases and where the marginal contribution of new pieces of information may shift 
the perception that the balance of risks has moved in a way that warrants a mon- 
etary policy response. Under exceptional circumstances, frequent meetings allow 
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for a rapid reaction, thereby reducing the lag with which monetary policy affects 
financial markets. However, as a rule, and in particular the Fed, central banks 
reserve the chance to make, usually under exceptional circumstances, monetary 
policy decisions outside regular meetings. 
Another relevant issue for the analysis of announcement effects linked to the 
frequency of meetings, regards the timing of the release of macroeconomic infor- 
mation. The US Federal Reserve and, in general, most central banks arrange their 
meetings at such a time that they are preceded by important data announcements 
to make sure that at the time of the decision the most relevant information is 
available. The longer the period between meetings, the stronger is the chance that 
macroeconomic news leads to a change of the assessment of the stance of monetary 
policy. In turn, this suggests that the optimal meeting frequency is related to the 
nature of the shocks hitting the economy. 
In this respect, an interesting case is provided by the Bank of Canada. Up to 
November 2000, the Bank of Canada could technically take any monetary policy 
decision on any business day, having assured banks that such announcements would 
be made at 9 am. This possibility led to the so-called "9 am watch" that occurred 
in foreign exchange and fixed-income markets with higher volatility being observed 
around the time when it might be likely that a change would be taken (see Bank 
of Canada, 2000). In order to correct for this problem, from the beginning of 
November 2000 the Bank of Canada introduced a schedule of eight meetings a 
year to decide on interest rate levels. The dates are selected so that they coincide 
with dates of important macroeconomic releases as in the case of the US. As a 
justification of such decision the bank considered that it would reduce uncertainty 
in financial markets. Other reasons that were put forward were the focus on 
medium-term policy and the enhanced transparency, accountability and dialogue 
with the public that such a change would bring. 
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While this study will not investigate the issue of the frequency of meetings, it 
will address the issue of whether the decisions taken by the US Federal Reserve at 
central bank meetings have different effects on the return and volatility of financial 
market assets than those taken at unscheduled meetings. A priori, the latter are 
potentially more susceptible of generating "surprises" and therefore having a strong 
impact on asset returns or volatility even in the period between meetings, as the 
case of Canada suggests. 
The question of whether scheduled announcements should be distinguished 
from unscheduled ones, relates to the research of Kim and Verrechia (1991) on the 
market reaction to anticipated announcements. Using a model where there is infor- 
mation asymmetry and costly private information acquisition, Kim and Verrechia 
show that when the quality of prior information regarding the announcement in- 
creases or noise decreases, uncertainty is reduced and the variance of the price 
change decreases. This would be the expected result in the case of a central bank 
which prepares the markets for the policy move, for instance via speeches of its 
board members or other communications following meetings where interest rates 
are kept unchanged. Kim and Verrechia also show that when the market partici- 
pants are aware that there will be an announcement (which applying to the current 
study would be the case when the central bank is holding a scheduled meeting) 
then there is an increased incentive for agents to acquire more private information 
and this results in a weaker price reaction at the time of the announcement. This 
would also suggest that changes in interest rates at unscheduled meetings are likely 
to have a stronger effect on the variance than at other times. As regards the quality 
of the announcement, which links to the above considerations on communication 
issues, Kim and Verrechia (1991) find that when the quality of the announcement 
is greater than expected, the price reaction to the announcement becomes stronger. 
122 
Given these considerations, in this study the testing of announcement effects 
is implemented distinguishing between announcement effects at scheduled and at 
non-scheduled meetings. The use of the conditional approach to test for announce- 
ment effects requires the derivation of the "surprise" component of each monetary 
policy decision. The following section reviews the several methods that are avail- 
able to compute such a series. 
3.3.2. Estimating the expected and unexpected components of a rate 
change 
As seen in section 3.2.2, in order to test for announcement effects it is useful to 
distinguish between the part of the change in the central bank rate of that is 
expected by market participants from the "surprise" component. In the literature, 
several proposals have been made for estimating such a breakdown: 
1) Estimate "surprises" in interest rates as model-based innovations; 
This first possibility consists in estimating a model for the process of determi- 
nation of the central bank interest rate and estimating the news component of the 
monetary policy decisions as the difference between the actual interest rate set by 
the central bank and the predicted value of the interest rate given by the model. 
The models used can consist in simple autoregressive processes for the short-term 
interest rate (see for instance Frenkel, 1981) or structural models that assume the 
endogeneity of the short-term interest rate to asset prices (see Rigobon and Sack, 
2003). 
The main drawback of this approach is that the resulting expected interest rate 
values depend on the model assumed to be governing the market participants' view 
of the monetary policy reaction function. In addition, models that could be seen 
as representing the market view of the interest rate setting process should include 
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macroeconomic variables capturing economic activity and inflation, but data on 
these variables are available only at a lower frequency than daily. 
2) Derive announcement effects from survey data on interest rate expectations; 
This approach consists in deriving expectations for interest rate changes from 
surveys where respondents are asked to state their expectations regarding the out- 
come of the central bank decision. This approach has been used in an event study 
of effects of macro announcements on exchange rates by Almeida et al. (1998), 
even though interest rate announcements were not included. These authors use the 
median forecasts from a survey of leading practitioners and academics provided by 
International Money Market Services (MMS) as the market expectation of several 
macroeconomic variables. The difference between the actual value for the variable 
in question and this expectation then yields the unexpected component of the an- 
nouncement. More recently, Andersen et al. (2003) also use MMS data in a study 
of macro announcements on foreign exchange, including data on surprises regard- 
ing the US Federal funds target. However, instead of a news component, they use 
a standardised news component following Balduzzi et al. (1999). This is simply 
the surprise component divided by the sample standard deviation of the series be- 
ing predicted (which is assumed to be constant). The advantage of this measure 
is that it makes it easier to compare the responses of exchange rates to different 
macroeconomic news. However, for the purpose of this study, which focuses only 
on announcement effects of monetary policy, such standardised measures would 
not constitute an advantage. 
3) Derive expectations from data on short-term interest rates; 
As regards approaches which estimate the surprise component from data on 
short-term interest rates, in the recent literature on the US, Cochrane and Piazzesi 
(2002) propose two alternative measures to derive surprise components. A first 
measure is obtained from running a regression of changes in the central bank 
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target rate on the target and the spreads of short-term and long-term interest 
rates over the target two days before the target change. This equation is then used 
to derive the expected component of the target change. Given that long-term rates 
are found to be important in explaining the change in the target -which, according 
to the authors, suggests that long-term rates embody inflation expectations to 
which monetary policy reacts- this approach seems to fall under the model-based 
innovations approach 1). A second approach used by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) 
is to define the monetary policy surprise as the change in the 30 day Eurodollar rate 
from just before to just after the target change. This approach has the disadvantage 
that Eurodollar contracts are subject to counterparty risk and they are settled in 
terms of Libor rates and not in terms of the Fed funds rate (see Faust, Swanson and 
Wright, 2002). An advantage of this method is that Eurodollar rates are available 
since mid-1984, so they could be used in longer-term analysis of monetary policy. 
4) Combine a narrative approach and a model-based approach to obtain interest 
rate expectations; 
Recently, Romer and Romer (2003) use a narrative approach to derive an in- 
tended funds rate series around meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC). These authors combine the Federal Reserve's own expected funds rate 
derived from the Weekly Report of the Manager of the Open Market Operations 
with detailed accounts of the FOMC meetings. They then regress the intended 
Federal funds rate on forecasts of output, prices and inflation produced by the 
Federal Reserve staff before each meeting. According to this methodology, the 
expected change in the Fed funds rate would be given by the estimated equation, 
with the residuals from the equation constituting changes in the intended funds 
rate not taken in response to anticipated developments. These residuals could be 
used as the monetary policy shock or surprise component of the decision. 
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While constituting a useful way of identifying monetary policy shocks, the 
approach of Romer and Romer requires that the researcher partly uses judgement 
to identify monetary policy shocks. In addition, the shocks depend on a specific 
reaction function for the Fed and their determination implies the use of data that 
is not available to the public at the time of the meeting (for instance internal 
forecasts and minutes of the meetings). In other words, they are derived from the 
point of view of the policy maker rather than from the point of view of the general 
public. This feature may constitute a drawback if the objective of the investigation 
is to study announcement effects of monetary policy on financial markets as is the 
case of the current study. In fact, as the public has no access to the information on 
the Fed's forecasts or minutes on the day of the meeting, it is hard to assume that 
this information is part of the market participants' information set. Moreover, the 
need to make the assumption that private expectations coincide with those of the 
Federal Reserve would imply not only the need for the public to know the models 
used by the Fed to produce the forecasts but also that their forecasts would be in 
line with the Fed's internal forecasts. 
5) Compute interest rate expectations from interest rate futures. 
This method has been used by several authors (see Krueger and Kuttner, 1996; 
Kuttner, 2001; Bomfim, 2003). This approach is valid mainly for the US, where 
futures contracts whose underlying asset is very closely related to the central bank 
instrument are available (namely the 30 day Fed Fund rate futures contract traded 
on the Chicago Board of Trade). For other countries, futures contracts are available 
only for money market interest rates and therefore they have no advantage with 
respect to the methods reviewed in 3). 
The use of future rates for the derivation of market expectations of central bank 
rate changes seems to be more advantageous than using money market interest 
rates, given that the valuation of the future contracts is closely linked to the 
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market participants' expectation of the Federal funds rate. This method also 
seems more appealing than the use of surveys of interest rates expectations which 
depend on the view of a limited number of experts whose opinions may be less 
representative of the market's view than what is reflected in the pricing of the 
futures. A further advantage of future contracts, is that it is possible to obtain a 
long series of observations (since 1988) which allows for a longer-term analysis of 
announcement effects of monetary policy than other methods. Furthermore, as will 
be seen in the next section, this option is much less dependent on the assumption 
that private agents are following a particular model of central bank behaviour as 
in options 1) or 4). 
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) argue that this approach has some drawbacks, 
namely the need to impose the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of 
interest rates in order to take the futures rate as the expected future spot rate; 
the additional complexity introduced by the institutional details of the Fed fund 
futures market and the fact that the data on futures start only in 1988. However, 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002) analyse alternative market-based measures 
of monetary policy expectations and conclude that the Federal funds futures dom- 
inates the other market based measures included in the study (namely the term 
Federal funds rates, eurodollar deposit rates, eurodollar futures rates, treasury bill 
rates and commercial paper rates). 
In fact, in an earlier paper, Krueger and Kuttner (1996) evaluate the efficiency 
of the Fed funds futures markets and conclude that, although there is a small 
premium in the Fed funds futures rate, it efficiently incorporates all available pub- 
lic information that can help in forecasting changes in the Fed funds rate. The 
authors reach this conclusion after showing that it is not possible to improve the 
futures-based forecast of the Fed funds rate by including other information avail- 
able to investors. However, the authors also find that during the period reviewed 
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(from 1989 to 1994) the use of futures data for forecasting the Fed funds rate 
only modestly improves the forecasting performance over the "no change forecast", 
suggesting that the Fed's moves often surprised the financial markets. Thus, the 
authors conclude that "Economists interested in the response of financial markets 
and the economy to monetary policy `shocks' should find the Fed funds future rate 
a simple but effective way to identify those surprises" . 
Overall, given the several advantages and disadvantages of the alternative mea- 
sures, in this study the approach uses data on futures on the Fed Funds rate to 
derive a series of market expectations of changes in the interest rates and the mon- 
etary policy surprise component. The next section describes in detail how data on 
futures contracts are used to derive monetary policy surprises and expectations, 
following the methodology recently proposed by Kuttner (2001). 
3.3.3. Deriving monetary policy expectations from futures contracts 
Given the choice of future rates as the instrument to derive interest rate expecta- 
tions, this section describes the details of their computation. As noted by Kuttner 
(2001), there are two complications involved in deriving expectations from data on 
Fed funds futures. First, the Fed funds futures price is derived from the average 
of the month's effective overnight Fed funds rate; second, the futures contracts 
are not based on the target rate but on the effective Fed funds rate. As Kuttner 
(2001) shows, the spot-month futures rate at the t-th day of month s (fat) can be 
interpreted as the conditional expectation of the average daily effective funds rate 
(f f) in calendar month s, plus a risk premium (pt): 
m 
f 
,t= 
Et (m Efff) + µs, t (3.23) 
Z=1 
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where m is the number of the days of the month and 0<t<m. This expectation 
-assuming that date t is not the first or last day of the month- can be decomposed 
into a part that is already known with certainty (i. e. the average effective funds 
rate in month s up to date t) and the expected average change in the funds rate 
for the remainder of the month: 
1tm 
f "t =m Eff 2+ Et (Ef f2) + µs, t (3.24) 
Z=1 i=t+1 
One possibility for computing the surprise component is to solve equation 3.24 for 
m 
the expected component Et (E f f2). Then, the monetary policy surprise can be 
i=t+i 
computed by taking the difference between the rate implied in the future prices 
m 
° (f t) and the average effective Fed funds rate of the month (ff), scaled by i=1 
the number of days remaining in the month (m-t): 
mm 
m(1 Ef f2 -f 
o") =1E (f fZ - Etf f2) -m /ýt (3.25) mtm 
i-1 
mt 
i-t+1 
mt 
It should be noted that this measure implies that market participants are assumed 
to expect that the central bank takes at most one decision to change interest rates 
in each calendar month. This assumption does not appear to be overly unrealistic 
as there were only two occasions during the sample period of this study where the 
Federal Reserve took more than one decision in the same calendar month (namely 
in December 1990 and December 1991), which suggests the exceptional character 
of these events (see section 3.3.1). 
A more important shortcoming of this measure is that the risk premium term 
can become important as shown by Kuttner (2001). Following Kuttner (2001), 
an alternative measure that is less susceptible of being contaminated by these 
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problems is the one-day surprise for date t defined as: 
St = 
mm t 
(f°t - . 
s°t-1) 3.26) 
This measure is simply the daily change in the rate implied in the Fed funds future 
contract, scaled to take into account the number of days in the month that are 
affected by the change. The rationale for this way of computing surprises is that 
if the Fed funds rate for the remainder of the month is fully anticipated, then 
agents should not revise their expectations from day to day and so the futures rate 
on date t will be the same as on day t-1. However, if there is a monetary policy 
surprise, then this should be reflected in a revision of the rate implied in the futures 
contract. Given that part of the Fed funds future is already determined (by the 
fact that the rate relevant for the valuation of futures contracts is the average Fed 
funds rate over the month), it is necessary to adjust the change in the fed funds 
future following the surprise to reflect the number of days affected by the change. 
This is done by multiplying the daily change in the futures rate by m t, 
i. e. the 
proportion of the calendar month remaining. 
An example serves to illustrate the intuition behind this. Suppose that the 
Fed fund target rate is at 3% and that the central bank is not expected to change 
rates at a meeting to be held in the middle of a certain month. Assume also that 
the differences between the Fed target rate and the effective fed funds rate are 
small and that the risk premium is negligible. Then the futures rate and the Fed 
funds rate should stay at 3% until the day of the meeting. If the central bank 
takes a surprise decision to increase interest rates by 50 basis points, then such 
change will only affect the Fed funds rate for the remaining half of the month. 
Because the futures contract by then has a backward looking component based on 
the average, the consistent rate for the Fed funds futures after the rate change is 
3.25%. However, the "true" surprise is 50 basis points. Therefore, it is necessary 
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to scale up the change in the futures rate by multiplying the change in the future 
rate by a scale factor of 2. 
It should be noted that the use of the daily change in the Fed fund future rate 
implies that the distortion introduced by the risk premium is reduced, being equal 
to ,t (µs, t -i5, t_1). Nevertheless, Kuttner (2001) shows that for the first and the 
last days of the month applying the above formula may lead to distortions due to 
the effect of scaled changes in the risk premia becoming non-negligible. Therefore, 
following Kuttner (2001), for the first three days and last three days of the month, 
the daily change in the one-month futures rate is used instead of the expression 
(3.26). 
In order to derive monetary policy surprises to be used in the empirical investi- 
gation, and in particular to address the issue of whether surprises on meeting days 
have a different impact on the market than on other days, it is necessary to de- 
termine accurately when the monetary policy surprises occur. This implies taking 
into account the timing of the Federal Reserve meetings, distinguishing between 
scheduled and unscheduled decisions, and the time when market participants be- 
come aware of the decisions. In this regard, the procedures followed by the Federal 
Reserve in announcing its intentions for the Fed funds target rate have changed 
over time. Up to the end of 1993, the Fed announced the intentions through the 
size and type of open market operations conducted by its trading rate in New York 
(see Feinman, 1993). Given that the decisions were taken after the Federal funds 
market was virtually closed, there was usually a one day lag between the moment 
when the monetary policy decision was taken and its effective "announcement" 
(in fact, during this period, the announcements were done by the size and type of 
open market operations performed by the New York Federal Reserve, see Feinman, 
1993). After February 1994 the announcement procedure changed, as monetary 
policy decisions began to be announced by a press release on the day they were 
131 
taken and in time to be reflected on financial market prices. As Kuttner (2001) 
points out, there are two major exceptions. The first occurred on 18 December 
1990 when the Fed announced the interest rate decision on the day of the meet- 
ing while stocks and bonds were still trading but the futures markets had already 
closed. Therefore, in this case the change in the Fed funds rate from the 18th to 
the 19th is taken as a measure of the surprise that is used for explaining the change 
in market prices on the 18 December. The second exception is on 15 October 1998 
when the Fed changed the futures rate target between meetings but the change 
was not recorded until the following day. 
Table 3.3 shows some information on the series of surprises used in this study. 
The column showing the descriptive statistics for total surprises corresponds to the 
series of surprises taking into account all the observations, i. e. dates when decisions 
to change interest rates were taken (at scheduled and unscheduled meetings) and 
meeting dates when rates were kept unchanged. As the table shows, the mean 
surprise is very close to zero (-0.1 basis points), with a standard error of close to 7 
basis points. The maximum surprise during the sample period is 75.6 basis points 
while the minimum is -101.5 basis points. 
Taking into account only the surprises occurring on meeting dates, the mean 
surprise is again very close to zero but the standard error is larger (12.1 basis 
points on days of meetings when changes in interest rates are made and 11.1 basis 
points on days of regularly scheduled meetings when the Federal Reserve keeps 
rates unchanged). This compares with 6.8 basis points when total surprises are 
taken into account, which suggests a higher uncertainty during meeting dates than 
on other days. 
As regards surprises on days when the Federal Reserve took monetary policy 
decisions in between meetings, the table shows that the mean surprise is now differ- 
ent from zero and relatively large. On average, market participants underpredicted 
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Total Scheduled meetings Unscheduled rate 
plus rate change no rate change changes 
Mean -0.13 1.6 -1.1 -19.1 Maximum 75.6 20.0 29.0 24.2 
Minimum -101.5 -27.5 -62.8 -101.5 Standard error 6.8 12.1 11.1 27.2 
Table 3.3. Statistics on the Fed's monetary policy surprises 
the level of the Federal funds rate target by around 19 basis points on these days. 
In addition, while the maximum surprise is within the range of those found for 
meeting days, the minimum is quite large. In fact it is larger than the maximum 
rate change of the Federal Reserve during this period (75 basis points). For in- 
stance, such a change would be consistent with market participants expecting a 
rate increase by 50 basis points and the Federal Reserve deciding to reduce rates 
by 50 basis points. This suggests that monetary policy surprises on decisions taken 
at unscheduled meetings tend to be larger in absolute value, probably reflecting 
the markets difficulty in predicting their occurrence. 
Following this review, in the next section a methodology is proposed to test the 
impact of these various surprises on the return and volatility of financial assets. 
3.3.4. Testing announcement effects with GARCH models 
Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models have 
been widely used in financial economics for modelling the return and volatility of 
asset prices. This section describes how these models can be adapted in order to 
investigate the existence of announcement effects of monetary policy. 
Of the many models with conditional heteroscedasticity that could be appro- 
priate for modeling the return and volatility of asset prices, this study, the choice 
relies on using standard univariate GARCH models. The main reasons for this 
choice are the following. First, these models are relatively simple and flexible, 
133 
which makes the necessary adjustments for testing announcement effects straight- 
forward. Second, a preliminary empirical application of these models revealed that 
they are able to adequately account for the heteroscedasticity encountered in the 
residuals. A third reason is that a multivariate extension of GARCH models is used 
further on, making the choice of univariate GARCH models even more appealing, 
given the possibility of comparing the results. 
The models are applied to daily data with the objective of investigating whether 
the return of each asset and its volatility change around monetary policy meetings 
and decisions. In order to do this three different specifications are used: 1) A 
first specification consists in using binary dummy variables (this approach has 
been used before in testing announcement effects by Bomfim, 2003; Li and Engle, 
1998; Ehrman and Fratzscher, 2002; Gaspar, Peres-Quiros and Sicilia, 2001); 2) 
A second specification combines dummy variables with variables that measure the 
surprise and the expected components around central bank meetings; 3) A third 
approach, introduced here, is to consider that there are continuous monetary policy 
information effects affecting financial asset prices. 
1) GARCH models using binary dummy variables 
The general specification of the GARCH model is composed by two equations, 
one for the return (rt) and one for the conditional volatility (ht) : 
n34 
rt =c+E -'Zrt-2 +EßiD2t +E bjWdayt + QHolt + Et (3.27) 
2=1 z=1 j=1 
a34 
lit = /-t + et-2 + 
1: 
ýjDjt +E OjW dayt + WHolt + Pht-1 
i=1 j=1 
where c and u are the coefficients on the constant in the conditional mean and 
conditional variance respectively. DZ, i=1... 3, represent dummy variables linked to 
monetary policy announcements. Three types of dummy variables are considered. 
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A first dummy, D1, equals 1 on days when the central bank holds a scheduled 
meeting to decide on interest rate levels but leaves official interest rates unchanged 
and equals zero otherwise. This dummy variable is used for testing the existence 
of non-announcement effects of monetary policy. A second dummy, D2, equals 1 
on days when the central bank holds a scheduled meeting and makes the decision 
to change interest rates and zero otherwise. This dummy variable attempts to 
capture announcement effects of central bank decisions that are taken at regular 
meetings. Finally, a third dummy variable, D3, equals 1 when the central bank 
holds an unscheduled meeting and changes interest rates, and zero otherwise. 
The use of these simple dummy variables implies that the same weight is given 
to every action or non-action. Thus, financial market prices would react in the 
same way to each monetary policy action or non-action. The test of whether 
announcement days have an impact on the daily return or in volatility can be 
performed by respectively testing the hypothesis that ß2 or Z ; 7j is equal to zero. 
The model includes also variables that take into account calendar effects. 
Wdayj, j=1 to 4, are dummy variables that account for the day of the week effect 
(four dummies, each of which equals 1 in each of the first four week days, Monday 
to Thursday, and zero otherwise) and Hol represents a dummy variable that equals 
1 when there is a holiday and zero otherwise. The use of calendar dummies is nec- 
essary to take into account regular effects on asset returns and volatility that are 
not linked to monetary policy. In the literature, these effects have been found by 
many researchers, in particular regarding the effect of weekends and holidays on 
stock returns (see for instance French, 1980, and, more recently, Fortune, 1999). 
A reason why weekend or holiday effects may occur is that if the process of the 
asset returns is a continuous one, then it should continue over the days the stock 
market is closed. Thus, according to this hypothesis, on days following weekends 
or holidays returns show a different behaviour than on consecutive calendar days. 
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2) Models combining dummy variables with surprises and expected values 
A second possibility to test for announcement effects is to weight each an- 
nouncement by the size of the "surprise" that it constitutes for the markets. This 
is achieved by multiplying each of the dummy variables in the model by the "sur- 
prise" (St). Similarly, it is also possible to include in the model the expected com- 
ponent of the change (Et), as this may also provide some information regarding 
the announcement effect (and also non-announcement effects). The most general 
specification of this type of models is the following: 
Tt =c+ 'Yirt-i ý- 
2-1 
a 
i=1 
3 
E, 3i'DitSt 
i=1 
Lui Dit St 
i=1 
Oi Dzt Et + 
i=1 
Lui Dzt Et 
ý=1 
4 
E 6j W dayjt + OHolt + Et 
j=1 
4 
1: 9jWdayjt + yHolt + pht_1 
j=1 
There is evidence of announcement effects whenever at least one of the coefficients 
ß or ru is found to be statistically different from zero. A priori, expected changes in 
interest rates should be priced in, so that the surprise component is the one most 
likely to be found relevant in practice. If expectations variables are found to be 
significant, then this may be a sign of financial market inefficiency or information 
asymmetry (see Donders, Kouwenberg and Vorst, 2000 and Kim and Verrechia, 
1991). 
3) Models assuming a continuous flow of information 
In this third hypothesis, the central bank is assumed to be providing a con- 
tinuous flow of information to the markets, by contrast with the previous cases 
where the announcement effects occur only when the central bank holds meetings 
or takes decisions at non-scheduled meetings. In addition, financial market partic- 
ipants are assumed to be always reassessing monetary policy and adjusting asset 
prices accordingly. This hypothesis does not appear overly unrealistic given that 
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central banks have several devices for providing information on monetary policy 
to the markets. Therefore, assuming a continuous flow of information may be a 
better approximation to actual practice than selecting only occasions of central 
bank meetings and decisions. Such communication devices include speeches from 
Board Members; official publications reporting on the economic and monetary 
developments and the way central banks interpret these; in some countries the 
release of minutes of previous meetings constitutes information that may change 
the market's assessment of the central bank decisions and/or make them change 
expectations regarding future decisions. In fact, central banks usually try to gear 
expectations in order to prepare the markets for the decisions. Thus, even though 
the reassessment of monetary policy by the markets is likely to be clustered around 
the releases of the relevant information than in a continuous way, there appears 
to be a case for testing whether financial market returns and volatility react con- 
tinuously to changes in expectations and surprises regarding the expected central 
bank rate. 
In this third hypothesis the specification of the model to be estimated is the 
following: 
n4 
rt =c+ 7irt_Z + ßsSt + ßeEt +E bjWdayjt + OHolt + Et (3.28) 
i=1 j=1 
a4 
ht = /ý +E2 i+ CUsSt 
+ ,, e Et + 1: Bj Wdayjt + coHolt + pht-1 
j=l 
Now dummy variables are no longer used and the returns are a function of expected 
changes and surprises in central bank rates. Thus, in this case financial market 
prices would react to what, at each moment in time, constitutes the overall market 
view as regards the future policy actions. 
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Finally, in the class of models 2) and 3) it is possible to allow for asymmetries 
in the reaction of financial market returns and volatility by adding to the mean 
and variance equations the absolute value of the surprises and expectations terms 
(omitting seasonal dummies) : 
n 
rt c+ 'YZrt-2 + 
Z-1 
3 
ßi Dit St + 
i=1 
3 
ýaeDit E't 
i=1 
3 
EOj"DjtjStj 
i=1 
(3.29) 
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In this case, evidence of asymmetry is found whenever both coefficients in at least 
pairs parameters ýas 
1 (3e Oae) (s as 1(e ae 1 one of the of 
(`i, 
ZJ, lZ, 2J, ` 
JZ , ü72 J or ý7i 
) are 
statistically different from zero. 
3.3.4.1. Testing for cross-country effects. In order to study cross-country an- 
nouncement effects, for instance to study how US monetary policy affects German 
financial markets, a specification similar to the one used for modelling the return 
and volatility for financial prices in the US can be used for modelling the processes 
followed by German variables. In order to test announcement effects, the dummy 
variables for the US monetary policy announcements can be included in the two 
GARCH model equations in the following way: 
n34 
rt =C+Y -'Zrt-i +E ßiDit-1 +E 6jWdayjt + oHolt + et (3.30) 
j=l 
a34 
ht = /t + E2 + -c7iDit-i +E ejWdayjt + coHolt + Pht-i 
Y--., 
t-iY, 
i=l i=l j=l 
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There is evidence of cross-country announcement effects on the mean return if the 
hypothesis ß2=O can be rejected or in volatility if the hypothesis t2=0 can be 
rejected. Note that in order to take into account the lag with which US announce- 
ments are reflected in German financial markets, the dummy variables for the US 
are lagged one day. 
3.4. Empirical application: announcement effects of monetary policy 
in the US and spillovers to Germany 
3.4.1. Data 
The sample for the US models contains daily data (assuming 5 day weeks) covering 
the period from 3 October 1988 to 29 June 2002 which gives 3583 observations. 
For the purpose of this study, the quantification of the surprise and expectation 
components of interest rate changes is done using futures data as described in sec- 
tion 3.3.2. In particular, the data refer to the 30 day future price traded on the 
Chicago Board of Trade and is obtained from Datastream. Besides the series of 
surprises and expectations, the data set contains daily series of the S&P 500 (clos- 
ing prices), of the US dollar Deutsche Mark (euro from 1 January 1999 onwards) 
exchange rate and of the 10-year US government bond yields. Data on daily stock 
prices is obtained from Global Financial Data in the case of the S&P500 for the 
US and in the case of the DAX index; bond yields are obtained from Reuters while 
the exchange rate is obtained from the Bank for International Settlements. The 
data on the S&P 500 and the exchange rate are converted into daily rates of return 
by first taking logarithms and then computing the daily change in the transformed 
series. For interest rates the daily change in the bond yield in basis points is used 
instead. Data on dates of the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis while dates 
of Fed decisions are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. As regards 
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Germany, the data used for stock prices is daily data on the DAX index, obtained 
from Global Financial Data, while for long-term interest rates the yield on 10-year 
German government bonds, obtained from Reuters, is used. 
3.4.2. Effect of US monetary policy announcements on US financial mar- 
kets 
The GARCH models presented in section 3.3.4 are estimated using maximum like- 
lihood and the maximization method of Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974) 
(BHHH). In order to implement the model, it is necessary to first determine the 
number of lags to use in the conditional mean equation and the number of GARCH 
terms. The criterion followed to choose this number of lags in the conditional mean 
equation is based on the analysis of the correlogram of the standardised residuals. 
As regards the GARCH terms, the criterion is based on both the observation of 
the autocorrelation of the squared standardised residuals using the respective cor- 
relogram and formal tests for the presence of ARCH effects up to the 5th order 
using the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test proposed by Engle (1982). The estimated 
standard errors are derived using a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance ob- 
tained using the method of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). Whenever possible, 
statistically insignificant terms have been dropped from the equations. The full 
results obtained in the present study for all the models are shown in annex 3. A. 
3.4.2.1. Results for the S&P500. Table 3.4 summarises the results for the S&P 
500 index. Starting with the model using only binary dummy variables, no evidence 
of announcement effects on the conditional mean equation is found. However, 
there is evidence of a significant increase in the volatility of the daily return of the 
S&P500 whenever the Federal Reserve changes interest rates in between scheduled 
meetings. 
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However, the results change when dummy variables multiplied by the size of the 
monetary policy surprises are used. In this case, there is evidence that monetary 
policy surprises affect the mean return of the S&P 500 whenever the Federal Re- 
serve changes interest rates outside the regular meetings. The negative coefficient 
implies that a surprise increase in interest rates by the Fed at an unscheduled meet- 
ing (or a smaller decrease in interest rates than expected by the market) decreases 
the daily return on the S&P 500, which is in line with the a priori predictions of 
the valuation models reviewed in section 3.2.3. In particular, a positive monetary 
policy surprise may lead market participants to expect a tighter central bank pol- 
icy and therefore imply an upward revision of the discount rate at which future 
cash flows from stocks are valued or may generate expectations of lower economic 
activity than previously foreseen. In other words, such responses could indicate 
that market participants interpret positive interest rate surprises as "bad news". 
As regards the volatility equation, again there is evidence of a significant effect 
of monetary policy surprises on volatility, but with distinct indications than in the 
case of binary dummies. The estimates with the model including surprises suggest 
that volatility increases around meetings where no decision is taken and there is a 
positive "surprise". Such reaction implies that when the central bank does not take 
any decision and the market revises interest rate expectations upwards in response, 
then the volatility of the S&P500 increases. This could indicate that when the Fed- 
eral Reserve frustrates market expectations of lower interest rates by not changing 
rates this has a stronger impact on stock market volatility than when the Federal 
Reserves disappoints the markets by changing rates by less than expected. This 
finding is consistent with the interpretation of positive monetary policy surprises as 
"bad news". By contrast with this finding, when the Fed takes decisions outside 
the regularly scheduled meetings, a positive monetary policy surprise (implying 
that market participants revise their interest rate expectations upwards after the 
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meeting) leads to a decline in its volatility. This result is somewhat puzzling and 
could be due to the uncertainty with which the coefficient is estimated (the effect 
is statistically different from zero only at a 10% level). 
As for the model assuming that not only monetary policy surprises matter but 
also the expected part of the interest rate change should be taken into account, 
there is some evidence that the expected components matter for the daily return 
on the S&P500 in the case of scheduled and unscheduled meetings. However, this 
evidence is not very strong, as the coefficients are statistically significant only at 
a 10% level. As regards the variance equation, there is no evidence that expected 
changes have an impact on the volatility of the S&P 500 returns. This weak 
evidence is consistent with market efficiency. 
Finally, when assuming a continuous flow of information, both the coefficient 
on surprises and that on expectations are found not to be statistically significant 
and therefore there is no evidence of continuous announcement effects of monetary 
policy on the S&P 500. Together with the evidence obtained with the models using 
dummy variables, this could reflect that outside regular central bank meetings and 
decisions, other sources of information rather than monetary policy are likely to 
be predominant in driving the S&P 500. 
3.4.2.2. Results for the US 10-year bond yield. Table 3.5 shows the results 
for the daily change in the US 10 year bond yield. Starting with the model with 
binary dummy variables, similarly to the case of the S&P 500, no evidence is found 
of announcement effects of monetary policy on the mean equation. However, in 
terms of the conditional variance of bond yields, there is evidence that on days 
when the central bank takes a decision to change interest rates at a scheduled 
meeting the volatility of daily changes in 10 year US bond yields increases. 
When surprises are taken into account, then bond yields tend to move in the 
direction of the surprise in the days of scheduled meetings when the central bank 
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Dummy Surprises Surprises Continuous 
variables only and flow of 
only expectations information 
Mean Variance 
GARCH 
(2,1) 
Mean Variance 
GARCH 
(1,1) 
Mean Variance 
GARCH 
(2,1) 
Mean Variance 
GARCH 
(1,1) 
D1 -0.004 
D2 0.25 
D3 0.53** 
D1St -0.004 0.01** -0.005 0.01** 
D2 St -0.002 -0.001 -0.03** -0.01 
D3 St -0.003** -0.02* -0.03** -0.02** 
Dl Et -0.001 0.0001 
D2Et -0.01* -0.01 
D3Et 0.01* -0.002 
St -0.001 -0.005 
Et 0.0001 0.0004 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level/10% level. 
Table 3.4. Models for the SP500 
does not take a decision. Thus, if market participants expect a smaller Fed funds 
rate than what turns out to be the case, implying an upward revision of expec- 
tations, this leads to an increase in 10-year bond yields. This reaction seems to 
be consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest 
rates, and not with the view that positive monetary policy surprises lead to lower 
bond yields via a downward effect on inflation expectations. As for the remaining 
results, no evidence is found of significant monetary policy announcement effects 
on meeting days or when the central bank changes rates in between meetings. 
As regards the variance, although the coefficient is significant only at the 10% 
level, there is some evidence that the variance of government bond yields changes 
in the same direction of the surprise when the central bank takes a decision in an 
unscheduled meeting. In the cases where the central bank keeps rate unchanged or 
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changes interest rates at scheduled meetings, no evidence is found of announcement 
effects. 
When monetary policy expectations are introduced in the model, there is ev- 
idence that the expected component of the interest rate changes at scheduled 
meetings matters for the mean change in bond yields. Even though the effect on 
the daily change in bond yields is smaller than in the case of surprises at scheduled 
meetings where no rate change takes place, the fact that the expected change in 
the central bank rate influences bond yields may be a sign of inefficiency in the 
market for government bonds. As regards the conditional variance of daily changes 
in bond yields, the results are not so clear. There is evidence that expectations of 
an increase in interest rates reduce the volatility of the 10-year bond yield while 
positive surprises increase volatility when the central bank changes interest rates 
at unscheduled meetings. However, the coefficients in these cases are significant 
only at a 10% confidence level. 
Finally, in models assuming a continuous flow of information, there is evidence 
that monetary policy surprises affect long-term bond yields positively, which is 
again consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. The ex- 
pected component of the change in the Federal Funds rate does not seem to move 
bond yields in this specification nor their variance. The fact that unexpected 
changes in the Fed funds rate seem to lead to changes in the same direction in 
bond yields, together with the finding that no such effects exist on stock returns, 
might suggest that monetary policy news outside monetary policy decision dates 
are more important in influencing bond yields than in driving stock returns. 
3.4.2.3. Results for the US dollar-Deutsche Mark. As regards the US dollar- 
Deutsche Mark exchange rate, the results shown in Table 3.6, for the models es- 
timated for the period from 3 October 1988 to 31 December 1998, suggest that 
there is much weaker evidence of announcement effects on the exchange rate than 
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Dummy 
variables 
only 
Surprises 
only 
Surprises 
and 
expectations 
Continuous 
flow of 
information 
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
GARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH 
(1,1) (1,1) (1,1) (1,1) 
D, -0.6 
D2 24.98** 
D3 -0.04 
DiSt 0.14** 0.10 0.14** 0.21 
D2 St 0.05 0.31 0.09 0.16 
D3 St 0.05 0.19* 0.03 0.35** 
D1 Et -0.01 -0.06 
D2Et 0.05** -0.23* 
D3Et -0.04 0.13* 
St 0.19** 0.06 
Et 0.003 0.06 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% level/ 
10% level. 
Table 3.5. Models for US 10 year bond yield. 
is the case of stocks and bonds. The only specification for which some evidence of 
announcement effects is found is the model including dummy variables interacting 
with surprises. In this model, surprises at meeting dates seem to lead to an ap- 
preciation of the US dollar against the Deutsche Mark and its volatility moves in 
the same direction of the surprise. One possible explanation for these weak results 
is that the exchange rate may be relatively more exposed to shocks from sources 
other than monetary policy when compared to stocks and bonds. In fact, while 
stocks and bonds are more likely to reflect the domestic macroeconomic conditions 
which are more closely linked to monetary policy, the exchange rate obviously very 
much depends on shocks in the foreign country, which may make it more difficult 
to find evidence of announcement effects on the daily change in the exchange rate. 
3.4.2.4. Models with asymmetries. Table 3.7 shows the results of the models 
with asymmetries. Starting with the S&P 500, there is some evidence of asymmetry 
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Dummy Surprises Surprises Continuous 
variables only and flow of 
only expectations information 
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
GARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH 
(1,1) (1,1) (1,1) (1,1) 
D1 -0.04 
DZ -0.05 
D3 0.02 
D1St 0.02 0.003 0.02 0.004 
D2 St 0.01** 0.005* 0.01 0.005 
D3 St 0.004 -0.003 0.005 -0.002 
D1 Et -0.001 0.001 
D2Et -0.001 0.0003 
D3 Et 0.004 0.0004 
St 0.001 -0.001 
Et -0.0002 -0.0004 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level/10% level. 
Table 3.6. Models for US Dollar - Deutsche Mark rate. 
in the mean return equation when the Federal Reserve changes interest rates at 
scheduled meeting days. In those occasions, a positive monetary policy surprise 
in changing interest rates at a scheduled meeting seems to have a small effect on 
the mean return. In fact, a Wald test shows that the coefficient of D2St is not 
statistically different from the symmetric of the coefficient on D2 St , suggesting 
that a positive monetary policy surprise (which could be interpreted as "bad news") 
has no significant effect on stock returns. However, when the central bank creates 
a surprise by reducing rates by more than what the market expects, there is a 
strong positive effect on the S&P 500 daily return. This suggests that lower than 
expected changes in interest rates seem to constitute "good news" for the markets 
and that the S&P500 reacts more strongly to these than to "bad news". 
Turning to the daily change in the 10-year bond yield, in the case of the mean 
equation there is evidence of asymmetric effects only in the case of surprises that 
146 
occur when the central bank changes rates at unscheduled meetings. The estimated 
coefficients suggest that when the Fed moves interest rates to a level lower than the 
one expected by market participants, thereby creating a "negative" surprise, the 
daily mean change in the 10-year bond yield shows a small decline, other things 
equal. In fact, a Wald test of restrictions shows that the coefficient of D3 St is 
not statistically different from the coefficient on D3 St at a 5% significance level. 
Thus, the results suggest that a negative monetary policy surprise has little, if any, 
effect on the daily change in bond yields. However, when the Fed creates positive 
surprises at an unscheduled meeting, then long-term bond yields, on average, tend 
to increase. In the case of the conditional variance equation, there is evidence 
that the variance of the 10-year US bond yields increases at scheduled meetings 
whenever there is a surprise and irrespective of the sign of the surprise. This 
contrasts with the results obtained for stocks and could indicate that what matters 
for the bond market volatility is that there is a monetary policy surprise irrespective 
of the sign. These results could reflect that while in stocks a positive monetary 
policy surprise may increase the risk of default and leverage, in low risk government 
bonds these effects are likely to be much less important. 
As regards the exchange rate, no evidence of asymmetric effects is found on 
the mean equation, which is consistent with the previous findings of weak effects 
of monetary policy announcements on the exchange rate. As for the conditional 
variance, monetary policy surprises when the central bank changes rates at sched- 
uled meetings appear to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate, irrespective of 
the direction of the surprise. This result is puzzling, as larger monetary policy 
surprises should lead to higher exchange rate volatility than otherwise. As regards 
the effect of surprises when the Federal Reserve takes decisions at unscheduled 
meetings, if the monetary policy surprise is positive the volatility of the exchange 
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S&P500 US 10 year bond yield USD/DEM exchange rate 
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
GARCH LARCH GARCH 
(1,1) (1,1) (1,1) 
D1 St -0.005 -0.002 0.16** 0.08 0.01* 0.001 
Dl St j 0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 -0.003 -0.001 D2 St -0.03** -0.001 0.05 -0.50 0.02* -0.0001 
D2 St 0.04** 0.01 -0.11 2.47** -0.01 -0.01** 
D3 St -0.03** 0.01 0.31** 1.09 0.01 -0.01** I D3Stj 0.003 -0.01 0.24** 1.35 0.01 -0.01** 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% level/10% 
level. 
Table 3.7. Models with asymmetries 
rate remains unchanged while if it is negative, i. e. the central bank interest rate is 
lower than was previously expected by the market, volatility increases. 
Overall, the results suggest that US monetary policy announcements have more 
important effects on stock returns and government bond yields than on the ex- 
change rate. As regards stocks, the findings broadly suggest that positive mone- 
tary policy surprises (i. e. a higher than expected increase in central bank interest 
rates) have a negative impact on stock returns and an upward effect on stock re- 
turn volatility. This result is consistent with the existence of a leverage effect on 
stocks. As for bond yields, the reaction to monetary policy announcements tends 
to be in the same direction as the policy surprise. Finally, announcement effects 
at unscheduled rate changes seem to be more important in stocks than 
in bonds, 
for which surprises on scheduled meeting days seem to be more important. 
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3.4.3. Influence of Fed's announcements on financial market develop- 
ments in Germany 
This section investigates whether monetary policy announcements in the US have 
an effect on financial market prices in Germany using the GARCH models pre- 
sented in section 3.3.4. 
Starting with stock prices, the results of the model using simple dummy vari- 
ables in Table 3.8 show some evidence that on days of scheduled meetings where 
interest rates are changed, there is a tendency for the daily return of the DAX to 
rise. However, when taking into account monetary policy surprises, then there is 
no longer evidence of announcement effects at regularly scheduled meetings. In 
this case, the results show that positive surprises on days when the US Federal Re- 
serve takes decisions at unscheduled meetings have a negative impact on the daily 
DAX return. This is consistent with the results found in the US and could reflect 
a leverage effect. In the model including also expectations or in the model includ- 
ing continuous surprises and expectations no evidence is found of announcement 
effects. 
As regards the conditional variance, there is evidence that the volatility of the 
daily return of the DAX index increases whenever there are meetings of the US 
Federal Reserve but interest rates are left unchanged. This statistically significant 
result also holds in the case of the model with monetary policy surprises. More 
precisely, a positive shock to US interest rates has an upward effect on conditional 
volatility of the daily return of the DAX index when the Fed holds meetings but 
leaves rates unchanged. The evidence of announcement effects on the volatility 
equation is also found in the model with expectations. In this case, a positive 
surprise when the central bank holds a meeting but leaves rates unchanged leads 
to a rise in volatility. However, in this case the upward effect on volatility is reduced 
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Dummy 
variables 
only 
Surprises 
only 
Surprises 
and 
expectations 
Continuous 
flow of 
information 
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
GARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH 
(2,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,1) 
D1 0.06 0.26** 
D2 0.38* 0.35 
D3 0.28 0.35 
D1 St -0.0003 0.01** -0.002 0.01** 
D2 St 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
D3 St -0.02* 0.003 -0.01 0.01 
D1Et -0.01* -0.01** 
D2Et -0.003 0.004 
D3 Et -0.003 0.02 
St -0.0004 -0.004 
Et -0.0004 0.0001 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% level/ 
10% level. 
Table 3.8. Models for the DAX index 
by the amount of the change that is expected. Finally, in the models assuming a 
continuous flow of information, there is no evidence that surprises or expectations 
influence either the mean return or the volatility of the DAX index. 
Turning to 10-year bond yields in Germany, Table 3.9 shows that there is no 
evidence of announcement effects on the daily change in bond yields. As regards 
the conditional variance, according to the simple model including dummy variables 
only, on days of regular Federal Reserve meetings the volatility of the bond yields 
in Germany decreases when the Fed does not take any decision. However, this 
is not the case when the Fed takes a decision in a scheduled meeting, since the 
volatility then rises, thus mirroring the result obtained for the US. 
The result that monetary policy announcements in the US have no effect on 
bond yields is no longer obtained in the model which takes monetary policy sur- 
prises into account. In this case, on days of scheduled central bank meetings, 
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positive monetary policy surprises in the US lead to an increase in the mean daily 
change in the 10-year bond yield in Germany in the same direction of the surprise 
and irrespective of whether the Fed changes interest rates or keeps them unchanged. 
As regards the variance equation, there is evidence that positive monetary policy 
surprises in the US increase the volatility of German bond yields, both in the case 
of scheduled meetings when the central bank changes interest rates and on days of 
unscheduled rate changes. 
In the model including also expectations, no evidence of an effect of expected 
interest rate changes on the mean change in bond yields is found. However, there 
is evidence that volatility increases with expectations of higher short-term interest 
rates on dates when the Fed takes decisions at unscheduled meetings. Thus, in this 
case expectations of higher rates seem to lead to higher uncertainty while expecta- 
tions of lower interest rates contribute to lower bond yield volatility, other things 
equal. By contrast, expectations of higher interest rates in scheduled meetings 
when the Fed takes no decision have a negative effect on the variance of German 
bond yields. 
Finally, in the specification assuming a continuous flow of information, the 
mean return increases in the same direction as the continuous surprises, a result 
also found for the US bond yield. This could indicate that systematic positive US 
monetary policy surprises lead to higher bond yields in Germany. 
Table 3.10 shows the results of the models with asymmetries. The results 
show that there is evidence of asymmetries only in the case of the mean return 
of the DAX when the Fed takes decisions at scheduled meetings, but only at a 
10% significance level. If there is a positive surprise, implying that the change in 
interest rates is larger than expected by the market, then there is an increase in 
the return of the DAX. Given the findings in the US model -that positive surprises 
at unscheduled meetings have a negative effect on the mean return of the S&P 
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Dummy Surprises Surprises Continuous 
variables only and flow of 
only expectations information 
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
GARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH 
(1,1) (2,1) (1,1) (1,1) 
Dx 0.33 -2.07** 
D2 -0.69 8.79** 
D3 -0.55 2.81 
D1St 0.06** -0.08 0.07** -0.16 
D2 St 0.11** 0.43** 0.11* 0.50** 
D3 St -0.0006 0.25** 0.01 0.28** 
D1Et 0.01 -0.08** 
D2Et 0.03 -0.01 
D3Et -0.004 0.12** 
St 0.06** 0.10 
Et 0.005 0.02 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5%/10% level. 
Table 3.9. Models for 10 year German bond yields 
500 (see Table 3.4) - this result is consistent with the existence of spillover effects 
from the US to Germany, with a tendency for the DAX daily return to rise when 
there are "bad news" for US stocks. However, in the case of a negative surprise, 
the daily return of the DAX increases even more, suggesting that "good news" for 
the US are also good for the DAX. 
As for German bond yields, there is evidence of asymmetries on meeting days 
when the central bank keeps rates unchanged and on days of unscheduled meeting 
decisions. In the case of the mean equation, positive surprises raise bond yields on 
these days, but negative surprises have a smaller effect. Finally, there is weaker ev- 
idence of asymmetries on volatility on days when interest rates are kept unchanged 
at scheduled meetings. 
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DAX German bond yield 
Mean Variance Mean Variance 
GARCH GARCH 
(1,1) 1,1) 
D1St -0.03** -0.004 0.07** -0.16** ID, Stj -0.01 -0.03** 0.03** -0.14* 
D2 St -0.04* 0.04* 0.09 0.64 
JD2St 0.05** -0.004 -0.04 0.54 
D3 St -0.02 -0.02 0.26* 0.06 JD3St 
-0.04 -0.03** 0.29* -0.02 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% level/10/0 
level. 
Table 3.10. Germany - models with asymmetries 
3.4.4. Evidence from implied volatility in index options 
Another way of testing announcement effects is to use volatility measures derived 
from option prices instead of historical conditional volatility measures based on 
GARCH models. The main advantage of using implied volatility measures is that 
they are forward looking and therefore their changes over time may reflect more 
accurately the revision in expectations induced by monetary policy surprises. 
As regards previous empirical findings, Donders et al. (2000) investigate an- 
nouncement effects of earnings announcements on volatility implied in option 
prices, arguing that reactions in the prices of options may be more informative 
than those in the stock prices. A first reason is the higher leverage in the option 
market (Black, 1975). In fact, a percentage change in the stock price index will 
lead to a more than proportional percentage change in the price of the option. 
In addition, the higher leverage in the option markets facilitates the adjustments 
by speculators to announcements relative to the case of traders holding outright 
stocks (see Donders, Kouwenberg and Vorst, 2000). 
This section tests announcement effects of monetary policy on implied volatility 
as measured by the VIX index of volatility for the US. The VIX index represents 
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the implied volatility of a 30 calendar day at-the-money option on the S&P 100 
index. In other words, it is the outcome of the market consensus view, in annualised 
terms, as to the expected daily standard deviation of the S&P100 index. The VIX 
index, also called "the investor fear gauge", is computed by equating the market 
price of an index option to its theoretical value given by the Black-Scholes (1973) 
and Merton (1973) option valuation model (see Whaley, 2000, for details). This 
implied volatility measure can be seen as the market's forecast of the future return 
volatility over the remaining life of the option (here 30 days). The VIX index has 
been shown by Christensen and Prabhala (1998) to have a favourable forecasting 
performance. In their study, these authors generally found that implied volatility 
outperforms past volatility in forecasting future volatility. In addition, Blair et al. 
(2001) find that the VIX index contains all the relevant information to forecast 
volatility so that measures of realised volatility derived from ARCH models do not 
provide much incremental information. 
As regards the modelling approach to be used for testing announcement effects, 
the choice was made to use an autoregressive process for modelling the square of 
the VIX index, i. e. to work instead with the expected variance of the S&P100 
rather than the expected standard deviation as in the case of the analysis with 
GARCH models in previous sections. Following a first look at the data, it was 
found that the residuals exhibited considerable heteroscedasticity. Therefore a 
GARCH model was assumed for the residuals. The model used for modelling the 
square of the VIX index (at) was then the following (here in the case of binary 
dummy variables) : 
34 
or t=c +'y(L)07 -1 
+ ßjD2t + 6jWdayjt + OHolt + Et (3.31) 
j=l 
ht =µ+ 5(L)Et-Z + Pht-, 
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where 6t follows a normal distribution with mean zero and conditional variance ht, 
-y(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L, Dit correspond to binary dummy vari- 
ables previously used to test monetary policy announcement effects (for meeting 
days when no change in the Fed funds rate was made (i=1); meeting dates when 
a rate change occurred (i=2) and for rate changes in between scheduled meetings 
(i=3)). 
The sample period goes from 11 October 1988 to 28 June 2002 and the data 
on the VIX index are taken from Datastream. The results are shown in table 3.11. 
As regards the results obtained with binary dummy variables, they show that the 
implied volatility of the S&P 100 increases on the days of unscheduled changes in 
interest rates, which confirms the previous results obtained with realised volatility 
for the S&P 500. On scheduled meeting days where a decision is taken, volatility 
tends to decline, although the result is valid only at a 10% significance level. 
When the size of the surprises is taken into account, the results no longer 
show evidence of announcement effects at non-scheduled decision dates, contrary 
to the previous result of some weak evidence that this was the case. However, on 
days when the Federal Reserve changes rates at previously scheduled meetings, 
the VIX index increases in the direction of the surprise. A positive surprise in 
interest rates, implying that the market expects lower rates than the outcome 
of the meeting, tends to increase implied volatility, which is consistent with the 
existence of a leverage effect. 
Finally, the results with surprises and expectations show that the expected 
component of the rate change appears to matter for the level of implied volatility. 
While the results for meeting days are consistent with a leverage effect, the result 
for days when the central bank takes decisions in-between meetings is somewhat 
surprising, as it implies that volatility is lower the larger the expected change in 
interest rates. 
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Binary dummies Surprises only Surprises 
and expectations 
GARCH (2,1) GARCH (4,1) GARCH (4,1) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
D1t/D1tSt 4.27 0.17 -0.13 D2t/D2tSt 
-16.74* 1.10* 1.48* 
D3t/D3tSt 38.91** 0.89 -1.57 
D1tEt 0.19** 
D2tEt 0.73** 
DstEt 
-1.96** Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level/10% level. 
Table 3.11. Models for the implied volatility in the VIX index 
3.5. A multivariate GARCH model for testing for announcement 
effects 
The advantage of univariate GARCH models for testing announcement effects 
of monetary policy is that they are quite flexible, allowing the introduction of 
several effects such as asymmetry or calendar dummies in the model in a straight- 
forward way. A possible disadvantage of the use of univariate methods is that 
these models allow for shocks to the process of the own return to enter the volatil- 
ity equation. If there are shocks to other assets that affect the conditional volatility 
of the asset return they will not be taken into account in the univariate framework. 
By using a multivariate approach to model volatility, it is possible to take into ac- 
count spillovers of shocks and volatility between the several asset returns, which 
may lead to more robust tests of announcement effects. 
In the literature, several studies have found evidence of volatility spillovers 
across financial assets. Fleming et al. (1998) analyse volatility linkages in stock, 
bond and money markets basing their analysis on the link between volatility and 
information flow, following the approach of Ross (1989). They argue that cross- 
market linkages in volatility can come about from two sources. The first is through 
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common information. For instance, a monetary policy action potentially has an 
impact on several markets and as a result the volatility of the different assets on the 
day of the action is more likely to be correlated. A second channel is by information 
spillovers caused by cross-market hedging. According to this hypothesis, events 
that cause changes of expectations of a trader regarding a certain asset would 
result in the trader rebalancing his or her portfolio. As a result, information that 
is thought to be specific to and influence only a certain asset, for instance stocks, 
may end up influencing trade volume and the volatility of other assets, such as 
government bonds. In fact, during periods of market turmoil safe haven flows from 
stocks to government bonds are frequently observed. Some examples from the 
financial press illustrate this: 
" "Treasury prices spiked higher yesterday morning when stock prices plunged 
wildly.... " "Analysts blamed the stock market's declines on worries about 
the weak economy and about the probability of another Fed easing - the 
same topics the bond market has been concerned about. ", Susan Kelly, 
Bond Buyer, October 6,1992. 
" "Fears that rising [Federal fund] interest rates will take a toll on economic 
growth spurred investors to bail out of economically sensitive stocks and 
drive share prices lower overall in another volatile session. Bonds surged 
and the dollar fell. ", Steven E. Levingston, Wall Street Journal, April 21, 
1994. 
" "Another sharp decline in stock prices lifted the bond market and drew 
attention away from other events of more usual interest to bond investors 
and traders. " "... the bulk of the buying in U. S. Treasuries was by traders, 
betting that instability abroad will keep the money flowing into the perceived 
safe haven of U. S. Treasurys", Margaret Boitano, Wall Street Journal, 
October 31,1997. 
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" "Markets surged worldwide yesterday... "" Global investors unwound their 
safe haven bets sending gold and oil lower, bond yields up, equities and the 
dollar higher. ", Deborah Hargreaves, Michael Morgan and Paivi Munter, 
Financial Times, 8 April 2003. 
The quote by Boitano is particularly interesting as it suggests that the relation 
between bond yields and their fundamentals may be affected by shocks which are 
specific to the stock market, which is a sign of volatility spillovers due to cross- 
market hedging of the kind predicted by Fleming et al. (1998). 
Given the above, there appears to be a case for testing monetary policy an- 
nouncement effects by taking volatility spillovers into account. In fact, if on the 
day of the announcement of the monetary policy decision there are other important 
shocks specific to each of the markets then this is likely to influence the results, pos- 
sibly obscuring the impact of announcement effects on asset prices. If these shocks 
are random they may lead to inefficient estimates, depending on their importance, 
resulting in insignificant coefficients in the terms on variables capturing monetary 
policy. Therefore, controlling for cross-market shocks in estimating announcement 
effects may lead to a more robust testing procedure. 
Previous studies testing announcement effects using multivariate GARCH mod- 
els include Christiansen (2000) who studies the effect of announcements on the 
employment situation and the producer price index on the conditional covari- 
ance structure for excess bond returns for six different maturities. Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2002) use a bivariate EGARCH model following Nelson (1991) for test- 
ing international linkages in money market by testing the existence of spillover of 
monetary policy news between short-term interest rates in the US and interest 
rates in Germany/euro area. Gulley and Sultan (2003) use a bivariate GARCH 
model of stock and bond returns to test the effects of daily changes in the Federal 
funds futures rate (thus, not using the surprise components as derived in section 
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3.3.2). They find that changes in the Federal Funds future rate are negatively 
related to both stock and bond returns. In addition, they find evidence of asym- 
metric effects of changes in the Federal funds future rate on the stock market, but 
not on the bond market. 
In this section a trivariate GARCH model is estimated that can take into 
account the volatility spillover effects described above and is used to test for mon- 
etary policy announcement effects. The model jointly models stocks, bonds and 
the exchange rate. 
3.5.1. Empirical approach: multivariate testing of announcement effects 
on volatility 
Annex 3. B reviews the several alternative possibilities for the multivariate model of 
volatility. These are the VECH model of Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988), 
the BEKK model of Engle and Kroner (1995), the Factor ARCH model of Engle, 
Ng and Rothschild (1990), the constant correlation model of Bollerslev (1990) and 
the dynamic correlation model of Engle (2002). 
The selection of the multivariate model to use for testing the effects of mon- 
etary policy announcements is based on two types of considerations. First, the 
multivariate GARCH model chosen should be sufficiently tractable to allow for 
efficient estimation by maximum likelihood. This seems to rule out the use of the 
VECH model, which is more demanding in terms of the number of coefficients that 
need to be estimated. Second, the model should be suited for investigating whether 
the announcement effects found in univariate approaches still hold in multivariate 
settings. In addition, it should also allow for taking into account the interactions 
between the conditional volatility and the shocks to the return process of the dif- 
ferent assets. In this regard, conditional correlation models do not appear to be the 
most appropriate, because in these models the conditional volatility of the several 
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assets evolves independently of the other assets. Although conditional correlation 
models allow for the volatilities of the several asset returns to be correlated, such 
a feature is not explicitly taken into account given that the main focus in these 
models is on the correlation between the returns of the several assets. By contrast, 
in the current study the main focus is on the effect of monetary policy on the level 
of the conditional volatility. 
For these reasons, and despite the extra savings in the number of parameters 
provided by conditional correlation models, this study uses a restricted version of 
the BEKK model which can also be interpreted as aN factor ARCH model. This 
model requires the estimation of a relatively small number of parameters while 
at the same time allowing for volatility interactions between the several financial 
assets involved. 
The multivariate model for the returns and volatility is estimated for the period 
between 11 October 1988 and 29 June 2002. The model is a trivariate GARCH 
model of the daily return of the S&P500, the daily change in the US 10 year bond 
yields and, up to 31 December 1998, the daily change in the logarithm of the US- 
Dollar Deutsche Mark rate and, from the first of January 1999, the US dollar - 
euro exchange rate. 
The specification of the mean return vector (rt) is given by: 
rt= /it + Et 
where µt is a3x1 time varying vector of the conditional mean of the asset re- 
turn and Et a3x1 vector of residuals. The residuals follow a multivariate normal 
distribution given by: 
et', N(O, Ht) 
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where Ht is a3x3 symmetric matrix representing the conditional variance of the 
vector of asset returns. 
In deciding the final specification of the multivariate GARCH model to be used, 
several choices need to be made. The model should have sufficient dynamics to 
describe the moments of the data and be sufficiently tractable to allow an efficient 
estimation by maximum likelihood. 
A first decision concerns the specification of the conditional mean (µt) to be 
used. An obvious choice is to start from the specifications previously used in the 
univariate GARCH analysis. However, given the constraints in terms of parameters 
posed in the multivariate FARCH setting, such choice would result in a very large 
number of parameters to be estimated. In fact, in the literature on multivariate 
GARCH modelling the processes chosen for the conditional mean are usually very 
simple, frequently consisting in no more than assuming that the daily return is a 
constant (see Bauwens, Laurent and Rombouts, 2003, page 3). ' Given the need 
of obtaining a parsimonious model, the choice is made not to include any dummy 
variable in the mean return equation, excluding the dummy variables for both 
announcement and calendar effects. Therefore, an autoregressive process of order 
4 is used for both the S&P 500 and the daily change in US 10 year bond yields and 
a first order autoregressive process is chosen for the daily change in the logarithm 
of the US-dollar-Deutsche Mark exchange rate. 
The second choice regards the equation for the conditional volatility. In this 
respect, similar considerations apply as in the case of the conditional mean return 
specification. In particular, the use of calendar dummies would also significantly 
increase the number of parameters of the model. Therefore, as in the case of the 
6A major exception is that of the class of models of the dynamic correlation type proposed by 
Engle (2002). These models are as flexible as univariate GARCH models in terms of the mean 
return specification. 
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mean equation, the choice is made not to include dummy variables for calendar 
effects in the model. In addition, the lag length in the process for modelling the 
variance-covariance matrix is limited to one, given that higher orders would result 
in a very high number of parameters to be estimated. 
The investigation of announcement effects of monetary policy using the multi- 
variate approach is conducted by using two specifications. A first model includes 
only binary dummy variables which take the value 1 when the central bank meets 
(distinguishing between occasions when rates are changed and occasions when 
interest rates are kept unchanged) and when the central bank takes decisions in- 
between meetings. A second model includes dummy variables interacting with 
"surprises" obtained from Fed funds futures following the methodology described 
in section 3.3.3 . 
The precise formulation of the variance matrix (Ht) in the model with binary 
dummy variables only is the following: 
Ht = SZ + B'Ht-, B + A'Et-lit-1A + 
J' Dltö1 + S2D2tS2 + 63D303 (3.32) 
where the extra restriction A=kB, with k being a scalar, is imposed. 6j, i=1 to 3 
are 3x3 diagonal matrices. Dlt corresponds to a dummy variable taking the value 
1 whenever there is a meeting of the central bank but the decision is taken not 
to change the interest rate and zero otherwise, D2t is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 whenever there is a meeting and the central bank changes interest 
rates and zero otherwise, while D3t is a dummy variable that takes 1 whenever the 
central bank takes a decision in between meetings and zero otherwise. Finally, st-1 
corresponds to the shock vector or the surprises to the mean return equation. 
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The model including binary dummies interacting with monetary policy sur- 
prises is the following: 
Ht = SZ + B'Ht-1B + A'Et_lEt-lA + 6' D1St6l + 6ZD2St(S2 + CS3D3St6 3 (3.33) 
where St corresponds to the monetary policy surprises. With this structure, both 
models contain 37 parameters. 
The estimation is performed by maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood func- 
tion is defined in the following way for each time period: 
Lt =- log 27 -1 log j Ht j- 
1(rt 
- pt)'-Ht 1(rt - pt) (3.34) 22 
and the log-likelihood for the full sample is: 
T 
L= >Lt (3.35) 
t=1 
The numerical method used to maximise the log-likelihood function was the al- 
gorithm proposed by Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974) (BHHH algorithm). 
Table 12 shows the results for the model with dummy variables and the model with 
monetary policy surprises. The full results of the model estimation are presented 
in Annex 3. C. 
As regards the estimated parameters of the conditional mean equations, the 
results suggest that a third order autoregressive process could be used for the 
S&P500 instead of a fourth order one previously used in the univariate approach. 
In addition, there is no longer evidence of first order autocorrelation in the process 
for the daily return of the exchange rate. As for the daily change in the 10 year 
bond yield, a fourth order autoregression, as used in the univariate case, continues 
to be appropriate. 
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The parameters of the variance matrix are shown in annex 3. C, with the vari- 
ables ordered with the S&P 500 daily return first, then the daily change in bond 
yields and finally the daily change in the exchange rate. Looking at the parameters 
of the variance matrix in turn, and starting with the parameters of the matrix of 
constants (a), it can be seen that these are poorly estimated with high standard 
errors. By contrast, the estimates of the scalar k coefficient and of the matrix A 
are almost all statistically significant, which suggests the existence of interactions 
between the volatilities of the different assets and shock spillovers. 
Concerning the importance of announcement effects, the results from the binary 
dummy version show that the volatility of the S&P 500 tends to rise on days when 
the Federal Reserve changes the Fed funds rate at scheduled meetings and also 
when interest rates are changed in-between meetings (see upper panel of Table 
3.12). As for bond yields, the only occasion when monetary policy announcement 
effects are found to significantly affect the daily change in bond yields is when the 
US Federal Reserve takes a decision to change interest rates in regularly scheduled 
meetings, in which case the volatility rises. At other occasions there is no evidence 
of announcement effects. Finally, no announcement effects of monetary policy are 
found in the equation for the conditional volatility of the US Dollar-Deutsche Mark 
(euro from 1 January 1999 onwards) exchange rate. 
Turning to the model with monetary policy surprises (see lower panel of Table 
3.12), there is evidence of announcement effects only in the case of the daily return 
of the S&P 500 and the daily change in the 10 year government bond yield, with 
no evidence of announcement effects of monetary policy found in the case of the 
exchange rate. As in the model with dummy variables, the announcement effects 
on the daily return of the S&P 500 appear to occur only when the Federal Reserve 
changes interest rates. In addition, the effect on volatility depends on the sign of 
the surprise. A positive surprise, implying that the rate increase (decrease) by the 
164 
Federal Reserve was larger (smaller) than expected, leads to a rise in the volatility 
of the daily return of the S&P 500, which could be interpreted as a leverage effect. 
As regards the bond yields, an unexpected rise in interest rates (or a smaller than 
expected cut in rates by the Fed) leads to higher bond yield volatility. Finally, 
in the equation for the exchange rate, no signs of announcement effects are again 
found. 
Overall, these results suggest that monetary policy announcements seem to 
affect mainly stock price volatility and, in less occasions, bond yield volatility. By 
contrast, the investigation failed to uncover evidence of announcement effects of 
monetary policy on the exchange rate or that monetary policy surprises occurring 
on meeting days but not accompanied by an interest rate change have a significant 
effect on the volatility of any of the assets involved. In addition, monetary policy 
surprises occurring outside regular central bank meetings seem to have a stronger 
impact on stock price volatility than those taken at regular meetings when the 
central bank changes rates. This might suggest that if the central bank is concerned 
with the effect of its actions on stock price volatility, then it is preferable to change 
interest rates on a previously scheduled meeting. However, if this is the case, the 
results show that even though the effect on stock price volatility may be lower, 
there will be an upward effect on bond yield volatility. If the central bank is 
concerned also with the volatility in bond yields, then the optimal decision will 
depend on the relative weight attached by the central bank to the volatilities of 
both markets. 
In any case, the problem of choosing between taking a monetary policy mea- 
sure at a scheduled meeting or not only occurs when the central bank expects 
to generate a positive monetary policy surprise in the markets. In fact, the es- 
timated coefficients imply that if the central bank produces a negative monetary 
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Model with dummy variables 
S&P500 Bond yield USD/DEM 
D1 0.18 0.38 -0.34 
D2 0.89* 1.11** -0.70 
D3 0.97* 0.61 0.23 
Model with surprises 
S&P500 Bond yield USD/DEM 
D1 St 0.08 0.04 -0.04 
D2 St 0.11** 0.21** 0.02 
D3 St 0.22** 0.10 0.03 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level/10% level. 
Table 3.12. Tests of announcement effects using multivariate 
GARCH models - effect on volatility 
policy surprise, then both stock return and bond yield volatility will decline. Fi- 
nally, it should be noted that even though no evidence of announcement effects of 
monetary policy actions on the exchange rate was found, the exchange rate plays 
an important role in the model. In fact, given the evidence of the existence of 
spillovers between the volatility of the exchange rate and that of stocks and bonds, 
the inclusion of the exchange rate in the model is important for the modelling of 
the conditional volatility process of the other two assets and therefore for testing 
announcement effects. 
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3.6. Do central bank's announcements contain news on inflation? -A 
high frequency investigation 
Another possible application of the methodology used for testing announce- 
ment effects of monetary policy is to address the issue of whether central banks 
have an information advantage relative to the private sector. In a recent investiga- 
tion for the US, Romer and Romer (2000) conclude that the US Federal Reserve 
appears to possess information about the future state of the economy that is not 
available to market participants. In order to arrive at this conclusion, Romer and 
Romer investigate whether forecasts of inflation made by the US Federal Reserve 
have additional information for predicting inflation to those made by commercial 
forecasters. In particular, they estimate regressions of actual inflation on inflation 
forecasts from both the Federal Reserve and commercial forecasters for different 
forecast horizons of the following form: 
7 ht = (S + 7Cýht + fFýht + 21ht 3.36) 
where 'Irht is actual inflation h quarters after month t and rh and rh are the 
commercial and Federal Reserve forecasts of inflation h quarters ahead at month 
t and Vht is the error term. In their results they find that 7F is usually large and 
statistically significant while 'yc is small and frequently insignificant, thereby con- 
cluding that the US Federal Reserve has an information advantage over commercial 
forecasters. 
Romer and Romer (2000) also estimate regressions in order to assess how mar- 
ket participants react to Federal Reserve actions and update inflation expectations. 
In order to do so they run the following regression: 
7ýht+l = (x + O'Trht + Mit ý' /ý(7ht+1 - 7ht) + Vht+1 
(3.37 
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This regression can be seen as estimating a process characterising the procedure 
followed by market participants for updating, from month t to month t+ I, their 
expectations of the inflation rate h-quarters ahead. According to the expression, 
commercial forecasts of inflation (7rht+1) are a function of the forecasts made in 
the previous month (7ht), of monetary policy actions (Mt) plus another term that 
reflects the change in the forecasts of the US Federal Reserve during the same 
period (7ht+1 - 'ýht) According to Romer and Romer, this last term should be 
an indicator of the general information that becomes available between the two 
forecasts. 7 Romer and Romer (2000) consider two alternatives for Mt: a dummy 
variable that takes the value one when the Fed changes target rates and zero 
otherwise; or the change in the Federal Reserve's funds rate target. A positive 
coefficient A would imply that a contractionary monetary policy action raises the 
inflation expectations of the commercial forecasters. This would be consistent with 
the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve's decisions have additional information on 
inflation. Indeed, the empirical findings of Romer and Romer (2000) find support 
for this hypothesis. 
This specification has some limitations. First, the use of monthly data makes 
it difficult to control for the arrival of new information between forecasts. This 
implies that it may be difficult to determine whether the changes in the commercial 
forecasts are reflecting the impact of monetary policy or other information arriving 
during the same period. The use of changes in Federal Reserve forecasts to control 
for this arrival may not be sufficiently accurate. In addition, the use of simple 
dummies or changes in the target rate does not address the issue of distinguishing 
between expected monetary policy actions and the surprise component, that was 
71n fact it may be only a noisy indicator because it reflects both general information arriving 
during the month and information that is observed only by the US Federal Reserve. 
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found to be useful in the context of the testing of announcement effects of monetary 
policy in previous sections of this chapter. 
In this section an approach for testing whether central banks have informational 
advantages relative to the general public is proposed, based on the use of high 
frequency data. The methodology consists in testing for announcement effects of 
monetary policy on inflation expectations. The reasoning behind this is that if 
the central bank creates a monetary policy surprise which is considered by market 
participants as providing relevant information on inflation not available to market 
participants, then this might lead to a revision of the market's views regarding the 
inflation outlook. 
The approach relies on financial market inflation expectations derived from 
index-linked bonds. These instruments allow for distinguishing between the ex- 
pected inflation rate implicit in the bonds and the real interest rate. The advan- 
tage of using inflation expectations derived from these instruments is that they 
are available on a daily basis. Therefore, it is possible to test whether there are 
significant changes in these implicit inflation rates during the days around central 
bank meetings or central bank decisions. Such changes can reveal information on 
the impact of central bank decisions (including both changing interest rates or 
keeping them unchanged) on financial market inflation expectations. The main 
advantage of this approach, relative to the one of Romer and Romer (2000), is 
that, contrary to the monthly change in inflation expectations, the daily changes 
in inflation expectations derived from index-linked bonds are much less likely to be 
influenced by shocks unrelated to monetary policy given the short period involved. 
By contrast, in the monthly approach by Romer and Romer (2000), it is more 
difficult to control for the influence of other information relevant for prices that 
arrives during the month. A further advantage of the daily approach in controlling 
for other sources of shocks to inflation expectations, is that central bank meetings 
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are usually scheduled so that the most relevant information on prices is available. 
Therefore, new data providing information on consumer prices are likely to become 
available only after a while past a scheduled meeting and, therefore, not affect the 
testing of announcement effects of monetary policy. 
More precisely, the approach consists in testing whether inflation expectations 
derived from financial market instruments change significantly around central bank 
meetings or meeting decisions. A change in inflation expectations from the period 
just before the rate decision to the period just after could be a sign that market 
participants perceive the central bank to have private information (that its decision 
could thereby reveal). An alternative interpretation is that a change in inflation 
expectations may also be perceived by market participants as indicating a shift in 
the preferences of the central bank. For instance, if a central bank is expected to 
react to worrisome inflation developments and fails to do so, this may be interpreted 
by the markets as if the policymaker had become less concerned with the rate of 
inflation. In any case, significant changes in inflation expectations around central 
bank meetings could be a sign of a lack of credibility of the central bank or of the 
existence of an information advantage. In addition to testing whether inflation 
expectations change around central bank meetings it is also useful to test what 
happens to the volatility of such inflation expectations. Again, a rise in volatility 
around central bank meetings can imply that the central bank is creating "noise" 
and, by its actions, creating uncertainty about the inflation outlook. This may be 
a sign of a lack of credibility of the central bank or that the central bank actions 
are causing uncertainty in the market, even though they may contain relevant 
information. 
Before turning to the empirical analysis it is useful to first review the mechanics 
of index-linked bonds and how inflation expectations are derived from them. This 
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analysis will also address the caveats involved in approximating inflation expecta- 
tions with these measures. 
3.6.0.1. Deriving inflation expectations from index-linked bonds. Real 
indexed bonds have been issued for the first time in the US in January 1997, but 
they have been available in other countries earlier (in the UK these instruments 
were issued for the first time in 1981, in Canada they were issued in 1991 and in 
Sweden in 1994). Inflation index bonds are constructed so that the real return on 
the bonds is known in advance, but the nominal return varies with the inflation 
realised over the life of the bond. For instance, in the US, the bonds are indexed to 
the nonseasonally adjusted CPI-U (for a review see Wrase, 1997). The indexation 
to the CPI index occurs with a lag, which is three-months in the US, and thus the 
bonds do not provide full insurance against unexpected price developments. 
In order to derive the expected inflation rate from index linked bonds it is 
necessary to compute the difference between the nominal yield on a standard gov- 
ernment bond and the real yield of the index-linked bonds. 
In deriving inflation expectations from index linked bonds the following diffi- 
culties arise. The derivation of inflation expectations from index-linked bonds is 
based on the expectations hypothesis of the term-structure and the Fisher rela- 
tion. Therefore the interpretation of the difference between the nominal and real 
yields as representing expected inflation is only valid if these hypotheses are valid. 
In addition, there are some issues regarding the comparability between the real 
yields derived from index-linked bonds and nominal yields of standard government 
bonds. First, there are issues of liquidity linked to the market size of nominal and 
indexed bonds. The market for real bonds is less liquid than that for nominal 
bonds and therefore holders of real bonds may require a higher liquidity premium 
than those holding highly liquid conventional nominal bonds. Thus, when taking 
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the difference between the yields of the two bonds, what this difference is measur- 
ing is not only inflation expectations and the expected inflation premium but also 
the difference in liquidity. Second, in order to recover the differences between the 
yields, it is necessary to use a zero coupon yield curve and this may not be very 
well computed given that there are not so many maturities available in inflation 
protected bonds and for some of the maturities the lack of liquidity may lead to 
a higher liquidity premium. Third, investors buying indexed-linked bonds may be 
more averse to inflation risk than the average investor buying nominal government 
bonds. Therefore, they may require a higher inflation premium in real bonds than 
those investors holding nominal bonds. Furthermore, they may react differently 
to changes in the outlook for inflation than the average investor holding nominal 
bonds. Finally, there are also differences in the tax treatment of index-linked bonds 
versus nominal bonds. 
It should be noted that while the above caveats need to be taken into account, 
they are more important when interpreting expectations of the level of inflation 
from index-linked bonds. However, the problems caused by such issues are much 
diminished when the objective of the investigation is determining announcement 
or non-announcement effects of monetary policy resulting in changes in inflation 
expectations. In this case, what matters more is the daily change in the difference 
of yields between nominal bonds and real yields derived from index-linked bonds. 
These daily changes are less likely to be affected by questions of liquidity and 
turnover in real bond markets or differences in tax treatment, as these are more 
slowly moving factors that should not change significantly from one day to the next. 
As a result, the distortionary effect on the daily change in break-even inflation is 
likely to be smaller. Thus, the only issue remaining is whether investors holding 
these bonds have a different degree of risk aversion to inflation. If so, they may 
react to monetary policy decisions in a different way than investors holding nominal 
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bonds, which, to some extent, could limit the interpretation of the results in this 
section as genuine changes in inflation expectations. 
3.6.0.2. Empirical results. As before, the specification of LARCH equations 
as those used in section 3.3.4 were used to test announcement effects of monetary 
policy on break-even inflation. The results are shown in table 3.13 and the full 
results in annex 3. D. The sample goes from 1 January 1998 to 28 June 2002, and 
includes 1166 data points. 
As can be seen in the table, starting with the models based on binary dummy 
variables, on days when the central bank takes decisions in between meetings, 
inflation expectations, on average, tend to rise. As regards volatility, on scheduled 
meeting days when the central bank takes a decision to change interest rates, some 
evidence is found that the volatility of index-linked bonds tends to rise. 
When monetary policy surprises are taken into account, there is evidence of 
announcement effects on the mean equations only in the case of decisions taken 
on non-scheduled meeting days. In this case, a positive monetary policy surprise, 
implying that the resulting interest rate is higher than previously expected by the 
market participants, results in a negative effect on the conditional mean inflation 
rate. This is consistent with the market participants interpreting the monetary 
policy action as providing information that inflation developments may require 
a stronger response of monetary policy than expected by the markets. This is 
also in line with the predictions of Pakko and Wheelock (1996), namely that only 
surprise moves or moves that are widely seen as turning points will typically alter 
expectations about inflation. Another possible explanation is that meeting days 
are scheduled around the release of important data while non-scheduled moves not. 
This may lead market participants to regard changes in interest rates in-between 
meetings as implying that the Federal Reserve may have gathered information that 
may not be available to the market. 
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As regards volatility, positive interest rate surprises produced at unscheduled 
meetings seem to lead to higher volatility of inflation expectations. Thus, when 
the Fed sets rates at a higher level than that expected by the market, it induces 
a higher volatility on expectations of future inflation developments. By contrast, 
if rates are lowered by more than expected, the volatility of inflation expectations 
declines. 
Finally, the results with the model with expectations suggest that monetary 
policy expectations do not play a significant role. 
However, in the model with a continuous flow of information, expectations were 
found to significantly affect the volatility of inflation expectations. This could 
indicate that, in general, expected increases in interest rates are associated with a 
higher uncertainty about the inflation outlook. 
As regards the mean equation, there is evidence that positive surprises in in- 
terest rates increase inflation expectations which would be indicative of insider 
information. This result contrasts with what is found with dummy variables on 
decisions in non-meeting days, where a positive surprise was found to negatively 
affect inflation expectations. 
Overall, these results suggest that if the central bank creates a positive sur- 
prise by changing interest rates in between meetings, it will be effective in reducing 
inflation expectations. However, such a move will have an upward effect on the 
volatility of expectations regarding inflation, which may be detrimental from the 
point of view of a central bank that is aiming at reducing both the level of inflation 
and its variability. In addition, the fact that positive monetary policy surprises 
increase the volatility of inflation expectations while negative monetary surprises 
reduce volatility could indicate that there is an asymmetry in the way market par- 
ticipants view the signals provided by the monetary policy decision. In particular, 
this seems to suggest that a positive surprise is interpreted as if the central bank is 
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trying to keep inflation under control, and therefore may increase the uncertainty 
regarding future inflation developments. However, when the central bank reduces 
interest rates, this is likely to convey the information that inflation is under control 
and in turn this reduces the volatility of inflation expectations. In fact, there is 
some parallel in this finding with the results of Chapter 2, which suggested that 
inflation was more important in influencing the probability of the high interest rate 
regime than the low rate one. 
Finally, these findings suggest that in meeting days monetary policy surprises 
do not produce significant effects on inflationary expectations while in previous 
sections it was shown that monetary policy announcements exist also on meeting 
days. This suggests that in case such announcement effects are due to the market 
participants viewing the central bank as having inside information, then such in- 
formation is likely to be related to variables other than inflation. However, given 
the short-period covered in the analysis and the fact that the break-even inflation 
rate may be a noisy indicator of inflation, some caution in interpreting the results 
is needed. In this respect, it would appear useful to extend the analysis of whether 
the central bank has an information advantage with respect to variables other than 
inflation, for instance for GDP, which would probably require a lower frequency 
approach than the one conducted here. 
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Dummy 
variables 
only 
Surprises 
only 
Surprises 
and 
expectations 
Continuous 
flow of 
information 
Mean equation 
D1 -0.007 
D2 -0.025 
D3 0.053** 
D1 St 0.003 0.004 
D2 St 0.003 -0.00001 
D3 St -0.0009** -0.0006* 
Di Et 
-0.0001 
D2 Et 0.0009 
D3Et 
-0.0004 
St 0.0008** 
Et 0.0002 
Variance equation 
GARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH 
(1,1) (1,1) (1,1) (1,1) 
D1 0.0003 
D2 0.002* 
D3 -0.0004 
D1 St 0.00002 0.0001 
D2 St 0.000004 0.00006 
D3 St 0.00002** 0.00006** 
D1 Et 0.00001 
D2Et -0.00005 
D3 Et 0.00004 
St -0.000004 
Et 0.00002** 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% level/10% 
level. 
Table 3.13. Models for break-even inflation: US 
3.7. Conclusions 
This chapter provides evidence that US monetary policy announcements have 
significant effects on financial markets. The strength of the announcement effect 
varies across the assets considered, with the results suggesting that monetary policy 
announcements have a clearer influence on equity returns and bond yields than on 
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the exchange rate. In addition, the results show that the evidence of a monetary 
policy announcement effect on the mean return does not necessarily imply that an 
announcement effect on the variance exists. 
The study analyses announcement effects, distinguishing between those pro- 
duced at scheduled meetings where interest rates are left unchanged, those pro- 
duced at scheduled meetings where rates are changed and those produced when 
the Federal Reserve changes the Fed funds rate in-between meetings. Using simple 
dummy variables it is found that on dates when the Fed takes decisions at un- 
scheduled meetings, the variance of the S&P 500 tends to increase. By contrast, 
decisions taken at scheduled meetings tend to produce few announcement effects 
both in terms of the mean and the variance of the S&P 500. In the case of bond 
yields, there is evidence of significant announcement effects when the Fed changes 
interest rates on scheduled meeting dates but not on days of unscheduled changes 
in interest rates. As for announcement effects of meetings when the Fed leaves rates 
unchanged (i. e. non-announcement effects), there is no evidence of a significant 
effect on the conditional mean or variance of the S&P 500 or bond yields. Finally, 
no evidence was found of significant announcement effects of monetary policy on 
the exchange rate in the model using simple binary variables. 
A limitation of the binary dummy approach is that the size of the monetary pol- 
icy surprise is not taken into account. When the surprises produced by monetary 
policy (i. e. the difference between the Fed funds rate and its market expectation 
derived from futures data) are used instead, the results change somewhat. 
As regards stocks, positive monetary policy surprises tend to decrease the mean 
daily return when they occur at unscheduled meetings, thereby appearing to be 
interpreted as "bad news" by market participants. This result is consistent with a 
leverage effect and the results of Bomfim (2003) who also find evidence of leverage 
effects but using simple dummy variables not scaled by the size of the monetary 
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policy surprise. In the case of volatility, announcement effects appear to be stronger 
at scheduled meetings when the Federal Reserve leaves rates unchanged. Again, 
the reaction to the surprise is consistent with the existence of a leverage effect. On 
other days, the effects did not seem to be very significant. 
In the case of bond yields, the results seem to be in line with the expectations 
hypothesis of the term structure, with positive monetary policy surprises leading 
to higher bond yields. However, these effects appear to be significant only on days 
of scheduled meetings when the Fed does not change interest rates. In the case of 
bond yield volatility, there is some weak evidence that positive surprises increase 
volatility, while negative surprises decrease it. 
As for the exchange rate, some evidence is found that positive monetary policy 
surprises lead to the appreciation of the domestic currency on days of regularly 
scheduled meetings. However, no further evidence of announcement effects was 
found for other days. 
As regards models assuming a continuous flow of information, which assume 
that markets are continuously reassessing their expectations regarding policy rates 
and the central bank is continuously producing news, no evidence has been found 
of announcement effects in the case of stock prices and the exchange rate. As for 
bond yields, the results point to the existence of a systematic relation between 
monetary policy surprises and the mean daily change in bond yields. This is again 
consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, with a positive 
monetary policy surprise (i. e. the level of the Fed funds rate is higher than expected 
by the market) leading to an upward revision of expectations of future rates and is 
therefore reflected in higher bond yields. One limitation of the assumption of the 
continuous flow of information is that it assumes that market participants expect 
that the Federal Reserve can change rates at each period of time. However, as seen 
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in the descriptive analysis of central bank rate-setting practices, the occasions when 
the central bank changes rates in-between meetings are relatively rare. 
The analysis of the models with asymmetries suggests that the lack of statistical 
significance of the coefficients on monetary policy surprises at scheduled meetings 
in the equation for the mean return of the S&P 500 may be due to asymmetric 
effects: a positive surprise (i. e. higher rates than expected) has almost no effect 
on the daily stock return while a negative surprise (lower rates than expected) 
leads to a significant upward effect on stock returns. As regards bond yields, 
there is evidence that positive surprises of decisions taken in-between central bank 
meetings raise bond yields much more than they decline in the case of negative 
surprises of the same size. Finally, some evidence is found that the volatility of 
bond yields depends on the absolute size of the surprises that occur at regular 
meetings, irrespective of their sign. 
As for cross-country announcement effects, some evidence is found of spillover 
effects. Scheduled meetings when the Fed surprises the markets by creating positive 
surprises but does not change rates, lead to a rise in DAX volatility, which is similar 
to the effect that such surprises have on the US stock price volatility. In the case 
of bond yields, the volatility of German bond yields rises in response to positive 
surprises due to rate changes taken at both scheduled and non-scheduled meetings 
of the Fed. 
The evidence of announcement effects of monetary policy on stock price volatil- 
ity was further tested by using implied volatility measures derived from options, 
which, given their forward-looking nature and their higher leverage may be more 
revealing as regards announcement effects of monetary policy. The data used were 
based on the implied volatility of the S&P 100. The results obtained with mod- 
els using binary variables are consistent with those found for the S&P500 using 
179 
GARCH models, in that they suggest that the stock return volatility is signifi- 
cantly higher on the days when the Fed changes interest rates in-between meetings 
than on other days. However, when taking the surprise components into account, 
there is no longer clear evidence of announcement effects, with only some weak 
evidence of positive monetary policy surprises on regularly meeting days having 
an upward effect on the implied volatility measure. A somewhat puzzling result is 
the finding that expected interest rate changes seem to have a significant upward 
effect on the implied volatility measure. 
A limitation of the use of univariate GARCH models is that, despite their 
flexibility, they do not take into account the possibility of shocks or volatility 
spillovers from other assets due, for instance, to cross-market hedging. In order to 
consider these effects, announcement effects of monetary policy on the volatility 
of financial asset prices are also tested by making use of a multivariate GARCH 
model, including stock returns, bond yields and the exchange rate. Two versions 
of the model are used. A first one consists of a multivariate GARCH model using 
binary dummy variables for the monetary policy announcements, while in a second 
model also the monetary policy surprises are taken into account. 
The results of both models suggest that there are important spillover effects 
in the volatility of the three assets. In this respect, although no announcement 
effects of monetary policy on the exchange rate are found, the exchange rate plays 
an important role in the model given that volatility spillovers from the exchange 
rate are important for the modelling of the volatility of the other variables in the 
system. 
As for the findings on announcement effects, the model with simple binary 
variables provides evidence of significant announcement effects of monetary policy 
on the volatility of the daily return of the S&P 500 on regularly scheduled meeting 
days and on days when the Fed changes rates in-between meetings, with volatility 
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rising on these days relative to other days. The results for the model with surprises 
also suggest that a positive monetary policy surprise on days when the central bank 
changes interest rates leads to a higher stock return volatility, which is consistent 
with a leverage effect. As regards bond yields, significant effects are only found 
in the case of scheduled meetings when the Fed changes interest rates. On these 
days, bond yield volatility is higher than average and a positive monetary policy 
surprise results in higher bond yield volatility, which is in line with the expectations 
hypothesis of the term structure. 
Finally, we test whether the Federal reserve possesses an information advan- 
tage relative to the general public as regards inflation developments, using high 
frequency data on inflation expectations derived from index-linked bonds. Overall, 
the results suggest that positive monetary policy surprises resulting from a rate 
change in-between meetings tend to result in lower inflation expectations. There- 
fore, contrary to the findings of Romer and Romer (2000) these results do not 
suggest that the market participants view the monetary policy surprise as an indi- 
cation that the Federal Reserve has privileged access to information. Instead, they 
suggest that the market focuses on the consequences of the unexpected monetary 
policy shock, interpreting a positive monetary policy surprise as a tightening that 
will lead to lower inflation in the future. However, the results also show that a 
positive monetary policy surprise increases the uncertainty of inflation expecta- 
tions, but only in the case of positive surprises. This could indicate that when the 
Federal Reserve sets higher rates than expected, there may be more uncertainty 
generated as regards the true inflation trends than when the Federal Reserve sets 
rates at a lower level than expected. 
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3. A. Full results of the estimation of univariate GARCH models 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level/ 10% level. 
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S&P500 Bond yield USD/DEM 
Mean equation 
rt s. e. rt s. e. rt s. e. 
c -0.06 0.04 -0.09 0.26 0.00 0.01 
rt-i 0.05 0.02** 0.06 0.02** -0.04 0.02** 
rt-2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
rt-3 -0.05 0.02** -0.04 0.02** 
rt-4 -0.05 0.02** -0.04 0.02** 
Mont 0.13 0.05** 0.49 0.32 
Tuet 0.07 0.05 -0.37 0.34 
Wedt 0.15 0.05** -0.20 0.32 
Thut 0.11 0.05** -0.44 0.35 
Holt -0.53 0.05** -0.56 0.25** 
Variance equation 
ht s. e. ht s. e. ht s. e. 
c 0.28 0.14 11.24 3.69 0.05 0.03 
Et_1 0.09 0.14** 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01** 
6t_2 0.08 0.03** 
ht_1 0.78 0.04** 0.91 0.02** 0.91 0.02** 
Dlt -0.004 0.53 -0.60 2.91 -0.04 0.02 
D2t 0.25 0.21 24.98 8.85** -0.05 0.04 
D3t 0.53 0.28** -0.04 5.92 0.02 0.07 
Mont -0.43 0.24* -30.01 4.72** 0.16 0.07** 
Tuet -0.20 0.15 -5.27 5.25 -0.24 0.06** 
Wedt -0.44 0.15** -12.44 4.95** -0.06 0.05 
Thut -0.07 0.14 0.16 5.79 -0.04 0.05 
Holt 0.48 0.09 5.79 4.35 0.04 0.04 
Arch (5) LM test 4.55[0.47] 0.77[ 0.98] 2.96[0.71] 
Table 3.14. Model with dummy variables only: US 
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S&P500 Bond yield USD/DEM 
Mean equation 
rt s. e. rt s. e. rt s. e. 
c 0.04 0.01** -0.12 0.26 -0.01 0.01 
rt-, 0.05 0.02** 0.06 0.02** -0.03 0.02* 
rt-2 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
rt-3 -0.05 0.02** -0.04 0.02** 
rt-4 -0.04 0.02** -0.04 0.02** 
D1tSt -0.004 0.01 0.14 0.04** 0.02 0.02 
D2tSt -0.002 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.01 0 005** 
DstSt -0.003 0.01** 0.05 0.03 0.004 
. 0.01 
Mont 0.65 0.33** 
Tuet -0.35 0.34 
Wedt -0.18 0.33 
Thut -0.46 0.35 
Holt -0.23 0.02** -1.10 0.27** 
Variance equation 
ht s. e. ht s. e. ht s. e. 
c 0.44 0.18** 14.74 3.49** 0.08 0.03** 
Et _1 
0.13 0.02** 0.05 0.01** 0.06 0.02** 
2 E t-2 
ht-1 0.82 0.03** 0.87 0.04** 0.89 0.05** 
DztSt 0.01 0.001** 0.10 0.16 0.003 0.02 
D2tSt -0.001 0.01 0.31 0.49 0.005 0.002* 
D3tSt -0.02 0.01* 0.19 0.11* -0.003 0.004 
Mont -0.60 0.34* -33.71 3.94** 0.10 0.07 
Tuet -0.40 0.20** -9.3 5.15* -0.25 0.07** 
Wedt -0.56 0.23** -15.26 4.55** -0.1 0.10 
Thut -0.30 0.16* -2.81 5.80 -0.07 0.06 
Holt 0.15 0.08* 10.56 5.13** 0.05 0.04 
Arch (5) LM test 5.89 [0.32] 1.19 [0.95] 2.91 [0.71] 
Table 3.15. Model with surprises: US 
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S&P500 Bond yield USD/DEM 
Mean equation 
C 
rt-1 
rt-2 
rt-3 
rt-4 
rt-5 
D1tst 
D2tSt 
D3tSt 
D1tEt 
D2tEt 
D3tEt 
Mont 
Tuet 
Wedt 
Thut 
Holt 
Variance equation 
C 
2 
6t-1 
2 
Et-2 
ht-1 
D1tSt 
D2tSt 
D& St 
D1tEt 
D2tEt 
DstEt 
Mont 
Tuet 
Wedt 
Thut 
Holt 
Arch (5) LM test 
Table 3.16. 
rt s. e. rt s. e. rt s. e. 
0.04 0.01** -0.13 0.26 -0.01 0.01 
0.05 0.02** 0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02** 
-0.05 0.02** -0.05 0.02** 
-0.04 0.02** -0.04 0.02** 
-0.03 0.02** 
-0.005 0.01 0.14 0.05** 0.02 0.02 
-0.03 0.01** 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.005 
-0.03 0.01** 0.03 0.04 0.005 0.01 
-0.001 0.001 -0.01 0.01 -0.001 0.001 
-0.01 0.004* 0.05 0.02** -0.001 0.002 
0.01 0.01* -0.04 0.03 0.004 0.002 
0.79 0.32** 
-0.33 0.33 
-0.17 0.32 
-0.44 0.35 
0.04 0.02** 1.05 0.28** 
ht s. e. ht s. e. ht s. e. 
0.44 0.12** 12.10 4.04** 0.09 0.04 
0.10 0.03** 0.05 0.01** 0.06 0.02 
0.06 0.04* 
0.77 0.04** 0.87 0.04** 0.89 0.04 
0.01 0.001** 0.21 0.16 0.004 0.02 
-0.01 0.02 0.16 0.55 0.005 0.002 
-0.02 0.003** 0.35 0.12** -0.002 0.003 
0.0001 0.001 -0.06 0.07 0.001 0.0003 
-0.01 0.01 -0.23 0.13* 0.0003 0.001 
-0.002 0.007 0.13 0.07* 0.0004 0.002 
-0.60 0.20** -28.19 6.67** 0.10 0.07 
-0.31 0.13** -7.59 5.21 -0.25 0.07 
-0.59 0.12** -13.68 5.25** -0.11 0.10 
-0.20 0.14 1.57 5.95 -0.07 0.06 
0.21 0.08** 12.23 5.04** 0.05 0.04 
4.49 [0.48] 2.12 [0.83] 3.50 [0.62 
odel with surprises and expectations: US 
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S&P500 Bond yield USD/DEM 
Mean equation 
rt s. e. rt 
c 0.03 0.01* -0.15 
rt_1 0.05 0.03* 0.03 
rt_2 0.03 0.03 0.02 
rt_3 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 
rt_4 -0.04 0.02** -0.04 
St -0.001 0.003 0.19 
Et 0.0001 0.001 0.003 
Mont 
direr 
Wedt 
Thut 
Holt -0-31 0.03 0.01 
Variance equation 
C 
2 Et-1 
ht-1 
St 
Et 
Mont 
Tuet 
Wedt 
Thut 
Holt 
Arch (5) LM test 
Table 3.17. Mo 
ht s. e. ht 
s. e. rt s. e. 
0.09 -0.003 0.01 
0.02** -0.04 0.02** 
0.02 
0.02** 
0.02** 
0.02** 0.001 0.002 
0.004 -0.0002 0.004 
0.34 
s. e. ht s. e. 
0.40 0.46 0.06 0.01** 0.05 0.01** 
0.13 0.04** 
0.82 0.06** 0.87 0.03** 0.92 0.01** 
-0.005 0.003 0.06 0.10 -0.001 0.001 
0.0004 0.002 0.06 0.04 -0.0004 0.0003 
-0.57 0.88 -27.34 4.33** 0.15 0.07** 
-0.36 0.48 -4.14 4.41 -0.24 0.06** 
-0.58 0.61 -8.28 4.21* -0.06 0.05 
-0.23 0.38 2.35 5.46 -0.04 0.05 
-0.29 0.09** 12.21 5.69** 0.04 0.03 
5.32 [0.38] 1.11 [0.95] 2.67[0.75] 
assuming a continuous flow of information: US 
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Mean equation 
C 
rt-1 
rt-2 
rt-3 
rt-4 
DltSt 
JDltstj 
D2tSt 
D2tst 
D3tSt 
ID3tst 
Mont 
Thet 
Wedt 
Thut 
Holt 
Variance equation 
S&P500 Bond yield USD/DEM 
rt s. e. rt 
0.03 0.01 -0.05 
0.05 0.02** 0.06 
0.03 0.02 0.03 
0.04 0.02** -0.05 
-0.04 
s. e. rt s. e. 
0.26 -0.01 0.01 
0.02** -0.02 0.02 
0.02 
0.02** 
0.02** 
0.005 0.01 0.16 
0.01 0.01 0.06 
-0.03 0.01** 0.05 
0.04 0.01** -0.11 
-0.03 0.01** 0.31 
0.003 0.01 0.24 
0.65 
-0.43 
-0.21 
-0.53 
0.20 0.03** 1.31 
ht s. e. ht 
0.04** 0.01 0.01* 
0.04 -0.003 0.01 
0.11 0.02 0.01* 
0.11 -0.01 0.01 
0.11** 0.01 0.01 
0.11** 0.01 0.01 
0.32** 
0.34 
0.32 
0.35 
0.30 
s. e. ht s. e. 
c 0.53 0.11** 11.62 3.97** 0.13 0.03** 
t_1 0.13 0.04** 0.05 0.01** 0.08 0.01** 
ht_1 0.81 0.05** 0.87 0.04** 0.86 0.03** 
D1tSt -0.002 0.005 0.08 0.23 0.001 0.004 
D1tSt j -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.24 -0.001 0.004 
D2tSt -0.001 0.01 -0.50 1.05 -0.0001 0.005 
JD2tSt 1 0.01 0.01 2.47 1.04** -0.01 0.01** 
D3tSt 0.01 0.02 1.09 1.48 -0.01 0.003** 
IDS-, SCI -0.01 0.02 1.35 1.48 -0.01 0.003** 
Mont -0.67 0.20** -28.73 6.19** 0.06 0.07 
Tuet -0.47 0.16** -6.26 5.30 -0.26 0.06** 
Wedt -0.68 0.20** -13.90 5.33** -0.13 0.08 
Thut -0.36 0.13** 2.89 5.83 -0.10 0.06* 
Holt 0.10 0.10 10.14 4.51** 0.06 0.05 
Arch (5) LM test 5.94[ 0.31] 2.10[0.84] 4.37 [0.50] 
Table 3.18. Model with asymmetries: US 
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Mean equation 
DAX Bond yield 
rt s. e. rt s. e. 
c 0.04 0.02** -0.23 0.17 
rt-i 0.04 0.02** 0.07 0.02** 
rt-2 0.05 0.02** 
rt-3 -0.001 0.02 
rt-4 0.06 0.02** 
Dlt 0.06 0.09 0.33 0.31 
D2t 0.38 0.20* -0.69 0.98 
D3t 0.28 0.29 -0.55 0.77 
Mont 0.49 0.23** 
Tier 0.47 0.24** 
Wedt -0.16 0.21 
Thut 0.18 0.21 
Holt -0.02 0.02 2.95 0.27** 
Variance equation 
ht s. e. ht s. e. 
c 0.28 0.09** 4.99 1.34** 
Et_1 0.08 0.02** 0.11 0.01** 
Et_2 0.07 0.02** 
ht-1 0.82 0.02** 0.88 0.02** 
Dlt 0.26 0.13** -2.07 0.75** 
D2t 0.35 0.23 8.79 4.20** 
D3t 0.35 0.23 2.81 2.21 
Mont 0.80 0.40* 0.63 2.74 
Tuet -1.19 0.32** -14.07 1.98** 
Wedt -0.31 0.10** -4.39 1.68** 
Thut -0.31 0.12** -4.83 1.75** 
Holt 0.23 0.08** 6.16 1.04** 
Arch (5) LM test 5.40[ 0.37] 8.56[0.13] 
Table 3.19. Dummy variable model: Germany 
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DAX Bond yield 
Mean equation 
rt s. e. rt s. e. 
c 0.04 0.02** -0.24 0.17 
rt-1 0.04 0.02** 0.05 0.02** 
rt-2 0.04 0.02** 
rt-s -0.002 0.02 
rt-4 0.04 0.02** 
rt-5 
DjtSt -0.0003 0.01 0.06 0.02** 
D2tSt 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.06** 
D3tSt -0.02 0.01* -0.0006 0.02 
Mont 0.54 0.23** 
Riet 0.40 0.22* 
Wedt -0.07 0.22 
Thut 0.32 0.21 
Holt -0.28 0.03** -0.16 0.08** 
Variance equation 
ht s. e. ht s. e. 
c 0.12 0.09 8.06 1.71** 
Et 1 0.10 0.03** 0.04 0.02* 
Et_2 0.05 0.03* 0.09 0.03** 
ht_1 0.80 0.03** 0.80 0.03** 
D1tSt 0.01 0.002** -0.08 0.14 
D2tSt 0.01 0.02 0.43 0.22* 
D3tSt 0.003 0.01 0.25 0.04** 
Mont 1.00 0.40** -5.02 3.25 
Tuet -0.98 0.31** -10.04 2.23** 
Wedt -0.10 0.13 -8.89 1.94** 
Thut 0.00 0.15 -5.64 2.14** 
Holt 0.42 0.10** 9.96 1.94** 
Arch (5) LM test 5.24[0.39] 9.25[0 . 10] Table 3.20. Model with surprises: Germany 
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DAX Bond yield 
Mean equation 
C 
rt-i 
rt-2 
rt-3 
rt-4 
rt-5 
DitSt 
D2tSt 
D3tSt 
DitEt 
D2tEt 
D3tEt 
Mont 
Tuet 
Wedt 
Thut 
Holt 
Variance equation 
C 
2 Et-1 
2 Et-2 
ht-1 
D1tS't 
D2t St 
D3tst 
D1tEt 
D2tE't 
D3tEt 
Mont 
Tuet 
Wedt 
Thut 
Holt 
Arch (5) LM test 
Table 3.21. Model wil 
rt s. e. rt s. e. 
0.03 0.02 -0.25 0.17 
0.71 0.07** 0.05 0.02** 
0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02** 
-0.004 0.02 
0.04 0.02** 
-0.002 0.01 0.07 0.02** 
0.01 0.02 0.11 0.06* 
-0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
-0.01 0.001** 0.01 0.005 
-0.003 0.004 0.03 0.03 
-0.003 0.01 -0.004 0.01 
0.71 0.07* -6.77 0.65** 
ht s. e. ht s. e. 
0.23 0.09** 7.60 1.60** 
0.13 0.02** 0.04 0.02** 
0.08 0.03** 
0.80 0.03** 0.82 0.03** 
0.01 0.002** -0.161 0.12 
0.02 0.01 0.50 0.25** 
0.01 0.02 0.28 0.14** 
-0.01 0.001** -0.08 0.01** 
0.004 0.004 -0.01 0.08 
0.02 0.01 0.12 0.02** 
1.01 0.37** -5.05 3.05* 
-0.78 0.29** -10.83 2.06** 
0.01 0.12 -8.35 1.83** 
0.07 0.14 -6.41 2.01** 
0.22 0.10** 6.47 2.09** 
5.18 10.39 
surprises an, 
4.59 [0.47] 
expectations: Germany 
190 
DAX Bond yield 
Mean equation 
C 
rt-1 
rt-2 
rt-3 
rt-4 
St 
Et 
Mont 
Miet 
Wedt 
Thut 
Holt 
Variance equation 
C 
2 Et-1 
2 Et-2 
ht-1 
St 
Et 
Mont 
Tuet 
Wedt 
Thut 
Holt 
Arch (5) LM test 
rt s. e. rt s. e. 
0.05 0.02** -0.12 0.17 
0.04 0.02** 0.04 0.02** 
-0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02* 
-0.01 0.02 -0.005 0.02 
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02* 
-0.0004 0.003 0.06 0.02** 
-0.0004 0.001 0.005 0.003 
-0.09 0.02** -1.30 0.14** 
0.15 0.09 5.70 1.56** 
0.13 0.02** 0.05 0.02** 
0.06 0.03** 
0.84 0.02** 0.81 0.03** 
-0.004 0.003 0.10 0.08 
0.0001 0.0001 0.02 0.02 
1.06 0.40** -2.85 3.00 
-1.12 0.31** -7.81 2.06** 
-0.14 0.11 -6.75 1.83** 
-0.12 0.15 -3.95 2.14 
0.27 0.08** 10.87 1.84** 
5.46 [0.36] 6.99 [0.22] 
Table 3.22. Model assuming a continuous flow of information: 
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DAX Bond yield 
Mean equation 
rt s. e. rt s. e. 
c 0.03 0.02 -0.32 0.16** 
rt_1 0.03 0.02* 0.06 0.02** 
rt_2 0.05 0.02** 
rt_3 -0.01 0.02 
rt_4 0.05 0.02** 
D1tSt -0.03 0.01** 0.07 0.01** 
ID1tSt -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01** 
D2tSt -0.04 0.02* 0.09 0.07 
ID2tSt 1 0.05 0.02** -0.04 0.08 
D3tSt -0.02 0.02 0.26 0.15* 
D3tSt -0.04 0.02 0.29 0.15* 
Mont 0.62 0.23** 
Tuet 0.41 0.22* 
Wedt -0.04 0.21 
Thut 0.29 0.21 
Holt -0.78 0.11 
Variance equation 
c 0.22 0.11** 8.33 1.46** 
0.13 0.02** 0.03 0.02 t_1 
6 2 
0.08 0.03** 
t_ 
ht_1 0.78 0.03** 0.83 0.02** 
D1tSt -0.004 0.01 -0.16 0.08** 
ID1tStj -0.03 0.01** -0.14 0.08* 
DZt St 0.04 0.02* 0.64 0.44 
D2tSt 1 -0.004 0.02 0.54 0.44 
D3tSt -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.40 
1 D3tSt -0.03 0.02** -0.02 0.40 
Mont 1.07 0.37** -5.59 2.90* 
Tuet -0.80 0.28** -14.85 1.97** 
Wedt 0.03 0.13 -8.57 1.72** 
Thut 0.16 0.17 -8.17 1.80** 
Holt 0.25 0.11** 10.58 1.54** 
Arch (5) LM test 8.89[0.11] 4.08[0.54] 
Table 3.23. Model with asymmetries: Germany 
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Binary dummies Surprises Surprises and 
expectations 
Mean 
equation rt s. e. rt s. e. rt s. e. 
c 9.51 2.91** 1.95 2.76 0.71 2.60 
rt_1 0.88 0.03** 0.89 0.03** 0.89 0.03** 
rt_2 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.04** 
rt_3 -0.07 0.03** -0.001 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
rt_4 -0.06 0.03* -0.19 0.03** -0.16 0.04** 
rt_5 0.05 0.03* -0.001 0.03 -0.002 0.03 
rt_6 0.12 0.03** 0.17 0.03** 0.15 0.03** 
Mont 7.75 2.68** 14.28 2.74** 14.38 2.48** 
Tuet -1.56 2.91 1.28 2.42 4.70 2.51* 
Wedt -6.33 3.11** -6.14 3.32* -5.16 3.35 
Thut -3.35 2.74 -2.83 2.79 -0.47 2.80 
Holt -17.66 9.39 -47.48 6.52* -25.32 5.39** 
Dlt/D1tSt 4.27 3.33 0.17 0.15 -0.13 0.30 
D2t/D2tSt -16.74 9.80* 1.10 0.66* 1.48 0.84* 
D3t/D3tSt 38.91 18.89** 0.89 0.78 -1.57 1.07 
DItEt 0.19 0.09** 
D2tEt 0.73 0.37** 
D3tEt -1.96 0.75** 
Variance 
equation ht s. e. ht s. e. ht s. e. 
c 533.62 149.86** 483.97 144.23** 522.96 3.28** 
t_1 0.09 0.04** 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 t_2 0.22 0.11** 0.30 0.12** 0.30 0.11** 
ßt_3 -0.09 0.09 -0.12 0.09 
ßt_4 0.33 0.08** 0.26 0.07** 
ht-1 0.66 0.08** 0.53 0.07** 0.56 0.08** 
Arch (5) t 3-11[0-68] 6.95 [0.22] 
Table 3.24. Model for implied volatility 
7.3910.20 
index 
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3. B. Review of main multivariate GARCH models 
There are many multivariate GARCH models available in the literature (for 
recent reviews see Kroner and Ng, 1998, and Bauwens, Laurent and Rombouts, 
2003). The main general models of the GARCH family available are the VECH 
model of Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988), the BEKK model of Engle and 
Kroner (1995), the factor ARCH (FARCH) model of Engle, Ng and Rothschild 
(1990), conditional correlation models (models in this class that are frequently 
used are the Constant Correlation (CCORR) model of Bollerslev, 1990, and more 
recently models with dynamic conditional correlation including Engle, 2002). 
The different models can be illustrated, without loss of generality, by the fol- 
lowing multivariate model for N returns: 
rt=µt+Et (3.38) 
where µt is aNx1 time varying vector of the conditional mean of the asset return 
and Eta Nx1 vector of residuals. The residuals follow a multivariate normal 
distribution given by: 
et^- N(O, Ht) (3.39) 
where Ht is aNxN symmetric matrix representing the conditional variance of the 
vector of asset returns. 
The VECH model of Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988) consists in simply 
stacking the elements of the variance co-variance matrix in a vector and modelling 
it in the following way (assuming, for sake of simplicity, a process for the variance- 
covariance matrix containing just one lag) : 
vech(Ht) = SZ + Bvech(Ht_1) + Avech(Et_lEt_1) (3.40) 
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where vech(. ) represents an operator that stacks the lower triangular part of a 
matrix into a N(2+1) x1 vector, A and B are square matrices of order N(N+1) 2 
while Q is a N(2+1) x1 vector of parameters. Despite its generality, the number of 
parameters to be estimated in this model is high even for relatively low numbers of 
N. More precisely, the number of parameters of this model is N( 2+1) +2 
(N(2+1 )2ý 
where N is the number of variables in the model. For instance, for N=3, the 
number of assets to be considered for the analysis in this section, the number of 
parameters to be estimated in the VECH model would amount to 78. 
The BEKK model of Engle and Kroner (1995) implies a lower number of pa- 
rameters. In the most general form, the BEKK model specifies the conditional 
variance matrix in the following way: 
Ht =Q+ B'Ht-1B + A'Et-lEt-, A (3.41) 
where SZ, A and B are NxN matrices with SZ symmetric. In this model the variances 
and covariances of asset returns depend on the unexpected shocks to the same asset 
and those of all the other assets and the past own variance and the covariances and 
variances of other assets. The main advantage of the BEKK model compared to 
the VECH model is that as long as the matrix Q is positive definite, the conditional 
covariance matrix of returns will also be positive definite (see Engle and Kroner, 
1995). In addition, there are gains in terms of the number of parameters to be 
estimated relative to the VECH model. In fact, in the above model the number 
of parameters to be estimated is N(2+1) + 2N2. With 3 assets, the number of 
parameters to be estimated is 24. 
The Factor ARCH model of Engle, Ng and Rothschild (1990) can be written 
in the following form: 
Ht = SZ + )V'[i3w'Ht-lw + a(w'6t-1)2] (3.42) 
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where A and w are Nx1 vectors, a and ß are scalars and SZ is a symmetric and 
positive definite NxN matrix. The main difference between this model and the 
BEKK model is that there is only one factor driving the volatility. In fact, setting 
B=icA in equation (3.41) results in a FARCH model with N factors. In this model 
the number of parameters to be estimated with three assets would be N(2+5) . 
With 
three assets, the number of parameters to be estimated in the FARCH model is 
just 12. 
In the constant correlation model of Bollerslev (1990), the conditional volatility 
is proportional to the product of the conditional standard deviations: 
Ht = DtRDt (3.43) 
where Dt =diag{ hit } where hit is the conditional variance of the return on asset 
i. The fact that the correlation matrix R is constant in this model can be seen 
as somewhat unappealing. Recently, Engle (2002) proposed an extension of this 
model to the case when the correlations are time varying in the so-called Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation Model, which models the variance matrix as: 
Ht = Dt Rt Dt (3.44) 
In the model by Engle, the conditional variances for each variable included in the 
model can be defined as a univariate GARCH model. The model is estimated in 
two steps, in the first step the conditional variances are estimated in univariate 
GARCH models and in the second step the conditional correlations are estimated. 
The main advantage of these models is that they allow to model the variances in 
a multivariate setting while at the same time allowing the flexibility of univariate 
GARCH models. 
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3. C. Full results of the estimation of multivariate GARCH models 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level/ 10% level. 
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S&P 500 Bond Yields USD/DEM 
Mean equations 
Coef. s. e Coef. s. e. Coef. s. e. 
c -0.06 0.05 -0.10 0.03** -0.07 0.02** 
rt_1 0.005 0.05 0.05 0.007** -0.03 0.03 
rt_2 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.006** 
rt_3 -0.15 0.04** -0.05 0.006** 
rt_4 -0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.006** 
Variance parameters 
Coef. s. e. Coef. s. e. Coef. s. e. 
0.70 0.29** 
1.35 0.23** 0.38 0.36 
0.21 1.13 -0.86 6.97 0.08 78.14 
A 
0.76 0.03** 
-0.28 0.04** 
0.075 0.03 
0.28 0.01** 
-0.16 0.01** 
0.71 0.02** 
0.08 0.01** 
k 
0.81 0.22** 
1.03 0.19** 
-0.30 0.09** 
61 
0.18 0.83 0.38 0.30 -0.34 0.24 
62 
0.89 0.48* 1.11 0.30** -0.70 0.54 
63 
0.97 0.50* 0.61 0.50 0.23 0.47 
Table 3.25. Multivariate GARCH model: Model with dummy vari- 
ables only 
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S&P 500 
Coef. s. e. 
c -0.07 0.03** 
rt_1 0.007 0.02 
rt_2 0.08 0.02** 
rt_3 -0.12 0.02** 
rt_4 -0.03 0.02 
Bond Yield 
Mean equations 
Coef. s. e. 
-0.07 0.02** 
0.08 0.0041** 
0.08 0.003** 
-0.07 0.003** 
-0.05 0.003** 
Variance parameters 
Coef. s. e. Coef. s. e. 
0.701 0.12** 
1.35 0.07** 0.38 0.16** 
0.21 0.31 -0.90 2.10 
0.71 0.02** 
-0.31 0.02** 
0.08 0.03** 
0.29 0.004** 
A 
-0.17 0.007** 
0.63 0.009** 
0.10 0.008** 
k 
USD/DEM 
Coef. s. e. 
-0.04 
-0.08 
0.02 
0.03** 
Coef. s. e. 
0.01 155.81 
0.72 0.09** 
0.91 0.10** 
-0.30 0.05** 
61 
0.08 0.08 0.04 0.22 -0.04 0.21 
b2 
0.11 0.02** 0.21 0.02** 0.02 0.73 
63 
0.22 0.05** 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.40 
Table 3.26. Multivariate GARCH model: Model with surprises 
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3. D. Inflation expectations models: full results 
Note: **/* indicate a coefficient statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level/ 10% level. 
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Mean Binary Surprises Surprises and 
equation dummies expectations 
rt s. e. rt s. e. rt s. e. 
c 0.001 0.002 0.0004 0.002 0.001 0.002 
rt_1 -0.06 0.03** -0.08 0.03** -0.06 0.03* 
rt_2 -0.002 0.03 -0.003 0.03 -0.004 0.03 
rt_3 -0.08 0.03** -0.07 0.03** -0.08 0.03** 
rt_4 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
rt_5 -0.06 0.03** -0.07 0.03** -0.06 0.03* 
Holt -0.003 0.01 -0.002 0.01 -0.003 0.007 
Dlt/D1tSt -0.01 0.01 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
D2t/D2tSt -0.03 0.02 0.003 0.002 -0.00001 0.002 
D3t/D3tSt 0.05 0.01** -0.0009 0.0003** -0.001 0.0003* 
D1tEt -0.0001 0.0002 
D2tEt 0.001 0.001 
D3tEt -0.0004 0.0004 
Table 3.27. Models for the daily change in the US break-even infla 
tion rate - mean equation 
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Variance Binary Surprises Surprises and 
equation dummies expectations 
ht s. e. ht s. e. ht s. e. 
c 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.001 
E2 0.11 0.04** 0.13 0.04** 0.15 0.04** 
ht_1 0.74 0.06** 0.76 0.05** 0.67 0.07** 
Mont -0-001 0.001 0.0002 0.001 0.00002 0.001 
'Boer 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.0005 0.00005 0.001 
Wedt 0.0004 0.001 0.001 0.0005* 0.001 0.001 
Thut 0.002 0.001** 0.003 0.001** 0.002 0.001** 
Holt 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
D1t/D1tSt 0.0003 0.0005 0.00002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
D2t /D2t St 0.002 0.001* 0.000004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
D3t/D3tSt -0.0004 0.001 0.00002 0.00001 ** 0.0001 0.00003** 
D1tEt 0.00001 0.00002 
D2tEt -0.00005 0.0001 
D3tEt 0.00004 0.00004 
Arch (5) 1.67 [0.89] 3. 14 [0.68] 1.89 [0.86] 
Table 3.28. Model for the daily change in the US break-even inflation 
rate - variance equation 
Mean Continuous flow Variance Continuous flow 
equation of information equation of information 
rt s. e. ht s. e. 
c -0.0004 0.0005 
c 0.0003 0.001 t_1 0.17 0.04** 
rt_1 -0.09 0.03** ht_1 0.71 0.05** 
rt_2 -0.006 0.03 Mont -0.0002 0.0006 
rt_3 -0.09 0.03** Tuet 0.001 0.0006* 
rt_4 -0.06 0.03** Wedt 0.0009 0.0005* 
rt_5 -0.07 0.03** Thut 0.002 0.0009** 
Holt Holt 0.001 0.0008* 
St 0.0008 0.0003** St -0.000004 0.00002 
Et 0.0002 0.0001 Et 0.00002 0.00001** 
Arch (5) test 6.41; [0.27] 
Table 3.29. Models for the daily change in the US break-even infla 
tion rate - continued 
CHAPTER 4 
Monetary policy and real stock prices 
4.1. Introduction 
Following the analysis of the previous chapter, which took a high frequency 
approach to study the link between monetary policy surprises (which could also be 
interpreted as monetary policy shocks) and asset returns, this chapter investigates 
the link between monetary policy actions and stock prices at a lower frequency. 
Monetary policy actions potentially constitute an important factor influencing 
the behaviour of stock prices. As stock prices can be seen as the discounted 
value of future payoffs provided by equity securities, it is usual in the literature 
to consider that monetary policy may influence stock prices by affecting both the 
macroeconomic environment and the rate at which the future cash flows provided 
by the equity securities are discounted. However, the interconnections between 
monetary policy actions, the macroeconomy and stock returns often complicate 
the empirical investigation of this relation. The endogeneity of these variables 
makes it necessary to identify what constitutes a monetary policy shock in order 
to arrive at a more precise characterisation of the contribution of monetary policy 
for explaining stock price fluctuations. 
Several ways have been proposed in the literature to test the influence of mon- 
etary policy on stock returns. Previous studies have focused both on the influence 
of monetary policy on ex-post returns or on ex-ante measures of stock returns. 
As regards the testing of the influence of monetary policy on ex-post returns, a 
simple approach is to conduct single equation regressions of ex-post stock returns 
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on monetary policy variables, and to test the statistical significance of the cor- 
responding coefficients (see for instance Smirlock and Yawitz, 1985). These tests 
may assume the form of Granger causality tests which assess whether past values 
of monetary policy variables have predictive power for future stock returns in ad- 
dition to the information provided by past values of stock returns. These simple 
approaches have some shortcomings, as stock returns are not only influenced by 
monetary policy. Therefore, in the literature it has been proposed to use instead 
multivariate regressions of excess stock returns on an extended set of explanatory 
variables, including macroeconomic and alternative monetary policy variables, as 
in Patelis (1997). Again this may also assume the form of testing for Granger 
causality in a multivariate setting as in Graham (1996). 
By contrast to the previous approach, the literature focusing on ex-ante stock 
returns relies on a stock valuation model to derive measures of ex-ante returns 
that are then used to investigate whether their behaviour is linked to monetary 
policy variables. For instance, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) use such an approach 
to study the effect of macroeconomic variables on stock returns. These authors 
use a multifactor model based on the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross 
(1976) to derive ex-ante stock returns. The APT is more general than the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), 
in that it allows for multiple risk factors to enter in the pricing of stock returns. 
In this setting, the return on any security is a weighted sum of the risk premia 
associated with the several risk factors, with the weights measuring the exposure 
of the security to each risk factor. In a special case of this theory, the risk factors 
can be specified as innovations to macroeconomic variables or as variables that 
can be seen as representing monetary policy. In the study of Chen, Roll and Ross 
(1986), short-term interest rates are included in the set of the economic forces 
influencing the stock market together with industrial production, consumption, 
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inflation and oil prices. More recently Patelis (1997) and Thorbecke (1997) use 
a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach to study how monetary policy helps to 
explain ex ante stock returns. VARs are convenient devices for capturing the 
systematic effect of monetary policy on stock returns. In fact, the VAR system 
can be seen as taking the place of a stock return valuation model. This thesis 
follows the VAR approach which is part of this second strand of the literature 
focusing on ex-ante stock returns. 
As mentioned above, in testing the effects of monetary policy on stock prices 
it is necessary first to determine or measure what constitutes "monetary policy". 
This apparently trivial issue has been the subject of an intense debate in the mone- 
tary economics literature (see Christiano et al., 1999). The difficulty in measuring 
monetary policy effects is due to the endogeneity problem. More precisely, to the 
fact that there are interdependencies between monetary policy, the macroeconomy 
and, in the case of the issue at hand, stock returns. Such interactions imply that 
when observing the economic reality what one sees is at least partially the outcome 
of past effects of monetary policy that need to be controlled for in order to iso- 
late the "true" effect of monetary policy actions on the macroeconomy. Moreover, 
current and past policy actions are taken in response to macroeconomic develop- 
ments and, as a result, are partly endogenous. Thus, in order to study the effect of 
monetary policy on stock returns it is necessary to determine what constitutes an 
exogenous monetary policy shock (see Christiano et al., 1999). This procedure is 
not always followed in the literature on the link between monetary policy and stock 
returns. In fact, some of the studies mentioned above make the assumption that 
monetary policy is exogenous to developments in other macroeconomic variables 
or stock prices. 
In the literature, several approaches have been proposed to identify monetary 
policy actions or shocks. This may be done by examining central bank statements 
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to determine whether exogenous shocks have occurred (the narrative approach to 
identification of Romer and Romer, 1989,2003); by deriving such shocks using 
Vector Autoregressive Models (VARs) originally proposed by Sims (1980); or by 
using structural models of the economy that are estimated or calibrated. 
In this chapter, the link between stock prices and monetary policy is stud- 
ied following the VAR approach. Initial applications of this methodology to the 
modelling of monetary policy effects on stock prices include Campbell and Shiller 
(1988), Campbell (1991), Lee (1992), Campbell and Ammer (1993), Thorbecke 
(1997) and Patelis (1997). In VAR models all variables are endogenous, which al- 
lows for modelling the complex interactions between monetary policy, stock returns 
and the macroeconomy. In order to test the contribution of monetary policy, the 
percentage of the forecast error variance in stock returns explained by monetary 
policy can be determined by means of a variance decomposition of the forecast 
error of stock returns (see Campbell, 1991). 
This study extends previous findings in several directions. First, it contributes 
to reduce the gap between the finance and the monetary economics literature by 
taking into account recent developments in the monetary economics literature for 
identifying monetary policy shocks in VARs and use these to explain stock price 
developments. Namely, it uses a nonrecursive scheme for identifying monetary 
policy shocks following Kim (1999) and apply it to the G7, extending the mod- 
els to include stock prices in the analysis. Second, the thesis extends existing 
studies for the US on the link between monetary policy and stock prices to other 
countries. This allows to take into account the criticism of Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998) that VAR identification procedures are not robust to different institutional 
arrangements. In fact, as will be seen, different countries require different identi- 
fication schemes. Third, the thesis contributes to fill a gap in the recent studies 
of the link between monetary policy and stock prices which either focus on VAR 
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models including mainly financial variables but omitting other variables that may 
be important for identifying monetary policy (as in Patelis, 1997, who does not 
include economic activity in the VAR system used to determine the importance 
of monetary policy) or VAR models that take into account financial variables but 
leave aside variables that are commonly used in the finance literature for predict- 
ing stock returns (for instance Rapach, 2001 and Lastrapes, 1998, who leave out 
the dividend yield or the price-earnings ratio). This investigation will also pro- 
vide useful indications regarding whether financial variables such as the dividend 
yield or the price-earnings ratio have relevant information for explaining stock 
price developments in the G7 in addition to that provided by macroeconomic or 
monetary policy variables. Fourth, the models used include the exchange rate and 
commodity prices. Therefore they differ from other studies which assume that 
the G7 economies are closed economies and as a result are more general. Finally, 
the chapter uses broad monetary aggregates as an information variable while the 
short-term interest rate is considered as the policy instrument. Such a setting 
is considered to be more in line with the central bank practice in the countries 
covered for most of the sample period. 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, the main theoretical contributions 
on the link between monetary policy, macroeconomic variables and stock prices are 
presented. Second, the issue of the identification of monetary policy is discussed 
in a general way and the option to choose the VAR approach for conducting the 
investigation here is justified. Following a brief review of the main approaches to 
identify monetary policy shocks in the VAR literature, the choice is made to use 
identification schemes based on short-run restrictions. After a brief review of the 
main findings in the VAR literature on the link between monetary policy and stock 
prices, the empirical results are presented. Six alternative benchmark VAR models 
are estimated and those found to best fulfill the criteria for identifying monetary 
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policy shocks are selected. In the next step, the importance of monetary policy 
for real stock prices is analysed on the basis of forecast variance decomposition. 
The two final sections before concluding introduce models including the dividend 
yield and the price-earnings ratio and test models for France and Italy including 
a German policy rate as an exogenous variable to take into account the possible 
endogeneity of monetary policy in these countries. 
4.2. Monetary policy and stock returns - theoretical overview 
Monetary policy can influence stock prices in several ways. For instance, 
through its effects on the macroeconomy monetary policy may influence macro 
variables important for stock prices or the rate at which future cash flows from 
shares are discounted. As already analysed in chapter 3, monetary policy may also 
influence expectations and cause shorter-term movements in stock prices. There 
may also be behavioural effects of monetary policy on the stock market. 
The objective in this Chapter is to look at the relation between monetary policy 
and stock markets from the perspective of determining the importance of monetary 
policy for the lower frequency movements in stock prices. The interest is not to 
examine the role of asset prices for monetary policy, on which there is an abundant 
literature. Such other strand of the literature focuses on issues such as whether 
asset prices should be included in the price level of reference to the central bank, 
whether asset prices are useful to forecast inflation or the impact of changes in 
asset prices on economic activity. For recent reviews of the main issues in this 
literature, which are beyond the scope of this thesis, see Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002). 
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4.2.1. Stock prices and macroeconomic variables 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) constitutes one of the first studies on the reaction of 
asset prices to macroeconomic developments. These authors study broad stock 
market aggregates and their relation to general economic state variables in the 
United States. They start with a simple relation between stock prices and expected 
discounted dividends: 
E(c) 
k 
(4.1) 
where E(c) represents the dividend stream and k the discount rate. They note 
that this relation implies (to a first order approximation) the following expression 
for stock returns: 
dp 
_ 
d[E(c)] dk 
p E(c) k 
(4.2) 
That is, the rate of return on stocks depends positively on changes in expected 
dividends and negatively on changes in the discount factor. Given this simple 
framework, their approach to studying the link between macroeconomic variables 
and stock returns consists in investigating how macro variables affect dividends and 
the discount rate. The authors use the expected level of industrial production and 
both expected and unexpected inflation as variables determining the behaviour 
of dividends. As regards the influence on the discount rate, they use interest 
rates of different maturities, term structure spreads, unanticipated changes in the 
riskless rate and risk premia, consumption changes (proxying for changes in indirect 
marginal utility) and real wealth. 
The simple model of Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) is useful in that it provides a 
broad framework for the review of the link between stock prices and macro vari- 
ables. Given that the set of all possible macroeconomic variables is very wide, 
this study will focus only on the broadest measures, namely inflation, output 
and money. While the relation between stock prices and economic activity seems 
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clearer, the link between stock returns, inflation and money deserves some further 
discussion. As regards output, the main question is whether it constitutes a good 
proxy for the cash flows provided by shares. This issue will be discussed in section 
4.7. 
4.2.2. Real stock prices and inflation 
The traditional view in economics is that the expected nominal return on an asset 
should equal the expected real return plus expected inflation, as put forward by 
Fisher (1930). Expected nominal rates should move one to one with expected 
inflation. If stocks are claims on real assets, then investing in equity should provide 
a hedge against both expected and unexpected inflation. Consequently, nominal 
returns on stocks should vary positively with inflation while real stock returns 
should be independent of the rate of inflation. 
However, in early empirical studies, a large amount of evidence was found 
suggesting that the relation between real stock returns and inflation was in fact 
negative. For instance, Lintner (1975), Bodie (1976), Nelson (1976), Fama and 
Schwert (1977) and Fama (1981) find a negative relation between real stock returns 
and both expected and unexpected inflation. These findings were considered a 
puzzle, given the previously held view that stocks should provide a good insurance 
against inflation. 
The empirical findings of a negative relationship between inflation and real 
stock returns have given rise to several explanations to rationalise the evidence. 
One first explanation is that stock prices may be distorted by money illusion 
(Modigliani and Cohn, 1979). According to this argument, a negative relation 
between inflation and real stock returns would arise if in valuing stock prices ac- 
cording to a formula such as (4.1) investors use nominal interest rates for discount- 
ing future real earnings instead of real interest rates. If that is the case, then a rise 
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in (expected) inflation and, by the Fisher relation, in nominal interest rates should 
lead to a decline in stock prices although real interest rates remain unchanged. As 
a result, a negative correlation between inflation and real stock returns arises. 
On the other hand, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) argue that inflation may in- 
fluence both cash flows and the discount rate even if pricing is done in real terms, 
due to unanticipated shocks to inflation. If pricing is done in real terms, then also 
unanticipated price level changes will have a systematic effect on stock returns. 
Another reason why inflation may influence real stock returns is that inflation 
may have costs to the economy, for instance by affecting relative prices thereby 
leading to a less efficient allocation of resources. In this regard, one could add that 
interest rates may also include an inflation risk premia. Therefore, in addition to 
expected cash flows, one should also take into consideration the possibility that 
inflation may affect the discount factor even if pricing is done in real terms. These 
arguments would lead to a prediction of a negative relation between inflation and 
stock prices. 
Another view on the relation between inflation and stock prices is to note that 
changes in stock prices reflect revisions in expectations about future corporate 
profits and the discount rate (see Chapter 3). This implies that measures that 
aim at reducing inflation can have an effect of actually raising discount rates and 
reducing profits in the short-run. However, the reduction of inflation that is bound 
to take place in the longer-term may lead to an upward revision of expectations 
of future profits and reduce discount rates due to an expected reduction in the 
inflation risk premium in the longer-run. In fact, several central banks argue that 
one of the reasons to focus on price stability is that there are substantial benefits 
from price stability to economic activity in terms of the reduction of long-term 
interest rates due to a lower inflation risk premium (see for instance European 
Central Bank, 1999, page 40). 
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Other authors argue that the negative correlation between real stock returns 
and inflation is spurious given that both expected returns and inflation are endoge- 
nous variables affected by real economic activity and exogenous state variables (see 
Farna, 1981; Geske and Roll, 1983 and Kaul, 1987). Within this type of expla- 
nations, Fama (1981) put forward the so-called "proxy" hypothesis. According to 
Fama, a rise in inflation is a signal of a coming decline in real economic activity. 
As stock prices are forward-looking variables, they should anticipate the coming 
slowdown and therefore decline in response to the expectation of a rise in inflation. 
Inflation would then just be a proxy of future economic activity. The result of 
Fama comes about because in his model money demand is assumed to be procycli- 
cal while money supply is exogenously determined. In such a setting, a rise in 
expected future GDP increases both stock prices and the demand for real money. 
Given that money supply is assumed not to adjust, the only way for equilibrium 
to be regained in the money market is if inflation declines thereby bringing about 
the required increase in real money balances. 
Geske and Roll (1983) and Kaul (1987) elaborate on Fama's result focusing 
on the role of monetary policy in influencing the relation between expected infla- 
tion and real economic activity. Geske and Roll (1983) introduce a central bank 
that implements monetary policy counter- cyclically. In their model, stock prices 
decline in the face of an expected fall in real economic activity as predicted in 
Fama (1981). In turn, the anticipated fall in economic activity amounts to a 
decline in government revenues and -given the assumption of broadly fixed gov- 
ernment expenditures- to expectations that a budget deficit will emerge. If these 
deficits are monetised (i. e. if monetary policy is countercyclical), the expectation 
of a coming budget deficit would tend to raise inflationary expectations. Thus, if 
monetary policy is assumed to be counter-cyclical, a drop in stock prices caused 
212 
by an expected economic slowdown will tend to be accompanied by a rise in in- 
flationary expectations and consequently real stock returns and expected inflation 
will be negatively correlated. 
Kaul (1987) extends the analysis by incorporating a money supply process 
into the analysis, which was considered exogenous in Fama (1981). In his study, 
Kaul concludes that the stock return-inflation relation depends on the equilibrium 
process in the monetary sector where both money demand and money supply 
factors play a role. He points to the fact that the results of Geske and Roll (1983) 
depend crucially on the assumption that the central bank follows a count er-cyclical 
monetary policy. However, if central banks pursue procyclical policies then real 
activity could be either unrelated or even positively related with inflation and this 
would lead to insignificant or positive relations between stock returns and inflation. 
In support of this theory, Kaul argues that the negative relation between inflation 
and stock returns observed in the US in the post World War 11 period is a reflection 
of the countercyclical nature of the monetary policy process during this time. Kaul 
also found that in the 1930s -a period during which monetary policy is thought 
to have been procyclical- the relation between inflation and real stock prices was 
positive or insignificant. 
More recently, a series of papers has addressed this issue by investigating 
whether the stock return-inflation relation can be explained by a combination 
of supply and demand shocks (see Hess and Lee, 1999 and Gallagher and Taylor, 
2002). In order to identify supply and demand shocks, these authors apply a bivari- 
ate VAR specified in terms of changes in real stock prices and inflation. The model 
is used to obtain demand and supply shocks using the Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
identification. Hess and Lee (1999) argue that supply disturbances are mainly due 
to real output shocks and cause a negative stock return-inflation relationship. By 
contrast, demand disturbances are seen as mainly resulting from monetary shocks 
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and give rise to a positive stock return - inflation relationship. The relative impor- 
tance of demand and supply shocks determines the final relation between the two 
variables. Similarly to the results of Kaul (1987), Hess and Lee (1999) conclude 
that in the period post World War II the correlation between inflation and stock 
prices in the US was negative, by contrast with the prewar period when it was 
positive. As for Gallagher and Taylor (2002), they consider an economy with a 
vertical long-run supply curve where demand shocks have no long-run impact on 
future output growth, only supply shocks matter. In this setting, the authors show 
that only supply shocks give rise to a negative relation between stock returns and 
infl. ation. 
Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) examine one hundred years of data and find 
that the negative link inflation-stock returns diminishes at longer horizons. At 5 
year horizons, expected inff ation is seen to have a positive and nearly one to one 
effect on stock returns. 
Other authors have followed an event study methodology to examine the link 
between stock returns and inflation. In a recent paper, Henry (2002) estimates 
the unanticipated response of the stock market to 81 disinflation announcements 
which took place on 21 countries. He concludes that the stock market on average 
appreciates by 24 per cent in real dollar terms if the stabilisation program is imple- 
mented at a time when the inflation rate is "high" (i. e. a 12-month inflation rate 
in excess of 40% during each of the 24 months preceding and including the month 
when the stabilisation is announced). However, he fails to find significant evidence 
of a positive effect of the desinflation process on stock prices when inflation is less 
than 40%. Thus, disinflation would have a positive effect on stock markets only if 
the inflation rate is very high. Given that such high levels of inflation rates have 
not been reached in the recent experience of the industrial countries, one might 
conclude from this study that the reduction of inflation is not positive for stock 
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markets. However, the fact that the sample of 21 countries used by Henry (2002) 
included only developing countries seems to limit the generalisation of his findings 
to industrial economies. 
In a different approach, Pilotte (2003) notes that the total return on a stock 
can be decomposed into two components: the dividend yield and the capital gains 
return and each of these components may have a different relation with inflation. 
By investigating the relation of these two components with inflation, Pilotte (2003) 
concludes that indeed they are related to inflation differently. Positive shocks to the 
economy are associated with increases in cash flows and in price-dividend ratios. 
However, positive shocks to the economy also lead to decreases in required excess 
returns and, in the case where monetary policy is not procyclical, to downward 
pressure on the price level. As a result, inflation will fall in response to positive 
shocks to output and thus lead to a negative relation between total stock returns 
and inflation and also between capital gains and inflation. However, dividend yields 
should be positively related to inflation. Pilotte finds evidence of this different 
behaviour both in the US and in other countries (namely France, Germany, Sweden 
and the UK). 
It should be noted that the question of the negative relation between stock re- 
turns and inflation has a close parallel in the macroeconomics literature in the cor- 
relation between consumer prices and output. For instance Friedman and Schwartz 
(1982) find a positive correlation between consumer prices and output before World 
War 11 and negative afterwards, mirroring the results obtained with stock prices by 
other authors. A more recent trend in the literature investigates the role of mone- 
tary policy in affecting the relationship between output and consumer prices which 
in turn could explain the negative correlation of inflation and stock returns. Floden 
(2000) investigates such correlation in a model where the central bank attempts 
to minimise a quadratic loss function on deviations of output and inflation from 
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target values. In his model the correlation between inflation and output is always 
negative and it increases in absolute value when the preference of the central bank 
for output stabilisation increases. In the same vein, Cover and Pecorino (2003) 
examine the inflation-output relation in a model containing an IS-LM equation, 
an aggregate supply curve and a quadratic loss function on inflation deviations 
and output deviations. In their model they are able to determine the conditions 
under which the relation between inflation and output growth can become positive 
or negative. If monetary policy is implemented in an optimal way then a negative 
price-output correlation can only emerge if the underlying economy is such that 
both demand and supply shocks can affect output and policymakers are concerned 
with both output and inflation. 
As can be seen from the review of the literature, the link between real stock 
returns and inflation seems to depend on the way monetary policy is implemented 
and on the shocks hitting the economy. In this regard, the approach to be fol- 
lowed here, by including in the model not only inflation but also other variables 
relevant to explain both inflation and stock returns (such as GDP and commodity 
prices), implies that the end result is likely to lead to a better control for spurious 
correlations such as the one highlighted by Fama (1981). 
4.2.3. Money and stock prices 
In his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes (1936) was one 
of the first to formulate the link between money and stock prices. In the context 
of the analysis of money demand, Keynes distinguished between the transactions 
motive, the precautionary motive and the speculative motive for holding money 
balances. According to the speculative motive, securities could be seen as just 
alternatives to monetary aggregates in which wealth could be invested. There are 
several approaches to money demand in which this link can be conceptualised. 
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One of the strands of the literature sees liquid assets as assets providing a flow 
of non-pecuniary services which enters the utility function (Riedman, 1959). This 
flow of non-pecuniary services varies proportionally with the stock of liquid assets 
and the demand for the flow of services is therefore approximated by the demand 
for the real stock of liquid assets. 
By contrast, other theories look at the demand for financial assets as the out- 
come of a selection of an optimal portfolio (Brainard and Tobin, 1968 and Tobin, 
1969). This approach assumes that the individual agent will choose the compo- 
sition of the portfolio of assets to maximise expected utility subject to a wealth 
constraint and taking as given the rates of return of the different assets and their 
associated risk measured by the variance- covariance matrix. Thus an increase in 
the risk of investing in stocks would lower the demand for stocks and increase the 
demand for money and vice-versa. Thus, increases of equity prices would tend to 
be accompanied by lower money growth. As a result of these theories, it seems 
appropriate to include money in models explaining stock prices. 
More recent studies include the one by Bakshi and Chen (1996) who build 
a monetary model in which the real equity price is proportional to real output 
and the real rate of return on equity is equal to the growth rate of real GDP. 
This model predicts that the covariance between real stock returns and money 
growth is positive as long as monetary policy is procyclical (i. e. money growth 
and output growth will be positively correlated). If money growth is negatively 
correlated with output growth, as in the case of a countercyclical monetary policy, 
then equity returns and money growth will be negatively correlated. The fact that 
in such model it is assumed that the central bank implements monetary policy by 
changing the rate of change of money influences the result. 
The empirical findings of Baks and Kramer (1999) provide support to the hy- 
pothesis that the link between money growth and equity is positive. Baks and 
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Kramer (1999) study the link between money growth and real stock returns in the 
G7 concluding that an increase in G7 excess money growth (i. e. a rate of growth 
of money in excess of real GDP growth) results in higher real stock returns in the 
G7 and lower G7 real interest rates. 
In this study broad monetary aggregates are included in the models used to 
study the link between monetary policy and stock prices. Given the above theoret- 
ical and empirical findings, such inclusion is justified even if monetary aggregates 
play no role as an instrument of monetary policy or as a target variable of the 
central bank. 
4.3. Alternative approaches for identifying monetary policy shocks 
The investigation of how macroeconomic variables respond to monetary policy 
actions is complicated by the fact that the economic data the researcher observes 
are the outcome of both recent and past central bank behaviour and the current 
and past behaviour of the other sectors in the economy. In order to study the 
impact of monetary policy, the researcher needs to disentangle what is due to 
the central bank from other influences. In the monetary economics literature this 
constitutes the problem of the identification of monetary policy. 
In the literature, several arguments have been put forward to rationalise what 
constitutes an exogenous monetary policy shock. A first argument, according to 
Christiano et al. (1999), is that changes in preferences of policymakers, the un- 
predictability of voting committee decisions and different personalities contribute 
to generate changes in monetary policy that are not predictable and are therefore 
sources of exogenous monetary policy shocks. Another rationale is based on the 
so-called expectations trap (see Ball, 1995). According to this argument, central 
banks sometimes deviate from their systematic reaction function to avoid the so- 
cial costs of disappointing private agent's expectations. Finally, a third argument 
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is based on technical factors such as measurement error (Bernanke-Mihov, 1995): 
the central bank can observe reality only with an error which is greater because 
only preliminary data are available when the bank takes decisions and this is a 
source of monetary policy shocks. 
In the practical procedure to identify monetary policy shocks, a first issue that 
needs to be taken into account regards the choice of the variables which are assumed 
to be part of the information set of the central bank. Recalling from Chapter 2 of 
this thesis that the identification of the monetary policy shock is assumed to be 
derived from a relationship of the following form: 
it =f (Qt) +Et (4.3) 
where it is the instrument of the central bank, fa linear function describing the 
central bank's reaction function and Et is the exogenous monetary policy shock. 
Qt is the information set available to the central bank at time t. If the model used 
to identify monetary policy shocks does not include important variables that are 
part of the set Qt, their effect will be attributed to the shock term thereby leading 
to an erroneous identification of the exogenous monetary policy shocks. Thus, the 
identification of the exogenous monetary policy shocks should be done in models 
that include a minimum set of variables justified in terms of economic theory. 
The main approaches for identifying monetary policy shocks are the narrative 
approach, the identification via Fed fund futures prices as in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, and VAR models. 
The "narrative approach" (introduced by Romer and Romer, 1989) tries to 
measure monetary policy actions by analysing central bank minutes and public 
statements of central bank representatives in order to determine subjectively what 
constitutes a monetary policy intervention. This option will not be followed in my 
thesis as it is more susceptible to result in a distorted assessment of monetary policy 
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due to the influence of the researcher's a priori beliefs. In addition, such measures 
would be harder to develop for some of the countries included in the analysis and 
which, as a rule, did not publish minutes of the central bank meetings. 
As seen in Chapter 3 of this thesis, it is also possible to identify monetary policy 
shocks from Fed funds futures prices. As shown in that chapter, expectations of 
the level of the central bank rate can be obtained from these financial instruments 
that reflect the market's view. By comparing these market expectations with the 
final outcome, a measure of monetary policy shock can be obtained. This option 
will also not be followed given that this chapter aims at a longer-term analysis of 
the effect of monetary policy on stock prices and the data on futures starts only 
in October 1988. A further limitation of the use of futures data is that these are 
available only for the US and the aim here is to analyse the G7. 
For the above reasons it appears that the best option to identify monetary pol- 
icy shocks is the use of a model. In this case two options are available. A first one is 
to address the issue in the context of structural VAR models. A second possibility 
is to build stylised structural models of each of the economies considered, making 
resource to calibration, and to derive monetary policy shocks from such a frame- 
work. In this thesis the choice made was to rely on structural VAR models. VAR 
models tend to be more flexible in summarising the main properties of the data 
although they are less clear regarding the general structure of the economy being 
represented. The research based on VAR models can be seen as complementary 
to further investigations resorting to dynamic general equilibrium models which, 
starting from the microfoundations, can be more precise as regards the theoretical 
underpinnings of the features found. 
Despite all the debate surrounding the issue of the identification of monetary 
policy in monetary economics, this issue has not received much attention in the 
finance literature, in particular in tests of the interactions between monetary policy 
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and stock returns. For instance, the results of Thorbecke (1997) and Patelis (1997) 
are crucially dependent on the ordering of the variables and no analysis of whether 
the VARs indeed provide a good basis for the identification of monetary policy 
shocks is performed. In addition, the VARs used are more appropriate for modeling 
stock returns but omit important information for identifying monetary policy (for 
instance Patelis does not include in the VAR any measure of economic activity 
which seems highly likely to be part of the central bank's information set). As 
mentioned above, which information to include in the VAR is an important issue 
to address, as this decision will bear crucially on what is assumed to constitute 
monetary policy shocks. 
In the VAR literature on the identification of monetary policy shocks several 
broad characteristics of the impulse responses of the key macroeconomic variables 
to a monetary policy shock should be fulfilled. As mentioned by Christiano et al. 
(1999), there is broad agreement in the literature that after a contractionary mon- 
etary policy shock short-term interest rates rise, aggregate output and monetary 
aggregates fall, and the price level responds very slowly and also falls. 
Despite the broad agreement on the stylised responses to monetary policy 
shocks, in the applied work on structural VARs several puzzles have been encoun- 
tered in the identification of monetary policy shocks. In models that use mone- 
tary aggregates as the monetary policy instrument, frequently a liquidity puzzle is 
found, whereby a positive shock to money leads to an increase in interest rates (see 
Sims, 1992). Other authors have used short-term interest rates as constituting the 
central bank instrument, thereby avoiding the liquidity puzzle. This choice can be 
motivated by institutional arguments (see McCallum, 1983; Bernanke and Blinder, 
1992 and Sims, 1992). In the empirical literature this choice has not been without 
its problems. A problem that has been frequently encountered in the practical 
implementation of these models is the so-called "prize puzzle", i. e. the result that 
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positive innovations in monetary policy (for instance a positive shock to interest 
rates) lead to an increase in consumer prices. Sims (1992) attributed this puz- 
zle to innovations in monetary policy being systematic responses to inflationary 
pressures. As central banks tend to raise interest rates when prices are rising, 
the interest rate tends to be positively correlated with prices, thereby resulting in 
the price puzzle. However, some authors have argued that the price puzzle can 
be solved either by including a commodity price index in the model to take into 
account of inflationary pressures (Christiano et al., 1996) or by identifying money 
demand and money supply shocks separately (Sims and Zha, 1995 and Gordon 
and Leeper, 1994). 
In this study, the short-term interest rate is used as the main instrument 
through which monetary policy is implemented. In particular, the approach follows 
the one of Kim (1999) who shows that with minimal identification assumptions im- 
pulse responses can be obtained for the G7 that are consistent with a monetary 
policy shock. In any case, each model is previously tested for the absence of the 
undesirable features mentioned above. Before describing in more detail such re- 
strictions, the next sections describe the VAR approach applied to the study of 
the link between monetary policy and stock prices. 
4.4. Monetary policy and stock prices - the VAR approach 
In the finance literature, the use of Vector Autoregressions for studying stock 
returns was first proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1988). These authors start 
from the following identity: 
Rt+i 
Pt+l + Dt+l 
Pt -1 
(4.4) 
where Rt+l is the net real stock return, Pt+j represents the real stock price and 
Dt+l the real dividend. The continuously compounded real return (, rt+, ) is then 
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given by the following expression: 
rt+l = ln(1 + Rt+l) (4.5) 
Which can be arranged to find the following expression for the real return: 
rt+l = pt+l - pt + lrn(l + exp(dt+l - pt+1)) (4.6) 
this expression defines the real stock return as a function of the change in the 
logarithm of stock prices and the log dividend-price ratio. Taking a first order 
Taylor expansion around the average dividend price ratio, one obtains the following 
expression for ex-post stock prices: 
k 00 
Pt = 1-, o 
+ ýpý (1 - o) dt+j+i - rt+j+i) (4.7) 
j=0 
where p (when the dividend-price ratio is constant) is the ratio of the ex-dividend 
to the cum-dividend stock prices and k is a constant. In turn the ex-ante real 
stock prices are expressed as a function of expected future dividends and expected 
future real stock returns: 
CX) 
pt =kp+ Et 
Ei«1 
- P) dt+j+i - rt+j+l) (4.8) 1 j=0 
Campbell and Shiller (1988) call this the dynamic Gordon growth model or the 
dividend-ratio model. Inserting this equation in (4.6), Campbell (1991) derives the 
following relation for the innovations in real stock returns: 
00 00 
rt+l - Et(rt+, ) - (Et+l - Et) 
EpýAdt+j+j 
- 
Epýrt+j+j (4.9) 
-j=o j=l 
this equation states that innovations in real stock returns are a function of innova- 
tions in expected dividend growth and in expected returns. Equivalently, in terms 
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of log-prices: 
Oo Do 
pt+l - Et(pt+, ) = (Et+l - Et) 
EpiAdt+j+l 
- 
Ejýrt+j+j 
-j=o j=l 
This type of specification has been used by Patelis (1997). However, instead of 
applying it to stock returns, Patelis uses this type of decomposition for modelling 
excess returns (et i. e. stock returns minus the one-month t-bill that proxies for the 
riskless rate): 
Oc 00 Oo 
et+, -Et(et+, ) = (Et+, -Et) 
j: pýAdt+j+1 - 
ylýet+j+j 
- 
Epýrrt+j+j 
_j=o j=l j=l 
in this model, innovations in excess stock returns are decomposed into innovations 
in dividend growth, future excess returns and in the real interest rate (rr). One 
advantage of using excess returns is that one can abstract from price level consid- 
erations. In this setting, monetary policy would then operate via the real interest 
rate. 
The Campbell- Shiller decomposition and their use of the VAR methodology, 
has motivated several other studies to apply a similar framework for analysing 
how stock returns react to monetary policy. Such findings are discussed in the 
next section. 
4.5. Previous findings in the VAR literature on the link between 
monetary policy and stock returns 
One of the first studies in the interaction between monetary policy and stock 
returns is the one of Lee (1992) who studies causal relations among real stock 
returns, real short-term interest rates (one month T-Bill rate minus a measure 
of expected inflation), real economic activity (measured by industrial production 
growth) and inflation. Using a VAR model for the US, the corresponding forecast 
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error variance decomposition shows that real stock returns are mainly explained 
by innovations in real stock returns (which explain almost 93% of the percentage 
of 24-month forecast error variance). Inflation explains about 3% of the forecast 
error variance of real stock returns while innovations in industrial production and 
the real short-term interest rate accounted each for 2%. 
Patelis (1997) sets up a VAR model with the following variables and ordering: 
changes in the Fed funds rate, the portion of nonborrowed reserves orthogonal to 
total reserve growth, ' the real interest rate, the term spread, the dividend yield 
and excess stock returns. In order to identify monetary policy shocks, Patelis uses 
an identification procedure based on the Cholesky decomposition. This implies 
a recursive structure where monetary policy variables precede financial variables 
assuming that shocks to monetary policy will first be reflected in financial markets 
and not the other way around. Similar to the conclusions of Lee (1992), Patelis 
(1997) finds that most of the variance in unexpected stock returns (86%) is due to 
financial variables while only a small part (3%) is due to monetary policy variables. 
The dividend yield in particular plays an important role in accounting for most of 
the explanatory power of the financial variables. As possible explanations for this 
result, Patelis (1997) argues that the dividend yield is a good predictor of stock 
returns either because it is very persistent or because unexpected asset returns are 
dominated by changes in expectations regarding future excess returns which the 
dividend yield predicts well. 
Thorbecke (1997) uses a recursive identification scheme similar to the one used 
by Patelis (1997) in order to investigate the link between monetary policy and 
stock returns. The VAR used by Thorbecke (1997) contains the following variables, 
ordered from the most exogenous to the most endogenous: growth rate of industrial 
production, inflation, the commodity price index, the fed funds rate, the log of 
'This indicator of monetary policy was proposed by Strongin (1995). 
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nonborrowed reserves, the log of total reserves and stock returns. The use of the 
commodity price index follows the scheme of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1994) who found that this variable is useful to remove the price puzzle (i. e. that a 
contractionary monetary policy shock leads to an increase in inflation). Thorbecke 
finds that an expansionary monetary policy shock increases stock returns both ex- 
ante and ex-post and this could either be because it increases future cash flows or 
decreases the discount rate at which they are capitalised. 
Lastrapes (1998) studies the responses of bond yields and real equity prices to 
money supply shocks in the G7 countries plus Holland. Lastrapes recalls the crit- 
icism of Faust and Leeper (1997) of the infinite horizon restrictions of Blanchard 
and Quah (1989), namely that finite samples generally do not contain information 
about infinite horizons. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use restrictions ap- 
plied at long but finite horizons. Lastrapes applied this identification scheme in 
a VAR with real equity prices, the yield to maturity on bonds, real output, real 
money balances and the nominal stock of money. The price level is not included in 
the model but is taken into account only implicitly. Lastrapes finds that real eq- 
uity prices respond positively, persistently and significant to expansionary money 
supply shocks (which in this model is equivalent to an increase in the aggregate 
MI). As possible channels for this transmission, Lastrapes suggests that it can 
happen as a result of 1) a liquidity effect that leads to a rebalancing of portfolios 
with substitution from real money balances to equities; 2) money influencing di- 
rectly real interest rates as in the limited participation models of Fuerst (1992) and 
Christiano (1991) and 3) due to the positive response of future output to shocks 
to monetary aggregates which could lead to higher expected payoffs to equities, 
raising real stock prices. By contrast to other findings, Lastrapes finds no negative 
relation between money supply shocks (via inflation) and real stock prices. The 
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author then concludes that stocks form a good hedge against inflation. However, 
his results vary significantly from country to country. 
More recently, Rapach (2001) analyses the effects of monetary policy on US 
stock prices using a structural VAR model estimated with quarterly data. The 
VAR includes the variables price level (GDP deflator), real stock prices, the in- 
terest rate (three-month T-Bill rate) and output. Rapach imposes restrictions on 
both the short-run impact and the long-run effects, following Blanchard and Quah 
(1989). The results show that each macro shock has important effects on real stock 
prices. Expansionary money supply shocks raise real stock prices and lead to lower 
interest rates in the short-run. Money supply is found to explain one third of the 
variability of stock prices at shorter horizons while at longer horizons aggregate 
supply shocks explain nearly 50% of variability in real stock prices. Rapach finds 
that expansionary shocks to aggregate spending raise the interest rate and depress 
real stock prices over time. Portfolio shocks play an important role in determining 
real stock prices at both shorter and longer horizons. Finally, Rapach (2001) finds 
a negative correlation between real stock returns and inflation over the postwar 
period thus in line with the hypothesis of Kaul (1987) that monetary policy was 
countercyclical during this period (see section 4.2.2). 
As can be seen from this review, there are approaches where authors use mainly 
financial variables in the investigation of monetary policy effects on stock returns, 
as in Patelis (1997). Others rely mainly on macroeconomic variables in the VAR 
and have no role for dividend yields or other financial market indicators (for in- 
stance Lee, 1992; Thorbecke, 1997; Lastrapes, 1998; Rapach, 2001). However, the 
question of which variables to include in the VAR model is crucial as the identi- 
fication of monetary policy shocks should be conducted in a VAR that includes 
enough information both on the formulation of monetary policy and for explaining 
the behaviour of stock prices. 
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In defense of models including only financial variables, one may argue, as done 
by Ammer and Mei (1996), that by relying more on financial market data than 
on macroeconomic data one will likely find fewer measurement errors. Moreover, 
financial variables like the dividend growth can be used to proxy real economy 
va, riables at longer horizons. However, even if this is the case, it is nonetheless 
important to identify monetary policy shocks appropriately and such identification 
is difficult to achieve if some macroeconomic variables that are usually thought to 
be part of the reaction function of the central bank are simply omitted from the 
specification of VAR models. 
Turning to studies that use primarily macroeconomic variables in VARs to as- 
sess the effect of monetary policy, such as Thorbecke (1997) and Rapach (2001), 
one limitation of the models is that they exclude information for predicting real 
stock returns as dividend yields or earnings statements may provide information 
that may be relevant for stock price valuations, in particular over shorter peri- 
ods. In fact, as found by Patelis (1997), financial variables appear to have more 
information for predicting stock returns than real variables which suggests that fi- 
nancial variables have relevant information for explaining stock prices beyond that 
of macroeconomic variables. In addition, there is an extensive literature that draws 
mainly on financial variables to explain stock returns (see for instance Fama and 
French, 2002). Thus, it appears desirable to include such variables in the models 
as is the case of the present chapter. 
A further issue has to do with the macroeconomic variables included in the 
VAR, s. None of the models used in the previous studies include broad mone- 
tary aggregates and some (such as Rapach, 2001) exclude money altogether from 
the analysis. However, developments in broad monetary aggregates potentially 
constitute an important determinant of stock returns as argued in section 4.2-3. 
Furthermore, the instrument of monetary policy is not always identified with the 
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short-term interest rate while it would seem that, at least in some countries, the 
short-term rate would be more important as a policy instrument. In addition, the 
studies of Patelis (1997), Lastrapes (1998) and Rapach (2001) do not include any 
variable capturing influences of external variables such as the exchange rate or 
commodity prices. While for the US such omission of foreign variables may have 
some supporting evidence given the smaller role of the external sector relative to 
the size of the US economy, for the other G7 countries such omission does not seem 
appropriate (see for instance Kim, 2001, who shows that monetary policy shocks 
in the US have significant effects in the non-US G6 countries). 
In this chapter I set up a structural VAR model including a minimum set of 
both financial and macroeconomic variables in order to have enough information in 
the VAR for it to allow both a meaningful identification of monetary policy shocks 
and for having sufficient information in the system for modelling stock prices. This 
VAR allows to determine the role played by monetary policy for real stock prices, 
relative to other macroeconomic and financial variables. 
4.6. Benchmark VAR models for identifying monetary policy shocks in 
the G7 
This section aims at obtaining a set of benchmark VARs for identifying mon- 
etary policy shocks in a model with stock prices. The identification of monetary 
policy in VAR models has been the subject of an intense debate in the monetary 
economics literature (see Christiano et al., 1999). The estimation of reduced form 
VAR models allows only for the estimation of shocks that mix exogenous shocks to 
both monetary policy, stock returns or other variables included in the VAR. In this 
regard, reduced form VARs do not provide information on structural relations. In 
order to build some structure into the model, it is necessary to impose restrictions 
on the VAR. The fact that there are several ways of imposing restrictions on the 
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VAR in order to identify what constitutes a monetary policy shock has led to some 
criticism on the VAR methodology. However, what seems important is that the 
restrictions on the model be well explained and justified on the basis of economic 
theory, as argued by Christiano et al. (1999) and that the impulse responses are 
in line with the consensual theoretical predictions. 
Several identification schemes have been proposed to identify monetary policy 
shocks. A first approach is based on the estimation of the monetary authority's 
feedback rule (Christiano et al., 1999; Sims and Zha, 1995). Two ways of identi- 
fying monetary policy shocks can be followed: schemes based on a recursiveness 
assumption where the information set available to the policymaker is assumed 
to be orthogonal to the shocks (using the Cholesky decomposition), or a non- 
recursiveness approach in which the information set is not orthogonal to the shocks 
(Sims and Zha, 1995; Kim 1999). A further approach is to use long-run restrictions 
in the line of the methodology of Blanchard and Quah (1989). Annex 4.1) presents 
further details on the several alternatives. 
In this study, the option will fall on using short-run non-recursive zero restric- 
tions to identify the monetary policy shocks. The reasons for this choice are the 
following. First, there is an argument based on informational delays. These de- 
lays occur because information on economic activity or prices is not available to 
policymakers at the time they refer to but only after a certain lag. Second, Kim 
(1999) has shown that such specification leads to good results in identifying mon- 
etary policy shocks in the G7, which is the focus of this study. Third, the use of 
recursive identification schemes such as the Cholesky decomposition would make it 
difficult to justify the options made in terms of economic theory. The use of short- 
run restrictions instead of long-run restrictions can be justified by the fact that 
the study aims at studying the interaction between monetary policy and financial 
markets. The fact that there may be several long-run relations in the systems 
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used, while interesting in itself, is not of direct importance for this study which 
tries to identify such interaction by focusing on the exogenous monetary policy 
shocks. Nevertheless, the use of the variables in levels instead of first differences, 
as done in this study, implies that there is no loss of the long-run information in 
the data. Section 4.6 discusses in further detail the restrictions made. 
The identification approach follows the methodology of Kim (1999), i. e. first 
structural VARs are constructed applying nonrecursive schemes for identifying 
monetary policy shocks. In a second step, the impulse response functions to the 
structural shocks are analysed. These impulse responses should be such that they 
"resemble" a monetary policy shock, i. e. the macroeconomic variables should 
react in line with what is predicted in the economic literature. In turn, according 
to Christiano et al. (1999), the following responses constitute the consensus view 
in the literature as to the expected responses of interest rates, prices and output 
to a contractionary monetary policy shock: 
(1) Interest rates should rise initially 
(2) The price level should decline 
(3) The output level does not increase 
The selected models used to identify the monetary policy shocks should produce 
impulse responses that are consistent with the above. It should be noted, though, 
that in this study the first criterion is verified by definition as it is assumed that 
the monetary policy instrument used by the central bank is the short-term interest 
rate. The monetary policy shocks are set equal to the responses to a positive 
shock to the short-term interest rate and not to monetary aggregates as in the 
related study of Lastrapes (1998). Nevertheless, as an additional feature to take 
into account in selecting the models -though not taken as a decisive criterion- it 
was considered desirable that an expansionary shock to the monetary aggregate 
should lead to a rise in the price level, at least in the medium to long-term. 
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4.6.1. Data 
The VAR models for the G7 countries are constructed including the following 
variables: the level of real output (Y), the price level (P), a monetary aggregate 
(M), the call money rate or the central bank official rate (IR), the level of real 
stock prices (STOCK), and the world export price expressed in domestic currency 
(WE). All variables are expressed in logarithms with the exception of the central 
bank rate. As regards real output, real GDP is used for all the countries. As for 
the price level, the consumer price index is used for all the countries except for 
the UK for which the GDP deflator is used instead. As for monetary aggregates, 
broad aggregates have been preferred and so for the US M2 is used, for Germany 
M3, for the UK M4, for Japan M2+CDs, for Italy M2, for Canada MI plus quasi 
money. The only exception is France for which the narrow monetary aggregate MI 
has been used given the lack of an appropriate long series for M2. As regards the 
stock price indices, they are deflated by the respective price level variable used for 
each country. The indices considered are the Standard and Poors 500 (SP500) for 
the US, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) index, for Canada, the DAX index for 
Germany, the FT Actuaries for the UK, the TSE index for Japan, the CAC 40 for 
France 2 and the MIB index for Italy. 
The world export price is included for the arguments mentioned in Kim (1999), 
namely for capturing inflationary pressures stemming from foreign variables that 
may feed through to domestic prices. In addition, the fact that the world export 
prices included in the model are denominated in terms of domestic currency implies 
that they can be seen as capturing also information related to the exchange rate. 
As argued by Kim (1999), given that most international prices are expressed in US 
dollars this includes mainly information on the exchange rate of each country with 
For the period from 1974QI to 1987Q2, the CAC Generale index is used instead. 
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respect to the US -A further reason to include this variable in the VAR is that such 
types of variables have been found to be useful in order to solve the problem of 
the "price puzzle", i. e. the result that a positive shock to the short-term interest 
rate is accompanied by a rise in the price level (see Christiano et al., 1999). 
The sample period starts in the first quarter of 1974 for the US, the UK, France 
and Germany and in the first quarter of 1975 for Japan, Canada and Italy. The 
sample ends in the last quarter of 2001 for the US, UK, Japan and Canada, and, 
bearing in mind the change in regime due to the start of Stage Three of Euro- 
pean Monetary Union, in the last quarter of 1998 for France, Italy and Germany. 
Appendix 4. A provides further details on the data used, including all the sources. 
Table 4.1 shows some descriptive statistics of the data used in this study which 
can provide a first summary information on the several series. As can be seen in the 
table, there are some differences in the growth of real stock prices of the different 
countries. During the sample period used in this study, the highest growth in real 
stock prices occurred in Germany with an average annual rate of growth close to 
7%. The stock markets of the US, UK and France had a similar performance with 
prices growing slightly above 5% per annum. Performance was weaker in Italy and, 
in particular, in Canada and Japan which showed an annual average growth, in 
real terms, of around 2.5%. The differences in the performance of real stock prices 
do not seem to be mirrored in the ranking of the several G7 economies in terms 
of real GDP growth. In fact, the worst performing stock markets (Japan and 
Canada) corresponded to the countries where real GDP growth was higher during 
this period and the "best performer" in terms of real stock prices (Germany) 
had the lowest average growth rate of real GDP of the G7 countries. Looking at 
inflation and differences in money growth, no clear picture emerges to explain the 
different performance of the stock markets. The same happens in the case of the 
real short-term interest rate, which has been lowest, on average, in Japan without 
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Stock Prices 
Nom. 
us 9.9% 
UK 12.2% 
Japan 5.0% 
Canada 7.5% 
Germany 9.7% 
Rance 10.5% 
Italy 12.2% 
Ta 
Real Prices Money 
GDP growth 
Real 
Annual growth rates 
5.2% 3.0% 4.7% 
5.2% 2.2% 7.0% 
2.4% 3.0% 2.6% 
2.6% 2.9% 4.9% 
6.9% 2.1% 2.8% 
5.3% 2.2% 5.2% 
4.1% 2.2% 8.3% 
)le 4.1. Descriptive statistics - Averages 
16.4 
14.0 
40.2 
14.9 
15.8 
12.6 
Stock Prices Real Prices Money 
GDP growth 
us 
UK 
Japan 
Canada 
Germany 
Rance 
Italy 
Nom. Real 
Standard error of the annual growth rate 
13.5% 
14.7% 
19.2% 
17.5% 
18.5% 
22.1% 
30.7% 
Tal 
14.4% 2.2% 2.9% 3.1% 
14.5% 2.0% 5.5% 4.4% 
19.5% 2.4% 3.1% 3.9% 
17.9% 2.4% 3.3% 4.7% 
18.8% 2.0% 1.7% 2.1% 
23.0% 1.7% 4.1% 4.4% 
30.8% 2.1% 5.7% 6.4% 
Short-term Div. P/E 
interest rate yield ratio 
Nom. Real 
Percentage points 
3.3 
3.6 
3.5 
3.7 
2.4 
3.3 
4.2 
1.4 
1.4 
0.5 
1.1 
1.2 
2.1 
0.8 
7.3 
5.7 
18.2 
5.4 
3.7 
4.1 
2.6 
1.8 
1.9 
3.6 
2.8 
3.1 
3.4 
le 4.2. Descriptive statistics - Standard error 
a corresponding good stock market performance. As for the dividend yield, it 
can be seen that the worst performing countries in terms of the real stock price 
growth had all lower average dividend yields than the other countries. Finally, 
with the exception of Japan, the G7 countries had similar average price-earnings 
ratios during the sample period (in a range of between 12.6 and 16.0). 
Table 4.2 shows the standard error of the various series. What is noteworthy 
is that the variability, of stock markets during this period is much higher than the 
variability in any macroeconomic variable. 
6.6% 
10.8% 
6.9% 
9.2% 
6.4% 
6.6% 
9.5% 
Short-term Div. PE 
interest rate yield ratio 
Nom. Real 
Percentage points 
7.4 2.6 3.5 
8.6 1.8 4.6 
4.8 1.9 1.1 
8.5 3.6 3.2 
5.7 2.8 3.6 
8.9 3.1 4.3 
11.7 3.4 2.5 
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In order to better characterise the series in a next step the order of integration of 
the various series is tested. Two types of tests are used. A first set of tests (namely 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (1979) (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (1988) (PP) 
tests) are aimed at testing the null of non-stationarity versus the alternative of 
stationarity. The null hypothesis of the second type of tests (the KPSS test) is 
that the series is stationary while the alternative is non-stationarity. Admittedly, 
it is difficult to distinguish between unit root processes and processes that are quite 
persistent but do not have a unit root, as is common of macroeconomic time series. 
The procedure of using tests with both hypotheses may therefore lead to a more 
robust testing procedure. 
The tests as well as all the results are presented in Appendix 4. B. Table 4.3 
summarises the main conclusions of the tests. The way the table should be read is 
the following. The table reports the assessment of the unit root tests in terms of 
the integration order of the series level. As regards the unit root tests where the 
null is non-stationarity, first it is tested whether the level of the series in integrated 
of order I or not. If the null can be rejected the testing procedure stops. In case 
it cannot, then the first difference of the series is tested, implying testing the 
hypothesis that the level of the series is 1(2) versus I(l). If a variable is considered 
to be integrated of order I this should be interpreted as implying that the test was 
not able to reject such hypothesis (which could as well be due to its low power) - 
As 
for the KPSS tests, a result implying that the variable is integrated of order I in 
the table only means that it was possible to reject the null that it was stationary. 
The precise procedures followed to arrive at these results are described in Annex 
4.13. All tests included a constant and, whenever it was found to be statistically 
significant, also a linear trend. 
As can be seen in tables 4.3 and 4.4 the tests do not always provide a clear-cut 
indication as to the order of integration of the series. Consumer prices appear to be 
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integrated of order I in Germany, France and Italy. Given that the price level series 
is clearly not stationary around a constant, the same applies to the US, Japan and 
Canada. For the UK the results of the tests are mixed with prices being either 
I(l) or stationary around a trend. Monetary aggregates appear to be I(l) in the 
UK, Japan, Canada and Germany. Given that also none of the levels of monetary 
aggregates appear to be stationary around a constant, monetary aggregates also 
seem to be I(l) in the US, France and Italy. The results for the other variables 
are more mixed. For GDP, the ADF and PP tests suggest that the variable is 
integrated of order I in the US, UK, Germany, France and Italy but in all these 
cases except Italy the null hypothesis of stationarity around a linear trend of the 
KPSS test cannot be rejected. Real stock prices seem to be integrated of order I 
in the US, Japan and Canada and stationary around a linear trend in the UK. As 
for the remaining variables commodity prices appear to be I(l) in the cases of the 
US, UK and France while the dividend yield is stationary around a linear trend in 
the cases of UK and Canada and integrated of order I in the case of Japan. The 
price earnings ratio appears to be stationary around a trend in most countries. 
Thus, surnmarising the evidence, all of the variables in levels in all the countries 
can be considered to be either I(l) or stationary around a linear trend and, with 
some caution regarding money and prices in most countries, none is considered to 
be 1(2). This will matter for the specification of the VAR models that follows. 
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ypmI STOCK WE DlV PE 
US ADF l(l) t 1 (1) nt 1 (1) t 1 (1) nt 1 (1) t 1 (1) nt 1 (1) t 1 (1) t 
PP 1 (1) t l(O) nt l(O) nt l(l) nt l(l) t l(l) nt l(l) t l(l) t 
KPSS 1(0) t 1 (1) t 1 (1) t 1 (0) t 1 (1) t 1(0) t 1 (1) t 1 (0) t 
UK ADF l(1) t 1 (0) nt 1 (1) nt 1 (1) nt 1 (0) t 1 (0) nt 1 (0) t 1 (1) t 
PP 1 (1) nt 1 (0) t 1 (1) t 1 (1) nt 1 (0) t 1 (1) nt 1 (0) t 1 (0) t 
KPSS l(0) t 1 (1) t l(1) t 1 (0) nt 1 (0) t l(1) t 1 (0) t 1 (0) t 
JP ADF I(I) nt l(1) nt I(I) nt 1(0) t 1 (0) nt l(1) t 1 (1) nt 1 (1) t 
PP 1 (0) t 1 (0) nt 1 (1) t 1 (1) nt 1 (1) nt l(1) t 1 (1) nt 1 (1) nt 
KPSS l(1) t l(1) t l(1) t 1 (0) t 1 (1) t 1(0) t 1 (1) t 1 (0) t 
CA ADF l(1) t l(1) nt l(1) t l(1) t l(1) t l(1) nt l(0) t 1 (0) t 
PP l(1) nt l(0) nt l(1) t 1 (1) t 1 (1) t I(I) nt l(0) t 1 (1) nt 
KPSS l(0) t l(1) t l(1) t 1 (0) t 1 (1) t 1 (0) t 1 (0) t 1 (0) t 
DE ADF l(l) nt l(l) nt l(l) t 1 (1) nt 1 (1) t 1 (1) nt 1 (1) t l(l) t 
PP 1 (1) t 1 (1) nt 1 (1) nt 1 (1) nt 1 (1) t 1 (1) nt 1 (1) nt 1 (0) t 
KPSS 1(0) t 1 (1) t l(l) t 1 (0) nt 1 (0) t l(O) t 1(0) t 1(0) t 
FR ADF l(l) t 1 (1) nt 1 (0) nt 1 (1) nt 1 (1) t l(l) nt l(l) t l(l) t 
PP l(l) nt l(l) t 1(0) nt l(l) nt l(l) nt l(l) nt l(l) t 1 (0) t 
KPSS 1(0) t 1 (1) t 1 (1) t 1 (1) t 1 (0) t l(l) t 1 (0) t 1 (1) t 
1T AD F1 (1) nt 1 (1) t 1 (0) nt 1 (1) t l(l) t 1(0) nt l(l) nt 
PP l(l) nt l(l) t 1(0) nt l(l) t l(l) t 1(0) nt l(l) nt 
KPSS l(l) t 1 (1) t l(l) t 1 (1) t 1 (0) t l(l) t l(O) t 
Table 4.3. Unit root tests: tests of I(I) versus 1(0) 
Note: I(I) - in the case of ADF and PP tests means that the null 
hypothesis of 
nonstationarity could not be rejected at a 5% significance level; in the case of the KPSS 
test means that the null of stationarity was rejected at a 5% significance level; 1(0) - in 
the case of ADF and PP tests means that the null hypothesis of nonstationarity could 
be rejected at a 5% significance level; in the case of the KPSS test means that the null 
of stationarity could not be rejected at a 5% significance level; t- test included a trend; 
nt - test did not include a trend. 
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pm 
US ADF 1(2) nt 1(2) nt 
pp 1 (1) t1 (1) t 
KPSS 1 (1) t 1(2) t 
UK ADF 1 (1) t 1(2) nt 
pp1 (1) t1 (1) t 
KPSS 1 (1) nt 1 (1) t 
JP ADF l(l) t 1(2) nt 
pp 1 (1) t1 (1) t 
KPSS 1(2) t1 (1) t 
CA ADF 1(2) t l(l) t 
pp 1 (1) t1 (1) t 
KPSS l(l) t 1(2) t 
DE ADF 1(2) nt l(l) nt 
pp 1 (1) t1 (1) nt 
KPSS l(l) t l(l) t 
FR ADF 1(2) nt 1(2) nt 
PP 1 (1) t1 (1) t 
KPSS 1 (1) t 1(2) t 
IT ADF 1(2) t 1(2) t 
pp 1 (1) t1 (1) t 
KPSS 1 (1) t1 (1) t 
Table 4.4. Unit root tests: tests of 1(2) versus I(I) 
Note: 1(2) - in the case of ADF and PP tests means that the null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity of the first difference of the corresponding series could not be rejected at 
a 5% significance level; in the case of the KPSS test means that the null of stationarity 
was rejected at a 5% significance level; I(I) - in the case of ADF and PP tests means 
that the null hypothesis of nonstationarity of the first difference of the series could be 
rejected at a 5% significance level; in the case of the KPSS test means that the null of 
stationarity could not be rejected at a 5% significance level; t- test included a trend; nt 
- test did not include a trend. 
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4.6.2. Benchmark VAR specifications 
In the analysis I consider 6 models with different nonrecursive specification schemes 
with restrictions partly based on informational assumptions suggested by Kim 
(1999) but some models will include in addition behavioural assumptions. All the 
models are just identified except model 4, which has one more restriction than 
necessary for identification. Model 6 is the one that more closely resembles Kim's 
(1999) basic specification, with the only difference being the inclusion of stock 
prices in the model. 
The models used for identification are the following: 
Model 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 Yt 
a2l 1 0 0 0 0 Pt 
a3l a32 I a34 0 0 mt 
0 0 a43 1 a45 0 IRt 
a5l a52 a53 a54 1 a56 STOCKt 
a6l a62 a63 a64 0 1 WEt 
Model 2 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
a2l 1 0 0 0 0 
a31 a32 I a34 0 0 
0 0 a43 1 0 a46 
a51 a52 a53 a54 I a56 
a61 a62 a63 a64 0 1 
Yt 
Pt 
mt 
llý 
STOCKt 
WEt 
= G° (L) 
= G°(L) 
Yt-i 
pt-I 
Mt-l 
IRt-, 
STOCKt-j 
WEt-I 
Yt- i 
Pt-l 
mt-I 
IRt-I 
STOCKt-i 
WEt-, 
ey 
ep 
ein 
CIR 
esp 
eWE 
e, y 
ep 
ein 
CIR 
P-sp 
CWE 
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Model 3 
1 0 0 0 0 0 Yt Yt-1 ey 
a2l 1 0 0 0 0 Pt Pt- I Cp 
a3l a32 I a34 0 0 Mt Mt-1 em G'(L) 
0 0 0 1 a45 a46 IRt IRt-I eIR 
a5l a52 a53 a54 I a56 STOCKt STOCKt-j esp 
a6l a62 a63 a64 0 1 WEt WEt-I CWE 
Model 4 
1 0 0 0 0 0 Yt Yt-1 ey 
a2l 1 0 0 0 0 Pt Pt- I Cp 
a3l a32 1 a34 0 0 A 
Go (L) 
Mt-I em 
0 0 0 1 a45 a46 IRt 11ý-i eIR 
0 0 a53 a54 I a56 STOCKt STOCKt-j C-sp 
a61 a62 a63 a64 0 1 WEt WEt-, CWE 
Model 5 
1 0 0 0 0 0 Yt Yt-1 ey 
a2l 1 0 0 0 0 Pt 
Pt- i r- p 
a3l a32 I a34 0 0 A 
Go (L) 
Mt-1 em 
0 0 a43 I a45 a46 11ýt IRt-I CIR 
a5l a52 a53 a54 1 0 STOCKt STOCKt-j esp 
a6l a62 a63 a64 0 1 WEt WEt-, C-WE 
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Model 6 
100000 
a2l 1 0 0 0 0 
a31 a32 I a34 0 0 
0 0 a43 1 0 a46 
a51 a52 a53 a54 1 0 
a61 a62 a63 a64 a65 I 
Yt 
Pt 
A 
IRt 
STOCKt 
WEt 
- G°(L) 
Yt- I 
Pt- I 
mt-I 
IRt-, 
STOCKt-j 
WEt-, 
ey 
ep 
ein 
eIR 
esp 
eWE 
All the models share common restrictions as to the behaviour of output, prices 
and monetary aggregates. It is assumed that the real side of the economy is sticky, 
with output reacting only with a lag to changes in prices or financial variables. 
Prices are also assumed to be sticky and react contemporaneously only to shocks 
to real output. The assumption that output and prices do not change contempora- 
neously in response to shocks to the other variables in the system can be justified 
by adjustment costs (see Sims and Zha, 1995). The third row of the system postu- 
lates a standard money demand function with nominal money balances depending 
on output, real income and the nominal interest rate. 
The fourth row is the monetary policy reaction function. In all the models zero 
restrictions are applied to the contemporaneous reaction of interest rates to shocks 
in real output and the price level. In the original formulation of Kim (1999) these 
restrictions are interpreted as implying that the central bank sets the interest rate 
(or money) after observing the current value of money (or interest rate) and the 
world export price. The fact that this contemporaneous reaction function does 
not include output or prices is due to the assumption that they are observed only 
with a delay, in contrast to money data. An additional question regards how to 
interpret the monetary reaction function in the models as it could be seen as either 
a money supply or an interest rate reaction function. While it is not possible to 
241 
distinguish between the two possibilities, during some periods covered in the sample 
and in some of the countries considered, monetary aggregates did play an important 
role in the formulation of monetary policy. However, the use of broad monetary 
aggregates in the VAR implies that the interpretation of such a function as a money 
supply where monetary aggregates are used as an instrument seems unwarranted. 
Therefore, it is argued that this equation represents a monetary policy reaction 
function where the monetary aggregate is used simply as an information variable 
to which the central bank may react to by changing interest rates. As in some 
cases this may not seem appropriate, as it is well known that monetary aggregates 
have in some countries and in some periods played only a small role in shaping 
monetary policy even as information variables (see chapter 2 of this thesis for the 
case of the US), models 3 and 4 impose the restriction that interest rates do not 
respond contemporaneously to monetary aggregates. 
As for the remaining variables in the reaction function, different approaches 
have been taken in the restrictions on real stock prices and on the world export 
prices. With the exception of model 1, the option was made to include world export 
prices in the contemporaneous reaction function of the central bank. The reason 
why the world export price is included is that it is expressed in domestic currency 
and therefore shocks to this variable should be readily observed in the same quarter. 
In addition, oil prices are an important component of this variable and information 
on these cost variables is available on a daily basis. In model 1 this option was not 
followed because such choice would lead to an underidentification of the shocks. 
As regards the restrictions on the contemporaneous reaction of monetary policy 
to shocks to real stock prices, in models 2 and 6 it was assumed that monetary 
policy does not react contemporaneously to stock prices by contrast with the other 
models. Although central banks may not normally react to stock prices, stock price 
developments may have information that may be useful for policy implementation. 
242 
For instance, large drops in stock prices have wealth effects that may matter for 
future output. Such losses may also lead to a deterioration of consumer confidence 
which is also likely to have real effects. In addition, if movements in stock prices 
reflect developments in other indicators that are available in a more timely manner 
than real output or prices, then information in stock prices may serve as an input 
for monetary policy and therefore may be related to interest rate movements in 
the short-run. 1n order to take this possibility into account, models 1,3,4 and 5 
relax the assumption that the interest rate does not react contemporaneously to 
stock prices. The fact that in models 1,3,4 and 5 the central bank is "allowed" 
to respond to real stock prices while at the same time not being expected to 
react contemporaneously to the price level can be justified by noting that over 
short periods changes in nominal stock prices are likely to dominate changes in 
consumer prices. Therefore, it appears appropriate to allow for this possibility in 
order to take into account that the central bank may react to nominal stock prices 
in the short-run. 
The remaining differences between the models are related to the assumptions 
regarding the inter-relationship between real stock prices and the world export 
price. Models 5 and 6 make the assumption that stock Prices do not react con- 
temporaneously to world export prices, even though information on this variable 
is considered to be available during the same quarter. Models I to 4 relax this 
assumption. On the other hand, world export prices in model 6 are expected to 
react to real stock prices contemporaneously, while this link may in practice be 
more feeble and delayed. Therefore, models I to 5 relax this assumption. 
4.6.3. Selection of lag length 
Each of the models presented in the previous section was specified and estimated 
for each of the G7 countries. The variables are included in levels in order to take 
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into account the possibility of cointegrating relations in the VARs. The VARS 
include a constant and a time trend. 
The first step in the empirical investigation is the choice of lag length. In 
order to do so, the VARs were first estimated in reduced form including between 
I and 6 lags for each variable, The approach followed in determining the most 
appropriate lag length was based on different criteria. First, common measures 
to assess lag length such as the Akaike criterion and the Schwartz criterion were 
computed. However, such measures did not provide a clear-cut indication to arrive 
at a definitive choice. In particular, the Schwartz criterion, with one exception, 
invariably led to the choice of a lag length of 1. However, when examining the 
residuals of the VAIRs, in most cases it was possible to reject the hypothesis that 
the residuals were not autocorrelated in many occasions, suggesting a too low lag- 
length. This outcome is probably linked to the tendency of the Schwartz criterion 
to underestimate the lag length in VAR models. Therefore, in the selection of the 
lag length an additional criterion was used. Namely, the residuals of the VARs were 
examined for vector error autocorrelation of order 5 and the criterion was to select 
the minimum number of lags for which the model does not show autocorrelation. 
The results are shown in table 4.5 and the details of the calculations in annex 
4-C. Based on these considerations, 4 lags were chosen for the models for the US, 
Japan and France, 3 lags for the UK and Germany, 2 lags for Italy and I lag for 
Canada. 
It should be noted that in some cases the presence of outliers in the data seems 
to lead to the finding of autocorrelation in the residuals. This is the case for Japan, 
the UK, France and Italy. In order to take these into account, the model for Japan 
includes an impulse dummy variable that equals I in the second quarter of 1980 and 
zero otherwise, while in the models for the UK, France and Italy a dummy variable 
is included in order to account for the 1987 stock market crash (this variable is 
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US Canada Japan UK Germany France Italy 
Akaike 6 lags I lag 6 lags I lag 1 lag 6 lags 2 lags 
Schwarz I lag I lag 2 lags I lag I lag I lag I lag 
Autocorrelation test* 4 lags I lag 4 lags 3 lags 3 lags 4 lags 2 lags 
* Minimum number of lags for which the model does not show evidence of vector autocorrelation 
at the 5% level. For the UK the result holds only at the 2% level while for Japan it only holds at 
a 4% significance level even though in this latter case the individual equations show no signs of 
autocorrelation at the 5% level. 
Table 4.5. Summary of lag selection tests 
equal to one in the last quarter of 1987 and zero otherwise). In addition, the 
models for Italy and the UK include an additional dummy variable for the third 
quarter of 1992, which coincided with the first exchange rate crisis of the European 
Monetary System (EMS), which led to the suspension of the participation of the 
Italian lira and the British pound in the EMS (see Kenen, 1995, chapter 7). 
4.6.4. Cointegration tests 
Given the choice of the specification in levels and the fact that the VARs include 
nonstationary variables, it appears advisable to test the residuals for stationarity. 
This is done by testing the VARs for cointegration using the Johanssen (1995) 
procedure. Failure to find cointegration would imply the nonstationarity of the 
reduced form residuals which in turn would create problems when deriving the 
structural shocks. In such case, a specification in first differences would be prefer- 
able. 
Table 4.6 shows the results. As can be seen in the table, in all of the countries 
it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that there is no cointegrating vector in 
the data. In fact, there is evidence that there are several cointegrating relations 
in the data. For the US, Japan, Canada and Germany there is evidence that 
there are three cointegrating vectors. For the UK and Italy, there is evidence of 
four cointegrating vectors while for France there is evidence of five cointegrating 
245 
lýrace test[p-value] 
rank <-- US UK ip CA 
0 147.4[0.00]** 192.23 [0.00]** 201.5[0.00] ** 286.9[0.00] ** 
1 97.9[0.01]** 130.81 [0.00]** 133.0[0.00] ** 134.7[0.00] ** 
2 65.2 [0.04] ** 83.534 [0.00]** 76.1[0.00]** 67.7[0.02]** 
3 38.4[0.13] 52.562 [0.00]** 33.8[0.30] 39.7[0.10] 
4 16.2[0.49] 24.526 [0.07] 18.6[0.31] 20.6[0.20] 
5 4.6[0.66] 6.8632 [0.37] 7.2[0.33] 8.3[0.22] 
rank<= DE FR IT 
0 207.3[0.00]** 164.3[0.00]** 195.8[0.00]** 
1 102.6[0.00]** 105.8[0.00]** 124.6[0.00]** 
2 68.6[0.02]** 64.1[0.05]* 72.0 [0.00] ** 
3 36.7[0.19] 44.7[0.03]** 36.6 [0.01]** 
4 14.8[0.59] 25.8 [0.05] 11.1[0.21] 
5 5.0[0.60] 10.7[0.10] 3.1[0.08] 
I able 4.6. Johansen cointegration tests 
vectors. These results support the specification of the VARS in levels instead of a 
specification in first differences. 
4.6.5. Impulse response functions 
Based on the estimated models (see annex 4.1) for details on the estimation), in 
the next step the impulse responses for each country are analysed to assess to what 
extent do the models satisfy the criteria outlined in section 4.6. The focuses only 
on those specifications found to work best in terms of such criteria. 
4.6.5.1. Results for the US. Starting with the US, the models for which the 
impulse responses best characterise a monetary policy shock are models 2,3 and 
5. These models imply different restrictions regarding the contemporaneous mon- 
etary policy reaction function. Model 2 assumes that the Federal Reserve does not 
adjust interest rates contemporaneously in response to stock market developments, 
but it adjusts them contemporaneously to developments in monetary aggregates. 
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By contrast, in model 3 the Fed funds rate is not assumed to react contemporane- 
ously to monetary developments but information from stock markets of the same 
quarter is taken into account in policy formulation. Model 5 assumes that the cen- 
tral bank takes contemporaneous information from stock markets and monetary 
developments into account when setting interest rates, and in this sense is more 
general than the other two models. 
The estimated impulse responses for real output and prices to a contractionary 
monetary policy shock (i. e. a rise in the policy rate of the US Federal Reserve) and 
the response of the US price level to a positive shock to the monetary aggregate 
M2 are shown in chart 4.1 together with 10% confidence bands computed with 
a bootstrap procedure with 100 replications. As regards the impulse responses of 
output to a restrictive monetary policy shock, both models 3 and 5 produce impulse 
responses that are consistent with the expected response, i. e. output initially drops 
but in the longer run returns to baseline, i. e. monetary policy has no real effects 
in the long-run. In this regard, model 2 does not perform so satisfactorily. In fact, 
although the short-run reaction of real output is similar to that of the other two 
models, in the longer-term a restrictive monetary policy shock seems to have a 
positive effect on output, which is difficult to justify on theoretical grounds. 
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Figure 4.1. Selected impulse responses - United States 
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As regards the effect on consumer prices, all models suggest that in the very 
short-run a shock to the policy rate has no significant effects on the price level. 
At longer horizons, models 2 and 5 continue to point, in a statistical sense) to 
the absence of an effect of a shock to the policy rate on the price level given 
that, even though the impulse response function is negative, the confidence bands 
cross zero. As for model 3, there is a significant dampening effect on prices that 
starts operating after three quarters and lasts up to 13 quarters. Thus, although 
the model shows that in the longer run the effect of a restrictive monetary policy 
shock on prices fades away, an exogenous increase in the policy rate has a downward 
effect on prices which lasts for quite a protracted period of time. 
Finally, in all of the three models the impulse responses of prices to a shock to 
the broad monetary aggregate M2 show that while in the short-run prices do not 
react very much to money, in the long-run a shock to M2 leads to a permanent 
effect on the price level in the same direction of the shock. Such result is consistent 
with the widespread view that in the long-run inflation is a monetary phenome- 
non. Overall, taking all evidence together, model 3 seems to constitute the best 
performing model for the US as it produces the impulse response functions that 
more closely resemble the criteria outlined in section 4.6. 
4.6.5.2. Results for the UK. Chart 4.2 shows the impulse response functions 
of the best performing models for the UK (namely models 1,2, and 6). The main 
difference between models I and 2 is that in model I the short-term interest rate is 
assumed to react contemporaneously to shocks in stock prices but not in response 
to shocks in commodity prices, while in model 2 the reverse assumption is made. 
Model 6 is similar to model 2 in that the short-term interest rate is assumed not 
to react contemporaneously to stock prices but in model 6 stock prices are not 
allowed to react contemporaneously to commodity price shocks. 
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Figure 4.2. Selected impulse responses - UK Model 1 Model 2 Model 6 
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As can be seen in the chart, the impulse response functions of models I and, 
even more strikingly, of model 6 are imprecisely estimated. In fact, in model 6 all 
of the impulse responses are statistically insignificantly different from zero. In the 
case of model 1, output does not increase in response to a restrictive monetary 
policy shock, which is in line with the criteria. However, there is no evidence that 
the price level decreases in response to a restrictive monetary policy shock. In 
addition, this model has the undesirable feature that the price level declines in the 
longer-run in response to a positive shock to the broad monetary aggregate M4. 
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As regards model 2, the impulse response function for output is in line with the 
expected reaction to a restrictive monetary policy shock. Namely, contractionary 
monetary policy shock dampens output temporarily but has no real effects in the 
longer-run. In addition, the price level now increases in response to a positive 
shock to the monetary aggregate, even though the effect is only temporary. As 
for the responses of prices, the estimated response pattern is consistent with a 
price puzzle, with prices rising in response to a positive shock to the short-term 
interest rate. However, this effect is not statistically significant. Furthermore, in 
the longer-term the price level indeed declines as required. Therefore, model 2, 
although with some reservations regarding the response of prices, seems to broadly 
meet the requirements. 
4.6.5.3. Results for Japan. Turning now to Japan, chart 4.3 shows the impulse 
response functions of the two best performing models, namely models 2 and 4. The 
main difference between these two models is that, by contrast to model 2, in model 
4 stock prices do not react contemporaneously to shocks to output or prices while 
interest rates react contemporaneously to shocks in stock prices. As can be seen in 
the chart, both model 2 and 4 meet the requirement that output does not increase 
as a result of a restrictive monetary policy shock. However, the price level only 
shows a significant decline in response to a restrictive monetary policy shock in 
model 4, while in model 2 it is always statistically insignificantly different from zero. 
As regards the response of prices to a shock to the monetary aggregate, in the two 
models there is a temporary increase in the price level after some quarters which 
is in line with the criteria. Overall, model 4 appears to be the most appropriate 
one for Japan. 
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Figure 4.3. Selected impulse responses - Japan Model 2 Model 4 
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Figure 4.4. Selected impulse responses - Canada 
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4.6.5.4. Results for Canada. As regards Canada, the best performing models 
correspond to the specifications 1,2 and 6. As shown in chart 4.4 the models fulfill 
all the required criteria for the identification of a monetary policy shock. Namely, 
real GDP does not increase in response to an upward shock to the short-term rate 
and the price level declines. In addition, the price level increases temporarily in 
response to an expansionary shock to the monetary aggregate. Given the difficulty 
in discriminating between all these models, model 6 is chosen for Canada as the 
most representative one. It is also the only model where a restrictive monetary 
policy shock has a significant negative effect on real output in the short-run. 
4.6.5.5. Results for Germany, Italy and FYance. As for the remaining coun- 
tries, chart 4.5 shows the results for Germany, where only model 6 performs in a 
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satisfactory way. The impulse responses of output to a restrictive monetary policy 
shock are not significantly different from zero and the reaction of prices is nega- 
tive only in the short-run. By contrast, the response of prices to an expansionary 
shock to the monetary aggregate M3 is positive and significant in the longer-term, 
as expected. As for Italy, only model 5 performs well, with a temporary drop in 
output and a decline in the price index in the longer run. As regards the response 
of prices to money, it is significant and positive, though temporary. As regards 
Rance, both models 4 and 5 broadly meet the requirements (see chart 4.6). The 
main difference between these models is that, by contrast with model 5, in model 
4 stock prices are assumed not to react contemporaneously to shocks to output 
and prices. Looking more closely at the impulse responses it can be seen that 
only model 4 shows a significant decline in the price level in response to a con- 
tractionary monetary policy shock. Therefore this model is chosen as the best to 
identify monetary policy shocks for this country. 
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Figure 4.5. Selected impulse responses - Germany (model 6) and Italy (model 5) 
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Figure 4.6. Selected impulse responses - France Model 4 Model 5 
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4.6.6. Effects of a shock to monetary policy on real stock prices 
Given the selected specifications in the previous section, the next question is what 
happens to real stock prices when there is an exogenous shock to the central bank 
rate. This is shown in charts 4.7 and 4.8. It should be noted that the impulse 
responses correspond to the reaction of the level of real stock prices in response 
to a one-standard deviation shock to the policy rate. The size of this shock varies 
from country to country. The size of a typical monetary policy shock (i. e. a one 
standard deviation increase in the short-term interest rate) is greatest in the UK, 
with a typical shock amounting to 113 basis points. The typical size of the shock 
in Canada is 67 basis points while in the US it amounts to 34 basis points. The 
standard error of the monetary policy shocks identified for Germany, France and 
Italy amounts to 11 basis points while for Japan it is only slightly higher at 12 
basis points. 
Chart 4.7 shows that in the case of the US, Canada and Japan, a contractionary 
shock to monetary policy has a negative effect on the level of real stock prices. In 
Japan, the negative effect seems to be quite protracted, being statistically negative 
up to 5 years. By contrast, the negative effect in Japan and the US seems to be 
only temporary. In the US model, the negative effect is only statistically significant 
four years after the initial shock. In the case of Canada, the effect is statistically 
found to be negative between 3 and 5 quarters after the initial shock. As for the 
UK, a contractionary monetary policy shock is found not to have a statistically 
significant effect on the real stock prices. 
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Figure 4.7. Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation positive 
shock to the short-term interest rate 
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Figure 4.8. Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation positive 
shock to the short-term interest rate 
Turning now to the remaining countries, the impulse responses obtained (see 
Figure 4.8) suggest that the only country where a positive shock to the short-term 
interest rate has a significant effect on real stock prices is in France, where there 
is a temporary decline in the level of real stock prices between 7 and 13 quarters 
after the monetary policy shock. 
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4.6.7. Effects of shocks to the price level on real stock prices 
Charts 4.9 and 4.10 show the effect of a one standard error positive shock to the 
price level on real stock prices. Following the discussion of section 4.2.2, if stocks 
provide a good hedge against inflation then positive shocks to prices should not 
lead to declines in real stock prices. The results present mixed indications in this 
respect. For the US and France, a positive shock to the price level seems to lead to 
a decline in real stock prices that can last for about three years. Although in the 
long-term the level of real stock prices returns to baseline, the negative effect is 
quite protracted suggesting that stocks do not constitute a perfect hedge against 
inflation. The results for Canada and Japan, while less clear than in the previous 
cases, also seem to be unfavorable to the hypothesis that stocks are a good hedge 
against price level shocks. Although the result is statistically significant only at a 
10% level, it seems that in these countries a positive shock to prices ha's a negative 
permanent impact on real stock prices in these countries. Finally, the results for 
the other countries seem to broadly support the argument that stock prices are a 
good hedge against inflation, with the response of real stock prices to shocks in 
the price level being always statistically insignificant. 
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Figure 4.9. Impulse responses of real stock prices to a one standard 
deviation positive shock to the price level 
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Figure 4.10. Impulse responses of real stock prices to a one standard 
deviation positive shock to the price level - continued 
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4.6-8. Forecast error variance decomposition for real stock prices 
Given the results of the previous section, this section analyses the forecast error 
variance decomposition for real stock prices for the models assessed to be the best 
representations of a monetary policy shock for each country. Recalling the analysis 
of the previous section, these are model 2 for the UK, model 3 for the US, model 
4 for Japan and nance, model 5 for Italy and model 6 for Canada and Germany. 
The results of the forecast error variance decomposition are shown in Table 
4.7. In most countries the interest rate explains a relatively small proportion of 
the variability of real stock prices. In fact in all the countries exogenous shocks 
to real stock prices are the most important factor explaining the variability of real 
stock prices. By contrast, the contribution of the short-term interest rate does 
not account for more than 10% of the variability in any of the countries and is 
particularly low in Germany and in the UK. 
As regards the other variables, consumer prices seem to play an important role 
as a source of shocks to stock prices in the case of the US and, to a lesser extent, of 
France. In addition, shocks to money are relatively important in explaining stock 
price fluctuations in a number of countries (US, Canada, Germany and Italy), 
particularly at longer horizons. Finally, world export prices in domestic currency 
seem to play an important role in the cases of Germanyand the UK. 
These results reflect, of course, the particular structure and variables chosen for 
the identification of policy shocks. In the next section, the model is extended with 
two variables thought to be important for forecasting real stock prices, namely the 
dividend yield and the price earnings ratio. The analysis of these extended models 
allows testing the robustness of the results analysed here. 
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of real stock price error variance due to: 
Quarters Real output Prices Monetary Policy 
aggregate rate 
Real stock 
prices 
World export 
prices 
US, Model 3 
4 1.6 11.6 3.6 5.1 76.3 1.8 
8 1.9 17.8 7.6 3.2 66.1 3.4 
12 3.3 18.3 10.7 3.0 61.0 3.7 
16 7.1 16.2 13.2 3.6 56.1 3.7 
UK, Model 2 
4 9.4 1.1 4.4 2.8 65.4 16.9 
8 12.0 1.4 4.6 3.3 63.8 14.9 
12 12.5 1.3 4.4 3.3 64.1 14.4 
16 12.6 1.3 4.6 3.2 64.1 14.2 
Japan, Model 4 
4 1.8 0.1 5.4 6.3 81.9 4.5 
8 18.1 0.6 4.0 4.5 64.1 8.7 
12 30.6 1.5 4.3 4.1 52.3 7.3 
16 34.7 2.0 5.0 7.8 44.6 5.8 
Canada, Model 6 
4 13.6 0.3 8.7 5.1 71.5 0.8 
8 12.5 0.4 12.9 8.1 63.9 2.2 
12 11.9 0.7 14.2 9.4 61.0 2.9 
16 12.0 0.9 14.1 9.7 60.3 3.0 
Germany, Model 6 
4 10.3 1.6 0.6 1.1 82.0 4.5 
8 16.1 2.5 9.3 0.8 58.6 12.8 
12 21.1 1.9 16.7 0.8 41.0 18.4 
16 25.1 1.6 17.0 1.1 34.7 20.4 
Italy, Model 5 
4 5.3 3.9 10.1 10.1 68.0 2.6 
8 4.1 3.0 26.3 7.5 56.7 2.4 
12 3.8 2.8 31.4 7.0 52.5 2.5 
16 3.7 3.6 30.9 6.9 52.1 2.8 
France, Model 4 
4 0.7 4.8 0.2 1.4 85.1 7.8 
8 5.5 14.2 0.6 3.2 70.8 5.6 
12 18.6 14.5 2.3 9.8 49.7 5.1 
16 32.2 11.4 2.5 10.2 39.3 4.4 
Table 4.7. Forecast error variance decomposition: benchmark models 
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4.7. Monetary policy shocks and stock prices - the role of financial 
variables 
In this section, the previously used models are extended to include other vari- 
ables that have been found to be relevant for the valuation of stocks. The extra 
variables considered are the dividend yield and the price earnings ratio. The in- 
clusion of these variables is motivated by the findings of Patelis (1997) that even 
though monetary policy plays a role in explaining stock prices in the US, the contri- 
bution of financial variables, in particular of the dividend yield, is more important 
in predicting stock returns. Rom the review of section 4.2 in the literature, div- 
idends and earnings are frequently associated with economic activity. In fact, in 
some of the models reviewed, dividends are defined as a share of real GDP (see 
Bakshi and Chen, 1996). However, there may be reasons to argue that dividend 
yields may contain information beyond that provided by measures of economic 
activity. It should be noted that even if the dividend yield is a better measure to 
include in the VAR than real GDP for explaining real stock prices, it would still 
be useful to include real GDP in the VAR given that real GDP is an important 
variable for monetary policy purposes. 
As regards dividends, Patelis (1997) argues that one interpretation of the div- 
idend yield, which is defined as the ratio between the dividends paid per share 
and the prices of the share, can also be seen as an indicator of irrational bubbles 
in stock prices that may later burst. The reason is that a low dividend yield on 
a particular share may be a sign that the stock price is high in relation to the 
pay-off of the share, indicating a possible overvaluation or as a sign of a bubble. 
In addition, there is a long tradition in the finance literature that suggests that 
dividends and economic growth may not necessarily be correlated, at least in the 
shorter-run. This follows in the line of the famous study of Lintner (1965) who 
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found that corporations try to smooth dividends, avoiding large changes from year 
to year. In addition, Lintn, er found that firms attempt to target a longer-term pay- 
out ratio that would be sustainable in terms of their longer-term earnings. Such 
behaviour would lead dividend growth to become less correlated with the business 
cycle. 
A further theory is that of signalling (see Bhattacharyya, 1979). According to 
this explanation there is information asymmetry between the managers of the firm 
and the capital market. In order to make up for this market imperfections, firms 
would use dividends as signalling devices for providing private information to the 
market. 
A final role played by the dividend yield could be that of a rate of return 
on shares. A rise of the dividend yield relative to other assets could lead to a 
rebalancing of portfolios of private agents with a higher investment in shares. This 
would possibly lead to a higher price of the shares and reduce the yield advantage 
of these securities thus reestablishing the equilibrium. However, the possibility 
that firms may remunerate investors by other means (for instance by buying back 
shares) and the fact that the volatility of share prices can be significant (as shown 
in section 4.6.1) would seem to suggest a smaller role of the dividend yield as an 
indicator of the expected return on shares. 
Overall, the fact that the information provided by the dividend yield or the 
price-earnings ratio may not be proxied by the information contained on the other 
variables in the system, suggests their inclusion in the analysis. 
4.7.1. VAR models including the dividend yield and the price-earnings 
ratio 
In order to take into account the role of financial variables, in this section the 
structural VARs are extended with the dividend yield and the price earnings ratio. 
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The option followed is to include these variables in the VAR model in turn instead 
of including them both simultaneously in the VAR. 
The question now arises of how to impose restrictions to the matrices in order to 
keep the models identified. Here, some limitations arise by the need for keeping the 
previous specifications as much as possible unchanged. The option adopted was to 
assume that the dividend yield (or the price-earnings ratio) is the most endogenous 
variable in the system with the exception of real stock prices. In order for the 
model to be identified, it is assumed that the dividend yield is contemporaneously 
exogenous, to real stock prices but is contemporaneously endogenous to all the 
other variables in the system. The restrictions in terms of the benchmark models 
of section 4.6 are the following (substituting the other coefficients for 9): 
0 0 0 0 0 Yt 
0 0 0 0 Pt 
0 0 mt 
0 0 IRt 
a5l a52 a53 a54 0 a56 Divt/PEt 
STOCKt 
WEt 
= G'(L) 
Yt-i 
Pt-l 
Mt-l 
IRt-, 
Divt1PEt 
STOCKt-j 
WEt-, 
ey 
ep 
em 
CIR 
eDivIPE 
P-SP 
e-WE 
The corresponding forecast error variance decomposition is shown in table 4.8. 
As can be seen in the table, the dividend yield plays an important role in explaining 
fluctuations in real stock prices in all the countries. These results therefore confirm 
the previous findings by Patelis (1997) for the US and extend them to the other 
G7 countries. However, an interesting result is that at least in three cases (the 
US, the UK and France) the inclusion of the dividend yield leads to a significant 
rise in the part explained by monetary policy. It could thus be the case that the 
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of real stock price error variance due to: 
Quarters Real output Prices Monetary Policy Dividend 
aggregate rate yield 
Real stock 
prices 
World export 
prices 
US, Model 3 
4 1.0 8.2 3.0 26.6 513 83 13 
8 0.7 11.2 4.0 18.1 52.7 10.5 3.0 
12 0.7 10.2 5.0 15.0 56.7 9.0 3.4 
16 1.8 9.0 6.4 13.3 582 7.9 3.4 
UK, Model 2 
4 1.4 2.7 1.7 40.8 27.6 25.7 0.2 
8 0.8 1.4 7.0 23.9 18A 44.4 4.4 
12 0.8 0.9 9.0 16.0 12.9 51.5 8.9 
16 1.0 0.7 9.0 12.2 10.1 54.2 12.9 
Japan, Model 4 
4 4.3 0.6 5.7 0.2 3&9 44.6 7.7 
8 24.7 0.6 3.9 0.2 25.3 29.8 15.5 
12 35.3 1.2 4.5 0.2 21.4 25.7 11.7 
16 37.5 1.6 5.4 0.2 19.3 24.9 11.0 
Canada, Model 6 
4 11.7 0.5 2.6 3.4 64.2 14.4 3.2 
8 11.0 0.4 3.2 4.0 67.4 10.9 3.1 
12 10.6 0.5 3.2 4.0 67.3 11.2 3.2 
16 11.3 0.7 3.5 4.0 65.8 11.6 3.2 
Germany, Model 6 
4 9.9 0.4 0.8 1.1 55.9 27.4 4.4 
8 17.0 2.0 14.3 1.4 36.7 18.1 10.5 
12 22.4 1.9 22.4 1.0 25.5 12.2 14.6 
16 26.2 1.7 22.8 0.8 22.0 10.4 16.2 
Italy, Model 5 
4 4.7 5.2 13.7 1.4 28.3 44.3 2.5 
8 3.6 4.0 31.4 1.4 23.1 34.6 2.0 
12 3.3 3.7 35.5 1.5 21.2 32.7 2.1 
16 3.3 4.1 35.0 1.6 20.7 32.9 2.4 
France, Model 4 
4 03 1.8 3.7 28.7 27.2 37.3 1.0 
8 5ýO 10.0 4.5 21.9 30,8 25.4 2A 
12 15.7 13.4 5.2 17.6 22.9 18.4 6.9 
16 28.9 11.5 4.7 13.9 18.5 15.4 7.2 
Table 4.8. Forecast error variance decomposition: models with div- 
idend yield 
failure in the previous models to find an important role for monetary policy could 
be due to the omission of relevant financial variables such as the dividend yield. 
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The exercise is repeated using the price earnings ratio in place of the dividend 
yield. The results are shown in table 4.9. Overall, shocks to the price earnings 
ratio seem to play an important role in explaining stock price variability in most 
countries, particularly at shorter horizons. As regards the importance of monetary 
policy, the policy interest rate continues to show a relatively small contribution to 
the variance in real stock prices, by contrast with the results obtained with the 
dividend yield. The main exception is Canada, for which monetary policy shocks 
now appear to be quite important. 
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of real stock price error variance due to: 
Quarters Real output Prices Monetary Policy Price- Real stock World export 
aggregate rate earnings prices prices 
ratio 
US, Model 3 
4 1.5 9.6 3.3 5.5 18.5 60.3 1.2 
8 1.6 14.6 7.0 3.4 17.7 52.1 3.5 
12 2.7 12.7 14.2 3.1 12.5 50.8 4.0 
16 4.5 10.3 19.3 5.5 9.9 46.8 3.7 
UK, Model 2 
4 2.4 1.1 0.6 1.3 64.8 29.4 0.4 
8 1.9 5.0 1.0 1.7 59.3 29.0 2.2 
12 2.1 6.4 1.0 1.8 57.3 28.4 3.1 
16 2.5 6.8 1.1 1.8 56.5 27.9 3.3 
Japan, Model 4 
4 2.7 4.0 7.0 1.3 56.6 20.0 8.3 
8 15.4 2.4 4.5 0.9 46.3 13.0 17.5 
12 21.5 2.0 3.7 0.9 39.8 16.6 15.4 
16 20.6 1.6 3.7 1.2 33.2 25.8 13.9 
Canada, Model 6 
4 12.1 0.2 7.0 7.8 29.0 42.0 1.9 
8 11.3 0.2 9.6 12.5 27.1 37.8 1.5 
12 10.7 0.4 9.8 14.7 27.0 35.8 1.6 
16 10.8 0.5 9.8 14.9 27.0 35.4 1.7 
Germany, Model 6 
4 10.5 2.0 0.6 3.5 33.8 47.9 1.8 
8 15.3 2.5 11.0 2.8 24.8 34.6 9.0 
12 19.0 1.7 21.2 1.8 15.9 27.9 12.4 
16 23.0 1.4 22.4 1.8 11.8 26.1 13.6 
France, Model 4 
4 1.4 2.9 1.2 3.4 33.6 49.7 7.7 
8 6.1 10.8 3.2 3.2 34.4 37.0 5.4 
12 18.4 11.6 10.3 5.4 24.5 26.1 3.7 
16 29.6 9.0 12.5 4.5 18.3 23.2 2.8 
Table 4.9. Forecast error variance decomposition: models with PE ratio 
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4.8. The endogeneity of European monetary policy 
The functioning of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) implied that during a substantial period of the sample 
the monetary policy of some European countries has tended to be very much 
influenced or determined by the monetary policy of Germany, arguably the centre 
of the system. This is the issue of the endogeneity of European monetary policy. 
The fact that in France and Italy, monetary policy might have been to a large 
extent determined externally implies that the identification of the monetary policy 
shocks in these countries made in the previous section might not have been the 
most correct one. In order to control for the effect of the German interest rate, 
in the next step such rate is included in the benchmark VAR models of France 
and Italy as an exogenous variable. This is similar to the procedure followed by 
Clements, Kontolemis and Levy (2001). 
Table 4.10 shows the results obtained for the forecast error variance decompo- 
sition with the extended models. The results suggest that after taking the effect 
of the German rate into account, the importance of the policy rate for fluctuations 
in real stock prices has increased in both countries and particularly so in the case 
of France. By contrast, in the model including the dividend yield, the policy rate 
does not assume the importance it had exhibited in the model which excluded the 
German rate (see Table 4-8). The results for the contribution of monetary pol- 
icy for real stock price fluctuations in the model for Italy including the dividend 
yieldare broadly the same as before. Finally, the results obtained for France with 
the model including the price-earnings ratio are broadly the same as in the model 
without the German rate. 
Overall, the results of taking into account the endogeneity of the monetary 
policy of France and Italy do not seem to change the previous conclusions that 
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of real stock price error variance due to: 
Quarters Real 
output 
Prices Monetary 
aggregate 
Policy Dividend Price- 
rate yield earnings 
ratio 
Real 
stock 
prices 
World 
export 
prices 
France, Model 4 
4 0.4 2.7 2.0 5.7 84.7 4.5 
8 2.0 8.3 2.8 7.0 75.9 3.9 
12 6.6 8.3 8.2 12.4 60.1 4.4 
16 10.5 7.6 11.4 13.3 53.0 4.1 
France, Model 4 with dividend yield 
4 0.4 1.2 3.0 5.0 48.8 39.5 2.0 
8 2.4 6.8 4.7 4.9 49.4 29.5 2.3 
12 7.6 9.2 6.3 10.1 40.4 23.5 2.9 
16 13.1 8.3 7.3 11.7 36.0 20.7 2.8 
France, Model 4 with price-earn ings ratio 
4 1.2 2.7 3.5 5.5 0.8 85.4 0.9 
8 2.2 10.8 3.3 6.0 0.6 74.5 2.5 
12 5.2 10.4 9.0 7.3 1.0 61.7 5.3 
16 8.6 9.3 15.1 6.7 1.8 53.2 5.3 
Italy, Model 5 
4 6.4 2.1 21.6 11.8 56.9 1.2 
8 5.3 1.8 36.9 8.9 45.9 1.3 
12 5.3 2.7 37.4 9.6 43.7 1.3 
16 5.3 4.4 36.7 9.6 42.5 1.6 
Italy, Model 5 with dividend yield 
4 6.0 1.8 21.1 0.6 30.1 39.3 1.1 
8 5.1 1.5 38.5 0.7 23.7 29.5 1.1 
12 4.9 2.3 39.6 1.0 22.6 28.4 1.1 
16 4.8 3.7 38.8 1.0 22.1 28.3 1.3 
Table 4.10. Forecast error variance decomposition: models with the 
German rate 
the dividend yield appears to be a more important determinant of real stock price 
fluctuations in these countries than the monetary policy instrument. 
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4.9. Conclusions 
In this chapter, structural VAR models are estimated for the G7, using a non- 
recursive scheme to identify monetary policy shocks. In a first step, six different 
possibilities have been considered for imposing short-run restrictions in the models. 
The models used in this step include for each country the variables real GDP, the 
price level, a policy interest rate, a monetary aggregate, real stock prices and the 
world commodity price expressed in domestic currency. These benchmark models 
are estimated for the G7 countries and the suitability of the resulting impulse 
response functions in accounting for a monetary policy shock is assessed. The 
results show that different countries require different identification assumptions to 
arrive at impulse responses that can be interpreted as representing a monetary 
policy shock. In particular, for the US, Japan and France, the best performing 
models are those where the short-term interest rate is assumed not to react to 
the monetary aggregate contemporaneously but where the central bank takes into 
consideration information from real stock prices of the same quarter. For the UK, 
Germany and Canada, the best Performing models imply that the policy rate does 
not react contemporaneously to the real stock price, but reacts contemporaneously 
to the monetary aggregate. 
The impulse responses of the models for the US, Japan, France and Canada 
imply that positive shocks to consumer prices lead to decreases in real stock prices 
in these countries, at least in the short-run. Thus, for these cases inflation seems 
to be detrimental for real stock prices. 
The results of the forecast error variance decomposition for these basic models 
show that monetary policy plays a relatively small role in explaining fluctuations 
in real stock prices in G7 countries. 
273 
However, in these models financial variables usually used to forecast stock prices 
are not included. When the dividend yield and the price-earning ratio are included 
in the models, the results change somewhat. In the models with the dividend 
yield, monetary policy now becomes an important factor explaining real stock 
price fluctuations in the US, UK and France, being the second most important 
factor influencing real stock price fluctuations after the dividend yield. As for 
the results with price-earnings ratio, they show a significant increase in the part 
explained by monetary policy only in the case of Canada. 
Thus, using more appropriate information to model stock prices and monetary 
policy, the results of this chapter broadly confirm those of Patelis (1997) extending 
them to other countries. Namely, that financial variables commonly thought to be 
predictors of real stock prices, such as the dividend yield, play a more important 
role in explaining stock price fluctuations than the one played by monetary policy 
shocks. 
Despite the higher importance of financial variables, in a few cases (namely 
the US, the UK and France) the inclusion of the dividend yield led to a consid- 
erable increase in the importance of innovations to monetary policy in explaining 
fluctuations in stock returns. One possible explanation is that if such important 
variables are excluded, the models are not able to sufficiently explain stock price 
developments thereby resulting in a low contribution of monetary policy shocks for 
explaining the forecast error variance for real stock prices. This could explain the 
modest importance granted to monetary policy shocks as a source of stock price 
fluctuations found in previous studies that excluded such variables. 
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4. A. Definition of the variables used 
Abbreviations: 
IMF-IFS: International Monetary Fund - International Financial Statistics. 
OECD-MEI: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Main 
Economic Indicators. 
Monetary Aggregates, Stocks, seasonally adjusted 
Country Definition Source 
us M2 US Federal Reserve Board, 
press release H6. 
UK M4 Bank of England. 
Japan M2 plus certificates of deposit Bank of Japan. 
Canada MI+Quasi-money IMF-IFS. 
Germany M3 IMF-IFS. 
France Mi IMF-IFS. 
Italy M2 OECD - MEL 
1) - Iveal GDP, Seasonally Adjusted 
Country Definition Source 
All G7 countries GDP, constant prices, at 1995 prices. IMF-IFS. 
*Adjusted for the impact of German reunification. 
Consumer price indices (CPI), Seasonally Adjusted 
Country Definition Source 
UK GDP -deflator IMF- IFS. 
All other G7 countries CPI IMF- IFS. 
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Policy rate 
Country Definition Source 
us Federal Funds rate US Federal Reserve. 
UK Minimum overnight interbank rate IMF-IFS. 
Japan Call rate IMF-IFS. 
Canada Overnight money market rate IMF-IFS. 
Germany Call rate IMF-IFS. 
France Call rate IMF-IFS. 
Italy Medium-term government bond yield IMF-IFS. 
Stock price index 
Country Definition Source 
us S&P500 
UK FT_Actuaries 
Japan TSE - Tokyo SE Price Index (TOPIX) 
Canada S&P/TSX 300 
Germany DAX 
France Paris CAC General Index/CAC 40 Index 
Italy Milan MIB Historical General Index 
Global 
Financial 
Data 
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Dividend yield 
Country Definition Source 
us S&P 500 Weekly Dividend Yield 
UK UK FT-Actuaries Dividend Yield 
Japan Tokyo SE Dividend Yield 
Canada Toronto Stock Exchange Dividend Yield 
Germany Germany MSCI Dividend Yield 
France France Dividend Yield 
Italy Italy Dividend Yield 
Global 
Financial 
Data 
Price-Earnings Ratio 
Country Definition Source 
us S&P500 P/E ratio Global Financial Data 
TTX TTK FT- Artmaries Price-EarninLys Ratio Global Financial Data 
Japan Tokyo Stock Exchange Price/Earnings Ratio Datastream 
Canada Toronto Stock Exchange P/E Datastream 
Germany Germany MSCI P/E Ratio Global Financial Data 
France France Price/Earnings Ratio Datastream 
Italy Not available. 
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4. B. Unit root tests 
As mentioned in the main text, three types of unit root tests were used ADF 
3 tests, Phillips-Perron tests and the KPSS test of Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests 
The ADF tests were applied by estimating the equation: 
'Ayt =c+ (p - I)yt-I + ý, Ayt-l + ... + O, Ayt-p + ut 
where the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, HO: p=1, is tested against the 
alternative of stationarity (i. e. Hi: p< 1). The selection of the maximum lag 
length (p) to use was achieved by resorting to the minimisation of the modified 
Akaike criterion (see Ng and Perron, 2001). The test statistic is just the t ratio 
corresponding to the coefficient on yt-1. P-values are obtained from MacKinnon 
(1996). Tests for I(I) versus 1(0) are performed setting y in the above equation 
equal to the level of the series in question while tests for 1(2) versus I(I) are 
obtained by setting y equal to the first difference of the series in question. The 
tables below report the lag length, the test statistic and the associated MacKinnon 
(1996) one-sided p-values and indicate whether a trend has been used or not (t 
means a trend has been used, nt -a trend has not been used). 
All calculations for the unit root tests were performed using Eviews 4.1. 
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Lag Test 
Length Statistic 
Prob. 'Rend Lag 
Length 
Test 
Statistic 
Prob. 71ýend 
Price level Output 
us 3 -1.80 0.38 nt 1 -2.92 0.16 t UK 1 -3-13 0.03 nt 0 -1.80 0.70 t Japan 4 -2.84 0.06 nt 6 -2.89 0.05 nt Canada 4 -2.70 0.08 nt 1 -2.59 0.29 t Germany 4 -1-55 0.50 nt 1 -0-36 0.91 nt France 4 -1.92 0.32 nt 4 -2.97 0.15 t Italy 4 -2.59 0.10 t 1 -1.15 0.70 nt 
Monetary aggregate Interest rate 
us 5 -2.48 0.34 t 2 -1.51 0.52 nt 
UK 5 -2.09 0.25 nt 0 -2-51 0.12 nt 
Japan 5 -2.16 0.22 nt 1 -3-68 0.03 t 
Canada 1 -2.41 0.37 t 1 -2.58 0.29 t 
Germany 1 -2.21 0.48 t 6 -2.78 0.07 nt 
France 1 -4.50 0.00 nt 5 -1-15 0.69 nt 
Italy 4 -3.32 0.02 nt 1 -2.33 0.42 t 
Real stock prices Commodity prices 
us 0 -2-89 0.17 t 1 -2.48 0.12 nt 
UK 0 -4.48 0.00 t 5 -3.43 0.01 nt 
Japan 1 -3.43 0.01 nt 2 -2.54 0.31 t 
Canada 0 -3.29 0.07 t 3 -2.45 0.13 nt 
Germany 0 -1.45 0.84 t 1 -2.47 0.13 nt 
France 1 -2-91 0.16 t 6 -2.41 0.14 nt 
Italy 1 -2.70 0.24 t 5 -3.04 0.03 nt 
Dividend yield Price-earnings ratio 
us 6 -3-36 0.06 t 1 -3.33 0.07 t 
UK 0 -4.89 0.00 t 0 -3.09 0.11 t 
Japan 2 -2.15 0.23 nt 1 -3.10 0.11 t 
Canada 4 -4.08 0.01 t 1 -3.74 0.02 t 
Germany 0 -1.99 0.60 t 2 -2.74 0.23 t 
France 2 -2.78 0.21 t 2 -2.67 0.25 t 
Italy 0 -2.18 0.21 nt - - - 
Table 4.11. ADF tests of I(I) versus 1(0) 
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Lag Test 
Length Statistic 
Prob. 'Iýend Lag 
Length 
Test 
Statistic 
Prob. 1ýend 
Price level Output 
us 2 -2.21 0.20 nt 2 -5.07 0.00 nt UK 2 -3.54 0.04 t 3 -3.38 0.01 nt Japan 3 -3.92 0.01 t 0 -13.49 0.00 nt Canada 3 -2.94 0.15 t 1 -4.94 0.00 nt 
Germany 3 -2.29 0.18 nt 3 -4.00 0.00 nt 
France 3 -1.15 0.69 nt 2 -4.58 0.00 nt 
Italy 3 -2.99 0.14 t 1 -4.95 0.00 nt 
Monetary aggregate Interest rate 
us 6 -1-54 0.51 nt 3 -4.63 0.00 nt 
UK 5 -1.41 0.58 nt 0 -9.67 0.00 nt 
Japan 5 -1.52 0.52 nt 2 -4.74 0.00 nt 
Canada 2 -4-57 0.00 t 1 -6.38 0.00 nt 
Germany 2 0 '70 -3.1 z 0.01 nt 2 -4.65 0.00 nt 
France 6 -2-13 0.23 nt 2 -5.44 0.00 nt 
Italy 3 -3.32 0.07 t 3 -3.56 0.01 nt 
Real stock prices Commodity prices 
us 3 -4-63 0.00 nt 2 -4.17 0.00 nt 
UK 0 -9-67 0.00 nt 2 -4.44 0.00 nt 
Japan 2 -4-74 0.00 nt 2 -4.35 0.00 nt 
Canada 1 -6-38 0.00 nt 3 -4.08 0.00 nt 
Germany 2 -4-65 0.00 nt 2 -4.05 0.00 nt 
France 2 -5.44 0.00 nt 2 -3.80 0.00 nt 
Italy 3 -3-56 0.01 nt 2 -3.61 0.01 nt 
Dividend yield Price-earnings ratio 
us 0 -7.99 0.00 nt 1 -4.63 0.00 nt 
UK 0 -8.93 0.00 nt 2 -5.63 0.00 nt 
Japan 0 -8.31 0.00 nt 0 -6.41 0.00 nt 
Canada 0 -7.94 0.00 nt 1 -4.97 0.00 nt 
Germany 3 -4.33 0.00 nt 0 -9.26 
0.00 nt 
France 0 -7.96 0.00 nt 0 -8.91 
0.00 nt 
Italy 1 -6-07 0.00 nt - - 
Table 4.12. ADF tests of 1(2) versus l(I) 
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Phillips Perron tests 
Similar to the ADF tests, the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests have as null 
hypothesis that the series is a non-stationary variable versus the alternative that 
it is stationary. The difference between the two tests is that in the PP tests the 
way of controlling for serial correlation is done with a non-parametric approach. 
The tables below report the bandwidth used, the test statistic and the associated 
MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values and indicate whether a trend has been used 
or not (t means a trend has been used, nt -a trend has not been used) - 
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Band Test Prob. Trend Band 
width Statistic width 
Price level 
us 8 -4-83 0.00 UK 6 -4.58 0.00 
Japan 8 -10.00 0.00 Canada 7 -7-10 0.00 
Germany 4 -2-34 0.16 
Rance 6 -0-86 0.96 
Italy 5 -2-59 0.10 
Monetary aggregate 
us 7 -3-03 0.04 
UK 7 0.31 0.99 
Japan 7 -0-79 0.96 
Canada 4 -3.17 0.10 
Germany 5 -2.42 0.14 
France 5 -5.32 0.00 
Italy 2 -3-32 0.02 
Real stock prices 
us 3 -2.91 0.16 UK 3 -4-64 0.00 
Japan 4 -1.28 0.64 
Canada 0 -3-29 0.07 
Germany 3 -1-71 0.74 
France 5 -3.11 0.11 
Italy 5 -2-70 0.24 
Dividend yield 
us 0 
-3.40 0.06 
UK 2 -5.15 0.00 
Japan 1 -2.10 0.25 
Canada 5 -4-36 0.00 
Germany 4 -1.19 0.68 
France 5 -3.06 0.12 
Italy 3 -2.18 0.21 
nt 
t 
nt 
nt 
nt 
t 
t 
nt 
t 
t 
t 
nt 
nt 
nt 
t 
t 
nt 
t 
t 
nt 
t 
t 
t 
nt 
t 
, it 
t 
nt 
5 
7 
10 
5 
4 
4 
3 
2 
1 
4 
1 
6 
3 
1 
6 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
4 
3 
3 
3 
Test Prob 
Statistic 
Output 
-2.78 0.21 
0.37 0.98 
4.14 0.01 
0.75 0.83 
2.20 0.48 
0.71 0.84 
1.15 
- 
- 
0.70 
Interest rate 
-1.75 0.40 
-2.54 0.11 
-1-55 0.51 
-2.95 0.15 
-2.76 0.07 
-1-57 0.50 
-2.33 0.42 
Commodity prices 
-2.21 0.20 
-2.14 0.23 
-2.84 0.19 
-1.77 0.39 
-2.69 0.08 
-1.86 0.35 
-3.04 0.03 
Price-earnings ratio 
-3.08 0.12 
-3.57 0.04 
-1.94 0.31 
-2.34 0.16 
-3.47 0.05 
-4.96 0.00 
Trend 
t 
nt 
t 
nt 
t 
nt 
nt 
nt 
nt 
nt 
t 
nt 
nt 
t 
nt 
nt 
t 
nt 
nt 
nt 
nt 
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t 
nt 
nt 
t 
t 
Table 4.13. Phillips Perron tests of I(l) versus 1(0) 
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Band 
width 
Test 
Statistic 
Prob. 'Rend Band 
width 
Test 
Statistic 
Prob. 11ýend 
Price level Output 
us 7 -4.92 0.00 t 0 -7-19 0.00 nt 
UK 4 -5.68 0.00 t 7 -10.30 0.00 nt 
Japan 8 -10.74 0.00 t 11 -18.75 0.00 nt 
Canada 6 -5.79 0.00 t 2 -6-12 0.00 nt 
Germany 2 -7.07 0.00 t 4 -10.80 0.00 nt 
Rance 2 -4.44 0.00 t 4 -8.08 0.00 nt 
Italy 1 -5.58 0.00 t 3 -6.23 0.00 nt 
Monetary aggregate Interest rate 
us 1 -4.80 0.00 t 4 -8.64 0.00 nt 
UK 5 -6.99 0.00 t 3 -10.41 0.00 nt 
Japan 4 -3.73 0.02 t 0 -6.39 0.00 nt 
Canada 4 -7.50 0.00 t 1 -13.76 0.00 nt 
Germany 4 -6.83 0.00 nt 4 -7-50 0.00 nt 
France 3 -6.42 0.00 t 6 -7.41 0.00 nt 
Italy 2 -8.22 0.00 t 3 -4.88 0.00 nt 
Real stock prices Commodity prices 
us 2 -8.94 0.00 nt 5 -7.12 0.00 nt 
UK 1 -10.18 0.00 nt 5 -8.36 
0.00 nt 
Japan 2 -7.38 0.00 nt 4 -8.14 
0.00 nt 
Canada 7 -8.36 0.00 nt 6 -8-13 
0.00 nt 
Germany 2 -8-08 0.00 nt 2 -7-85 
0.00 nt 
France 1 -7.41 0.00 nt 3 -6.78 
0.00 nt 
Italy 1 -6.47 0.00 nt 3 -6.92 
0.00 nt 
Dividend yield Price-earnings ratio 
us 4 -7-89 0.00 nt 0 -5.65 
0.00 nt 
UK 23 -10.41 0.00 nt 4 -8-06 
0.00 nt 
Japan 1 -8-35 0.00 nt 2 -6-38 
0.00 nt 
Canada 16 -8-00 0.00 nt 2 -6.89 
0.00 nt 
Germany 4 -8-14 0.00 nt 7 -9-38 
0.00 nt 
France 3 -7-80 0.00 nt 9 -9-31 
0.00 nt 
Italy 0 -7-86 0.00 nt - - - 
Table 4.14. Phillips-Perron tests of 1(2) versus I(l) 
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KPSS tests 
The KPSS tests differ from ADF and PP kind of tests in that they test the 
null hypothesis that the series is stationary. These tests are based on the residuals 
of the following OLS regression(for the case of tests with trend): 
yt -c+ -yt + Ut 
The test is then based on the LM statistic: 
LM =S 
(t) 
(4.13) Y--d 
(T2 f0 
t 
where S(t) is a cumulative residual function 
t 
S(t) J: ft, 
r=l 
and fo is the estimator of the residual spectrum at frequency zero. The method 
used to select the bandwith is based on the kernel sum of covariances estimation 
using a Bartlett function. The tables below report the bandwidth selected, the test 
statistic and the corresponding 5% critical value (5% c. v. ). It is also indicated 
whether a trend has been used or not (t means a trend has been used, nt -a trend 
has not been used). 
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Band Test 
width Statistic 
5% Týend Band 
C. V. width 
Price level 
us 9 0.279 0.146 
UK 9 0.287 0.146 
Japan 8 0.298 0.146 
Canada 9 0.305 0.146 
Germany 8 0.217 0.146 
Rance 8 0.307 0.146 
Italy 8 0.307 0.146 
Monetary aggregate 
us 9 0.291 0.146 
UK 9 0.291 0.146 
Japan 9 0.300 0.146 
Canada 9 0.208 0.146 
Germany 8 0.200 0.146 
France 8 0.306 0.146 
Italy 7 0.325 0.146 
Real stock prices 
us 9 0.237 0.146 
UK 8 0.078 0.146 
Japan 9 0.226 0.146 
Canada 8 0.156 0.146 
Germany 8 0.143 0.146 
France 8 0.129 0.146 
Italy 7 0.116 0.146 
Dividend yield 
us 8 0.180 0.146 
UK 6 0.098 0.146 
Japan 9 0.279 0.146 
Canada 6 0.094 0.146 
Germany 8 0.106 0.146 
France 8 0.098 0.146 
Italy 7 0.065 0.146 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
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8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
7 
7 
7 
Test 5% 
Statistic c. v. 
Output 
0.056 0.146 
0.121 0.146 
0.266 0.146 
0.115 0.146 
0.109 0.146 
0.087 0.146 
0.197 0.146 
Interest rate 
0.107 0.146 
0.274 0.463 
0.070 0.146 
0.145 0.146 
0.103 0.463 
0.147 0.146 
0.169 0.146 
Commodity prices 
0.096 0.146 
0.178 0.146 
0.092 0.146 
0.112 0.146 
0.117 0.146 
0.209 0.146 
0.186 0.146 
Price-earnings ratio 
0.127 0.146 
0.074 0.146 
0.109 0.146 
0.049 0.146 
0.066 0.146 
0.153 0.146 
Trend 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
nt 
t 
t 
nt 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
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Table 4.15. KPSS tests of 1(0) versus I(I) 
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Band 
width 
Test 
Statistic 
5% Trend 
c. v. 
Band 
width 
Test 
Statistic 
5% 
c. v. 
Trend 
Price level Output 
us 8 0.082 0.146 t 4 0.046 0.463 nt 
UK 7 0.194 0.463 nt 7 0.102 0.463 nt 
Japan 8 0.207 0.146 t 12 0.510 0.463 nt 
Canada 7 0.091 0.146 t 5 0.083 0.463 nt 
Germany 4 0.118 0.146 t 3 0.095 0.463 nt 
Rance 6 0.117 0.146 t 5 0.074 0.463 nt 
Italy 5 0.114 0.146 t 4 0.049 0.463 nt 
Monetary aggregate Interest rate 
us 7 0.196 0.146 t 0 0.068 0.463 nt 
UK 7 0.141 0.146 t 3 0.222 0.463 nt 
Japan 7 0.069 0.146 t 4 0.031 0.463 nt 
Canada 5 0.154 0.146 t 7 0.131 0.463 nt 
Germany 5 0.077 0.146 t 6 0.085 0.463 nt 
France 5 0.154 0.146 t 5 0.079 0.463 nt 
Italy 3 0.131 0.146 t 0 0.426 0.146 t 
Real stock prices Commodity prices 
us 2 0.310 0.463 nt 6 0.085 0.463 nt 
UK 11 0.142 0.463 nt 5 0.097 0.463 nt 
Japan 4 0.237 0.463 nt 5 0.035 0.463 nt 
Canada 3 0.117 0.463 nt 6 0.089 0.463 nt 
Germany 3 0.217 0.463 nt 4 0.044 0.463 nt 
France 3 0.272 0.463 nt 5 0.088 0.463 nt 
Italy 5 0.077 0.463 nt 5 0.133 0.463 nt 
Dividend yield Price-earnings ratio 
us 3 0.196 0.463 nt 4 0.135 0.463 nt 
UK 19 0.183 0.463 nt 1 0.054 0.463 nt 
Japan 4 0.041 0.146 t 3 0.092 0.463 nt 
Canada 10 0.148 0.463 nt 3 0.038 0.463 nt 
Germany 4 0.096 0.463 nt 7 0.044 0.463 nt 
France 3 0.098 0.463 nt 4 0.360 0.463 nt 
Italy 0 0.085 0.463 nt - - 
Table 4.16. KPSS tests of I(I) versus 1(2) 
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4-C. Results of the lag selection tests 
This annex presents the results of the lag selection tests for the several models. 
The table below summarises the results of the lag selection tests, namely of the 
Akaike, Schwartz criterion and the autocorrelation test. 
Information criteria 
Akaike criterion 
Lags US UK Japan Canada Germany France Italy 
1 -25.8 -22.3 -22.3 -23.5 -24.9 -23.9 -22.0 
2 -26.4 -22.1 -23.6 -23.4 -24.8 -24.3 -22.3 
3 -26.3 -22.1 -23.6 -23.2 -24.9 -24.0 -22.2 
4 -26.4 -22.1 -24.6 -23.1 -24.6 -24.0 -22.1 
5 -26.1 -22.1 -24.5 -22.9 -24.7 -24.1 -22.1 
6 -26.4 -22.2 -24.9 -22.7 -24.6 -24.3 -22.3 
Schwartz criter ion 
Lags US UK Japan Canada Germany France Italy 
1 -24.8 -21.2 -21-3 -22.4 -23.8 -22.8 -20.8 
2 -24.5 -20.2 -21.6 -21.4 -22.7 -22.2 -20.2 
3 -23.5 -19.2 -20.7 -20.2 -21.8 -21.0 -19.1 
4 -22.6 -18.3 -20.8 -19.3 -20.5 -20.0 -17.9 
5 -21.4 -17.4 -19.8 -18.1 -19.7 -19.1 -17.0 
6 -20.9 -16.6 -19.3 -17.0 -18.6 -18.3 -16.2 
Tests for fifth order autocorrelation 
Country Number Test Test P-Value 
of I ags form Statistic 
US 4 F(180,267) 1.14 [0.17] 
UK 3 F(180,238) 1.31 [0.02] 
Japan 4 F(180,244) 1.27 [0.041 
Canada I F(180,356) 1.06 [0.33] 
Germany 3 F(180,238) 1.15 [0.15] 
France 4 F(180,197) 1.23 [0.081 
Italy 2 F(180,238) 1.14 [0.18] 
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4. D. Alternative identification schemes for identifying monetary policy 
shocks in VAR models 
In order to illustrate the different approaches, let the reduced form of the VAR 
model be the following: 4 
Yt - C(L)Yt-, + ut (4.15) 
where Yt is the vector of endogenous variables, C(L) is a matrix polynomial in 
the lag operator (L) and C (L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L. The 
standard hypotheses hold for the residuals, namely that they are assumed to be 
normally distributed around a zero mean: 
E(ut) =0 (4.16) 
E utu 
E when ts (4.17) 
S) 0 when ts 
Condition (4.17) implies that there is no serial correlation among disturbances 
but, at the same time, contemporaneous correlation is allowed. In a standard 
VAR framework, simultaneous relationships are then condensed in the variance- 
covariance matrix E, making the economic interpretation of these relationships 
quite difficult. In fact, a shock at time t-s to the generic variable yj (i. e., a 
change in uj, t-, ) has a direct impact on another variable yj at time t, since yj, t-, 
enters directly the i-th equation, but it also has an indirect effect due to the fact 
that at any period a shock to uj propagates immediately to all other variables 
(disturbances), since E is non-diagonal. Thus in dynamic simulation exercises, the 
information contained in the variance-covariance matrix is somehow lost. 
4 Deterministic terms and exogenous variables are ommitted from this presentation for reasons of 
simplicity of exposition. Such exclusion does not imply any loss of generality. 
288 
A structural VAR for an economy can be represented by the following model: 
A(L)Yt - Bet (4.18) 
where A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, et is anx1 vector of 
structural disturbances, serially uncorrelated and with variance var(et)=A. The 
matrix A(L) can be decomposed into parameters that take part in contemporane- 
ous relations and parameters that apply to lagged terms: 
(L) = Ao + A'(L) (4.19) 
where AO is the matrix of contemporaneous coefficients and AO (L) is the matrix 
excluding the contemporaneous coefficients. Therefore: 
AoYt + AO(L)Yt-, = Bet 
or 
Yt = -Ao 'AO(L)Yt-I + Ao 
'Bet 
In turn, the matrix C(L) is related to these matrices in the following way: 
C(L) - -AO'A'(L) 
(4.20) 
(4,21) 
(4,22) 
and the vectors of the structural disturbances and the reduced-form residuals are 
related by the following expression: 
Bet = Aout (4.23) 
which implies the following relation between the variance-covariance matrices of 
the structural and reduced form residuals: 
Ao-'AAO' (4.24) 
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The Cholesky decomposition implies that the structural disturbances are orthog- 
onal. In order to transform the original reduced form VAR (4.15) into a model in 
which disturbances are orthogonal, Sims (1980) proposed to rely on the Cholesky 
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix. Since E is symmetric and posi- 
tive definite, there exists a unique lower-triangular matrix P such that E= PP'. 
Thus, using the vector moving average (VMA) representation of the reduced form 
for the VAR (4.15), one can write: 
00 
Yt = JI (L) P) (P-lut) (L) et E Tiet-i (4.25) 
i=O 
where 
IF (L) = fl (L) P= (I-C (L))-'P, et P-lut, qji = Hip, lIo = 1. (4.26) 
The identification implies making the matrix B equal to the identity matrix and 
matrix AO equal to P-'. This means that the structural disturbances coincide with 
the orthogonalised innovations. It is then possible to show that the new residuals 
et are orthogonal and have unit variance: 
E (etc') =E P-'utu'P-" P-'EP-" =- P-'PP'P-" = 1. (4.27) tt 
The study of the impact of an unexpected shock is much simpler in this new 
framework since the exact relation between a change in the j disturbance at time 
s and the value of yj at t becomes: 
ayi, t (11s), P, . (4.28) 
aej, t-s 
where (11, )' refers to the i-th row of rl, and Pi the j-th column of P. 
Thus it is possible to exactly analyze the impact and the propagation over time 
of a shock to any variable included in the model. In particular, this possibility 
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is of extreme importance for the monetary authority given the still incomplete 
knowledge about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy impulses. Within 
this framework it is easy not only to study how macro variables are affected by an 
unexpected change in the monetary policy stance but also to assess the effectiveness 
of monetary innovations over time. 
However, the Cholesky decomposition is not an atheoretical approach. The 
lower triangularity of P implies a recursive scheme among the variables (the Wold 
causal chain) that has clear economic implications. In order to obtain nonrecursive 
schemes, it is necessary to impose other types of restrictions on either matrix A or 
B, as described in the following section. 
4. D. O. 1. Identification based on short-run restrictions. Recalling the spec- 
ification of the VAR model in structural form: 
A (L) Yt - Bet (4.29) 
k 
(L) -- Ao + AiL' (4.30) 
where A and B are nxn non singular matrices. In model (4.29) the contempo- 
raneous relations are explained directly in the AO matrix and indirectly in the B 
matrix. Note that there are no assumptions on the diagonal elements of B, so that 
the structural disturbances might enter more that one equation. The structural 
model is linked to the reduced form model (4.15) by the following relations: 
C(L) = -Ao-'AO(L) (4.31) 
Aout = Bet (4.32) 
E= Ao-'AAO 1 (4.33) 
Given that E is a symmetric matrix, the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
reduced form model give rise to an insufficient number of parameter for the exact 
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recovering o the structural form. In fact, supposing a model lag-length of k, in 
the structural form there are 2n 2+ kn 2 free parameters belonging to A0, Ai and B, 
while from the estimates of Ci and E one gets only kn 2+n (n + 1) /2 values. The 
SVAR methodology suggests to impose restrictions only on the contemporaneous 
structural parameters so that reasonable economic structures might be derived. 
Thus the needed 2n 2-n (n + 1) /2 constraints are imposed on both AO and B, 
but not on Aj. That is why structure (4.32) is usually known as the AB model. 
Finally, note that also the Cholesky procedure is a specific case of the AB model. 
In particular, it belongs to the so-called K model, in which it is imposed AO - P-1 
lower triangular. 
This nonrecursive approach has been followed by Kim (1999) to identify mon- 
etary policy shocks in the G7 countries. Kim's approach is to set the matrix B 
equal to the identity matrix and then to impose further restrictions on the matrix 
of contemporaneous terms A0. The matrix E has nx (n+ 1) /2 parameters. Normal- 
ising the diagonal elements of the matrix AO to equal 1, it is necessary to impose 
additional nx (n-l)/2 restrictions on A0. While such restrictions always carry some 
arbitrariness, they can be justified on the basis of economic theory. 
4. D. O. 2. Identification with short-run and long-run restrictions. This ap- 
proach is followed by Blanchard and Quah (1989), and implies imposing restrictions 
on the cumulative impulse response function. This type of specification only works 
in VARs specified in terms of stationary variables. Writing the reduced form model 
in the Wold-moving average representation: 
Yt = ut + C(I)ut-I + 
C(2)Ut-2+ C(3)Ut-3 + 
--- 
(4.34) 
p 
Returning to the above structural model, let -A'(L) - A19L', and assume that 
AO is equal to the identity matrix and that there are no restrictions on matrix B. 
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Solving for the long-run effect of the structural shocks, one obtains: 
p 
EAi 
-11-lBet - D(O)et + D(I)et-, Yt OL)-'Bet + D(2)et-2 + --- (4.35) 
i=l 
and thus ut -D (0) et and D (j) -C (J) D (0) for j=1,2, ... Thus, the identification 
of the matrix D(O) is enough in order to recover the structural influences from 
the reduced form residuals. All that is necessary for identification is to impose 
enough restrictions on the matrix 11 of the long-run relations in order to identify 
the structural shocks. 
4. D. O. 3. Estimation of structural VAR models with short-run restric- 
tions. The selection of short-run restrictions as the method used to identify mon- 
etary policy shocks, implies an estimation procedure based on maximum likeli- 
hood, where the restrictions are applied to the residuals. More precisely, the 
log-likelihood being maximised is specified in the following way: 
Tf 
log JA12 - log JB 
12 T 1: (B-'ASA'B /-1 (4-36) 
22 
where S is the sample covariance matrix of residuals and A and B are the matrices 
as defined in section 4. D. O. I. The maximization method used is the one of Broy- 
den, Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno (BFGS). Further details on the estimation of 
structural VAR models can be found in Amisano and Giannini (1997). 
CHAPTER 5 
Overall conclusions 
This thesis provides a case for developing models incorporating features of both 
monetary economics and finance approaches. It does so by taking a broad view, 
covering a wide spectrum of financial market assets, from the money market to 
long-term bonds, equity, exchange rates and derivatives. 
In the first essay, regime-switching models of the short-term interest rate in- 
corporating macroeconomic factors are specified and estimated for Germany and 
the US. The main novelty of the approach is that transitions between the regimes 
are a function of a monetary policy rule. 
The thesis introduced monetary policy factors differently in each of the three 
methodologies proposed, namely the Markov Regime Switching (MRS) model, the 
Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model or the Smooth 'Ransition Autoregressive 
(STAR) model. 
The results for Germany and the US show some variation according to which 
of the three methodologies is chosen. However, there is evidence in all cases that 
the short rate followed different regimes during the periods studied. 
In the MRS approach the estimated models for both countries suggest that the 
short-term interest rate switched between a first state of low interest rates and 
low volatility and a second state of high interest rates and high volatility. This is 
in line with previous results found in the literature. However, in both countries, 
there is evidence that the short-rate is mean reverting in both regimes, and that the 
volatility of the short-rate is positively related to its level. By contrast, previous 
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studies usually conclude that mean reversion is a feature of the high interest rate 
regime only. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients on output and inflation (when statisti- 
cally significant) in the transition probability functions are in accordance to what 
could be expected from a central bank reaction function. 
An analysis of the historical evolution of the probability of the short-term 
interest rate being in each regime suggests that the estimated models are, to a large 
extent, capable of capturing shifts in monetary policy that are well documented in 
the literature. 
The MRS results for Germany suggest that switching probabilities in this coun- 
try are a function of the output gap in both regimes but not of inflation which does 
not seem to be an important determinant of the regime switches. Furthermore, the 
probability of the low (high) interest rate regime declines (rises) when the output 
gap increases, which is in line with a monetary policy rule. 
As regards the US, both the output gap and inflation appear to influence the 
probability of the interest rate remaining in the low interest rate regime. However, 
in the case of the transition probability of it being in the high interest rate regime 
only inflation appears to matter. These findings confirm those of Bansal and Zhou 
(2002) that the business cycle may be an important determinant of regime shifts, 
but in addition characterise this dependence more precisely: while in a low interest 
rate regime both output and inflation influence the transition probability in a 
Taylor rule fashion, the high interest rate regime appears to correspond to periods 
where the central bank is primarily concerned with inflation. This is in line with 
the suggestion of Ang and Bekaert ý(2002) that inflation plays an important role 
in explaining the smoothed probability of the US interest rate being in the high 
interest rate regime. 
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As regards the TAR models, the results again point to the existence of more 
than one regime in both countries with economic developments determining the 
process followed by the short rate. In both the models for Germany and the 
US, the short-rate is found to be mean-reverting in both regimes. However, the 
coefficient on the constant on the low interest rate regime is imprecisely estimated 
in both cases. Furthermore, the threshold value is estimated rather imprecisely, 
particularly in the case of the US. 
In the estimation of STAR models, satisfactory results were obtained only for 
Germany. For this country, there is evidence of mean reversion of the short rate 
in both regimes and, as in the MRS case, of the output gap (but not inflation) 
influencing the transition between the regimes with the expected sign. 
Overall, the analysis provides evidence that macroeconomic variables linked 
to monetary policy are important in the modeling of the short-term interest rate. 
This evidence is particularly strong in the case of the Markov Regime Switching 
model, which seems to produce the best results. 
By contrast with the first essay which focused on the specification of the sys- 
tematic effect of monetary policy on financial markets, the other two main essays 
of the thesis primarily deal with the effect of monetary policy "shocks" - 
The second essay studies monetary policy announcement effects using two ap- 
proaches. A first one uses simple binary dummy variables. A limitation of the bi- 
nary dummy approach is that the size of the monetary policy surprise is not taken 
into account. This is important as the endogeneity of financial market prices may 
mask the "true" effect of monetary policy, an issue that is discussed at length in 
the third essay. Thus a second approach uses monetary policy surprises obtained 
from futures data. 
The analysis of announcement effects in the second essay is based on GARCH 
models that are able to capture volatility persistence and clustering. In fact, the 
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results provide strong evidence of GARCH and calendar effects, suggesting that 
tests of announcement effects that disregard such features may lack power. 
The results reveal that US monetary policy announcements have significant 
effects on financial markets. The strength of the announcement effect varies across 
the assets considered, with the results suggesting that monetary policy announce- 
ments have a clearer influence on equity returns and bond yields than on the 
exchange rate. In addition, the results show that finding evidence of a monetary 
policy announcement effect on the mean return does not necessarily imply that an 
announcement effect on the variance exists. 
The study confirms the findings of other studies that it is important to distin- 
guish between announcements made at regularly scheduled meetings from those 
made at unscheduled meetings. 
As regards stocks, positive monetary surprises (i. e. when the prevailing Federal 
funds rate is higher than the one expected by the market) tend to decrease the 
mean daily return when they occur at unscheduled meetings, thereby appearing 
to be interpreted as "bad news" by market participants. This result is consistent 
with a leverage effect and the results of Bomfim (2003) who also finds evidence 
of leverage effects but using simple dummy variables not scaled by the size of 
the monetary policy surprise. In addition, the effect of monetary policy surprises 
on stock price volatility appears to be stronger at scheduled meetings when the 
Federal Reserve leaves rates unchanged. 
In the case of bond yields, the results seem to be in line with the expectations 
hypothesis of the term structure, with positive monetary policy surprises 
leading 
to higher bond yields. However, these effects appear to be significant only on 
days 
of scheduled meetings when the Fed does not change interest rates. 
In the case of 
bond yield volatility, there is some weak evidence that positive surprises 
increase 
volatility, while negative surprises decrease it. As for the exchange rate, with 
297 
few exceptions, the investigation provided little evidence that monetary policy 
announcements or surprises provoke significant reactions of this financial asset 
price. 
Despite the lack of clear evidence of announcement effects on the exchange rate, 
a multivariate approach followed in this thesis shows that including the exchange 
rate is important for controlling for cross-market spillover effects. The results of 
this multivariate model show that there are significant announcement effects on 
the volatility of stock prices on scheduled meeting days and on days when the Fed 
changes rates in-between meetings. Volatility rises on these days relative to other 
days and is positively correlated with the monetary policy surprises. In the case 
of bond yields, significant effects are only found in the case of scheduled meetings 
when the Fed changes interest rates. On these days, bond yield volatility is higher 
than average and a positive monetary policy surprise results in higher bond yield 
volatility. 
As for cross-country announcement effects, some evidence was found of spillover 
effects from US monetary policy announcements to financial markets in Germany, 
particularly in the case of bond yields. 
The existence of monetary policy announcement effects on stock price volatility 
was further tested by using implied volatility measures derived from options of the 
S&P 100, which, given their forward-looking nature and their higher leverage may 
be more revealing as regards announcement effects of monetary policy. The results 
obtained with models using binary variables are consistent with those found for the 
S&P500 using GARCH models, in that they suggest that the stock return volatility 
is significantly higher on the days when the Fed changes interest rates in-between 
meetings than on other days. However, when taking the surprise components 
into account, there is no longer clear evidence of announcement effects, with only 
some weak evidence of positive monetary policy surprises on regularly meeting 
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days having an upward effect on the implied volatility measure. A somewhat 
puzzling result in this analysis is that expected interest rate changes seem to have 
a significant upward effect on the implied volatility measure. 
Finally, it was tested whether the Federal Reserve possessed an information 
advantage relative to the general public as regards inflation developments, using 
high frequency data on inflation expectations derived from index-linked bonds. The 
results suggest that positive monetary policy surprises arising from a rate change 
in-between meetings lead to lower inflation expectations. Therefore, contrary to 
the findings of Romer and Romer (2000), these results do not suggest that the 
market participants view a monetary policy surprise as an indication that the 
Federal Reserve has a privileged access to information. Instead, they suggest that 
the market focuses on the consequences of the unexpected monetary policy shock, 
interpreting a positive monetary policy surprise as a tightening that will lead to 
lower inflation in the future. Another interesting result is that a monetary policy 
surprise increases the uncertainty of inflation expectations, but only in the case 
of positive surprises. This suggests that when the Federal Reserve sets rates at 
a higher level than expected, more uncertainty is generated regarding the true 
inflation trends. When the Federal Reserve sets rates at a lower level than expected, 
markets seem to interpret such decision as suggesting that inflation is well under 
control. 
The final essay is complementary to the second one in that it aims to test 
whether monetary policy effects on stock prices are only limited to the very short- 
run or have a more lasting effect. The focus on a lower frequency and the need for 
having a sufficient number of observations demanded the expansion of the sample 
period and required a different methodology for identifying the monetary policy 
shocks. In this essay, this is done by using structural VAR models, estimated 
for the G7, using a non-recursive identification scheme. Given that the period 
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analysed is much longer than in the second essay on announcement effects, changes 
in consumer prices become relevant, so that the analysis now focuses on real stock 
prices instead of the nominal stock returns analysed in the second essay. 
In a first step, six different models were estimated corresponding to six possi- 
bilities for imposing short-run identification restrictions. The models include for 
each G7 country the variables real GDP, the price level, a policy interest rate, a 
monetary aggregate, real stock prices and the world commodity price expressed 
in domestic currency. The results show that different countries require different 
identification assumptions to arrive at impulse responses that can be interpreted 
as representing a monetary policy shock. In particular, for the US, Japan and 
Rance, the best performing models are those where the short-term interest rate 
is assumed not to react to the monetary aggregate contemporaneously but where 
the central bank takes into consideration information from real stock prices of the 
same quarter. For the UK, Germany and Canada, the best performing models im- 
ply that the policy rate does not react contemporaneously to the real stock price, 
but reacts contemporaneously to the monetary aggregate. 
The results of the forecast error variance decomposition for these benchmark 
models show that monetary policy plays a relatively small role in explaining fluctu- 
ations in real stock prices in G7 countries. This result is very much in line with the 
findings of the literature in this respect (see Patelis, 1997). Nevertheless, in these 
models, as in other reference studies, financial variables are not used to forecast 
stock prices. 
In a second step, the basic models are extended with two financial indicators, 
namely the dividend yield and the price-earnings ratio and the results change 
somewhat. The findings are particularly interesting for the US, the UK and France, 
for which monetary policy becomes an important factor explaining real stock price 
fluctuations in the extended model. These results raise the question of whether the 
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usual finding in the literature that monetary policy has only a small contribution 
to fluctuations in real stock prices is due to the models used not including sufficient 
information to explain stock price developments. In fact, the finding that in the 
models not extended with the dividend yield shocks to stock prices have a large 
contribution for explaining stock price fluctuations (a sign that the other variables 
in the system are explaining little of the variation of stock prices) could account 
for the low contribution of monetary policy to the residual stock price variance. As 
the inclusion of the dividend yield leads to a more appropriate model for explaining 
real stock prices, the contribution of monetary policy for stock price fluctuations 
now appears to be more important than before. Thus, a major conclusion of this 
study is that omitted variables could be the underlying reason why the role of 
monetary policy in explaining stock price fluctuations is usually found to be small. 
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